NATO
Towards the Challenges of Contemporary World

2013

Edited by
Robert Czulda
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NATO

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Department of Theory of Foreign and Security Policy, University of Lodz

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The oldest research unit of the Faculty of International and Political Studies (Wydział Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych) at the University of Lodz (Uniwersytet Łódzki). It was founded by Professor Waldemar Michowicz, who initially founded the Institute of International Studies (1994), which was later converted into the WSMiP (2000). The department conducted a project financed by the Committee for Scientific Research (Komitet Badań Naukowych) entitled “The History of Polish Diplomacy” (“Historia dyplomacji polskiej”), which resulted in a six-volume work of the same title. Currently, the department has three main research themes: theoretical, political, military and non-military aspects of wars and armed conflicts in the twentieth and 21st century; the theory and practice of foreign policy; and international security.

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**Foreword**

“In a world where strategic surprise is the rule, NATO must be prepared for all contingencies. No two operations are alike (...) To be effective, NATO must remain capable of dealing with multiple tasks and multiple crises, ranging from conflict prevention to cyber-defense”.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2013)

We hereby pass this publication into the hands of our Dear Readers. It represents the result of the collective effort of more than twenty academics and its subject matter involves issues concerning NATO’s activities in the 21st century. Although the basic reason for the establishment of the transatlantic alliance in 1949, namely, the threat from the Soviet Union, has disappeared, nobody in the contemporary world seriously talks of the dissolution of NATO. There has been no agreement on attempting such a thing and nor should there be. Despite its faults and problems, NATO constitutes a value in of itself.

NATO found a new goal in the 1990s, when decision-makers bravely and not without doubts decided to (successfully) undertake military interventions during the war in the Balkans. These relatively successful operations outside NATO borders, including *Deny Flight* and *Deliberate Force*, meant that the Alliance started to perceive itself not as a form of collective defence, but rather as a key international player with the right - or even obligation - to intervene regardless of the location of a threat. Going beyond the framework of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty required courage, but it was a necessary action since it enabled NATO to be itself again in a new international situation, to redefine its aims. By leaving its borders, set by the Washington Treaty of 1949, NATO found a new sense of purpose. Thus, if NATO wants to play a correspondingly important role in the years to come, it must show courage and a visionary ability once again, equal to that demonstrated by Secretary General of NATO Manfred Wörner (1988 - 1994) or U.S. politician Richard Lugar, who used the famous phrase “out of area or out of business”.

The constant evolution of the structure of international security has required and still requires NATO to adapt its methods of operation within the Alliance and the methods of co-operation with the wider international community. Contemporary security issues involve a vast number of complex and evolving threats and challenges, such as international terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed states, smouldering conflicts, organized crime, cyber threats, the degradation of the natural environment and the related threat to security, competition for energy resources (including water), natural disasters, and many others. Unlike in the previous era, it is obvious that the effect of contemporary challenges does not impact
all member states in the same way. Asymmetric threats may arouse a common concern, but they do not need to be automatically treated as an armed attack against the whole Alliance. In contrast to the situation during the Cold War period, modern challenges may not necessarily be deemed as being of sufficient significance to trigger such a reaction. This includes, for example, cyber attacks or energy blackmail (the threat of gas and oil supplies being cut off as a method of applying political pressure). Consequently, NATO members must redefine how they express solidarity within the Alliance, which has currently suffered from weakness or even erosion, taking into account the weakening of the American - European partnership. However, at the same time, NATO must be committed to responding to traditional Article 5 threats, such as conventional warfare.

A wide range of contemporary challenges and threats, and their volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity make it necessary to develop a new, flexible and integrated holistic approach. The modern world requires NATO to build institutional partnerships with a range of actors. This applies not only to the other major international organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union, but also to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as the private sector, for example the energy and IT sectors. All these players must become partners in the attempt to cope with multi-dimensional security-related problems. Given the vast differences in their goals, mandates, methods and philosophy of action, building trusting and effective relationships between them will be an arduous process. Nevertheless, as the biggest political and military organization in the world, NATO cannot avoid contemporary challenges if it does not want to “go out of business”.

Editors

Warsaw - Lodz 2013
INTRODUCTION
Anders Fogh Rasmussen  
(NATO)

Future of NATO – Secretary General’s Perspective

Striking a New Transatlantic Deal

For over sixty years, NATO has been our collective life insurance. The Washington Treaty’s key principle can be summed up as “all for one, and one for all.” Yet NATO is not just a military Alliance. The Washington Treaty also commits all Allies to strengthening their free institutions. Promoting conditions of stability and well-being. And encouraging economic collaboration. Like collective defence, these too are enduring commitments.

NATO was formed to defend our freedoms. Personal freedom. Political freedom. And economic freedom. These values are more powerful than any military might.

At the height of the Cold War, our nations struck a unique transatlantic deal. Protected by NATO, nations that had gone to war against each other forged closer cooperation, and laid the groundwork for the European Union. As communism collapsed, NATO and the European Union opened their doors to new members, spreading freedom across Central and Eastern Europe. Former foes became friends and Allies. That was the second transatlantic deal.

Now in this global century, Europe and North America face a new challenge: to protect our shared values across the globe, and shape the global agenda in line with those values. So now we need to strike a new transatlantic deal. To do more with each other, not less. To come closer, not drift apart. To turn outwards, not inwards.

So how can we make our community of values stronger, wider, deeper? My long-term vision is of a transatlantic common market. So I welcome the launch of talks on a transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. This will stimulate jobs, innovation, growth. And in a world where not all play by the same rules, it will ensure that we continue to set global standards.

But my vision goes beyond trade deals. It’s about people, science, culture. Coming to America strengthened my personal bonds with families, colleagues and institutions across this great country. Coming to America as high school students, my two daughters made life-long friends. Coming to America as a college student changed my son’s life. He’s actually married to an American and settled here in the States. And my wife and I are proud to be grandparents to Danish and American children. That’s why strong exchange programmes are the best way to keep us connected.
North America and Europe must also continue to work with the wider world. As NATO Secretary General, I have visited South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Because partners around the world want us to engage, and we must. We may be divided by geography, but we share the same values and face the same challenges: cyber attacks, terrorism, missile proliferation, piracy. And no country, and no continent, can deal with such challenges on its own.

Finally, we must deepen our security cooperation across the Atlantic. This is the foundation for everything we have. So we must continue to invest in NATO. And we must all shoulder a fair share of the burden, just as we all share in the benefits. Today, there is a growing imbalance in the security contributions made by America and Europe. European nations need to do more, and to do better. Because to remain America’s partner of choice, Europe’s choice must be to become the strong partner that America needs.

The transatlantic relationship is vital for the freedom, security and prosperity of Europe and North America. And it provides the bedrock of the rules-based global order. This vital partnership is about more than the single strand of security. It’s also about politics. Economics. And above all -- people. (…)

*Why Europe Needs to Step Up For Security*

(…) NATO’s creation was an investment in a stable and secure Europe. An investment not just by European nations but also by the United States and Canada. It has been a wise investment for us all. Thanks to NATO, we have enjoyed the longest period of peace and prosperity in our history. Our Alliance has successfully safeguarded the values that unite us as a transatlantic community: freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.

For the first four decades, we prevented the Cold War from getting hot. And for these past two decades, we have proved to be just as valuable for our security, but in a different way. We have opened our door for new members. We have engaged many other countries in partnership, dialogue and cooperation, including Russia. And alongside the European Union, we have expanded the zone of peace and stability in Europe. We have also demonstrated our determination, and our ability, to respond to crises and challenges. Both close to home, as in the Balkans and Libya. And at a strategic distance, as in Afghanistan. Norwegian forces have made -- and continue to make -- a vital contribution to these efforts.

We are building a NATO missile defence to protect against the growing threat posed by long-range missiles. We are also building up our defences against cyber attacks. And we are patrolling key maritime routes to counter piracy. Because in our increasingly connected world, any disruption to our transport, energy and
communication systems will be at great cost – not just to our economies, but also to our security.

An arc of crisis now stretches from the Sahel, across North Africa and the Middle East, and into Central Asia. And developments in North Korea are just the latest reminder that instability in one nation can affect regional and international stability. While these challenges are very different, they are all collective challenges. They affect all our nations. And they require a collective response. That is why defence matters. And why NATO matters.

But the security that NATO offers does not come for free. All Allies need to make the appropriate investment in defence. Because to deal effectively with the full range of security challenges, we need the full range of security capabilities. We need an Alliance that remains capable and credible. So we need forces that are flexible, modern and deployable.

At a time of economic austerity for many of our nations, some say we can’t afford the price of security. But I say we can’t afford the cost of insecurity. I am a former Prime Minister, and an economist by training. I know that defence cannot be divorced from economic reality. Governments simply have to balance their budgets. And that includes defence budgets.

But we must not forget that our freedom, our prosperity and our well-being rest on our security. And on our ability to provide the stability that is necessary for our economies to function and flourish. Our investment in NATO is a mutual investment, shared among all the Allies. It provides us all with a position of strength and influence. And it gives all of our nations – big or small – far greater security than they could ever achieve on their own.

But today, there is a serious imbalance in the investment made in our Alliance. The figures are stark. The United States now accounts for three quarters of NATO’s defence spending. This imbalance has serious operational and political consequences. A new generation of U.S. politicians and voters are asking why they should continue to “subsidise” Europe’s security, if European nations themselves seem unwilling to pay their share. If this trend continues, I am concerned it could undermine the support for NATO. And that could put the vital bond between Europe and North America at risk.

So how do we move forward? How can we continue to safeguard our freedom? And how do we preserve our ability to tackle risks and threats to our security, even at a time of austerity? I see three key priorities. The first priority is to hold the line on defence investment. There is a lower limit of how little we can spend on defence, while still being able to meet our responsibilities. That limit has been reached. We cannot afford to make any further cuts. And we must ensure that, as soon as our economies recover, we start to invest more in defence, and in NATO.
The second priority is to work more closely together. So that we use our resources more effectively. Let me give you two examples. The first concerns equipment. Many modern military capabilities are extremely expensive – and some nations cannot afford to buy them on their own. But by working together with other nations, they can share the costs and acquire the critical capabilities they need – and the Alliance needs. This is being “smart” with the way we invest in defence capabilities – and we call this approach “Smart Defence”.

The other example concerns our forces. Our Afghanistan, Balkans, and Libya operations have given our forces considerable experience of working together. This is a vital skill we need to keep. But our operational tempo is likely to reduce in the coming years, so we need to find another way to maintain this operational edge. And this is the purpose of our “Connected Forces Initiative”. By training and exercising more together – both with Allies and with partners – our forces will maintain their ability to operate together.

The third priority is to create a new, and better, balance in NATO. When we acted to protect the people of Libya from a murderous regime two years ago, European nations showed that they are willing to lead a NATO operation, and to provide the majority of capabilities. The Norwegian air force made a tremendous contribution to the success of that effort.

But Libya also confirmed what we have seen in Afghanistan. And what we saw again with the French-led operation in Mali earlier this year. That European nations continue to rely on the United States to provide certain high-end capabilities that are key to modern operations - long distance transport aircraft; air-to-air refueling aircraft; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. I am glad that European nations have now started to work together to address this imbalance – and to fill these critical gaps. I continue to encourage them to cooperate more – whether within NATO, or within the European Union, or within bilateral or regional groups (…).

More than six decades ago, we made a very wise investment. We invested in a security alliance between Europe and America that has served us extremely well. We now need to make sure that NATO continues to serve us as well in the future. And there is no alternative. We need to invest today – politically, militarily and financially – so that we can be prepared for whatever tomorrow may bring. Because we need hard capabilities to back up our diplomacy. To ensure that Europe retains credibility and influence. To sustain our continent’s role as a global actor. And to help keep the spirit of freedom alive.

This article is composed of two speeches delivered by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen: “Striking a new transatlantic deal” (May 1, 2013) and “Why Europe needs to step up for security” (May 8, 2013). Reprinted from www.nato.int with the knowledge and consent of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
Longin Pastusiak  
(Vistula University)

What kind of NATO?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was established 64 years ago, and despite the fact that it operates pursuant to the same, unchanged Washington Treaty of 4 April 1949, it has undergone numerous changes:

- The internal structures of the Alliance have changed;
- NATO defence doctrines have changed;
- The scope of NATO membership has changed;
- The geographical scope of activities of the Alliance has changed, not *de iure* but *de facto*;
- The balance of power within NATO, Euro-Atlantic relationships, relations between NATO and the European Union have changed.

In other words, NATO has shown flexibility and adjusted itself to the current requirements that ensure the security of its members. Hence the expectation that the North Atlantic Alliance will continue to change depending on emerging threats and on whether it will be possible to create a new, secure world order.

Thanks to the changes that began in Poland and covered a vast area from Gdańsk on the Baltic coast to Vladivostok upon the Pacific coast and the end of the Cold War, we can say that today we have a new Europe, a new world, but we still do not have a new world order. The previous orders in Europe were established as a result of the finished wars:

- The Thirty Years’ War gave way to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648);
- The Treaty of Vienna - after Napoleonic wars;
- The Treaty of Versailles - after World War I.
- The Yalta and Potsdam Accords - after World War II.

Since the Cold War was a specific type of total war, logically speaking, it might have been expected that a new world order would be established after it ended. The President of the United States, George H.W. Bush was a politician who spoke about the need to establish a new post-Cold War global order. Unfortunately, he never presented any specific proposals during his presidency (1989 - 1993).

NATO is the only regional security system in the world and, what is more, it is the one that covers the most stable region on the planet. The most unstable regions in the world, i.e. Asia, Africa, Latin America, do not have any such regional
security systems. Thus, instead of going beyond its own statutory Euro-Atlantic area, NATO countries should support the establishment of regional security structures where they do not exist. Here can be identified one of the important tasks of the Alliance. If it proves impossible to create a world-wide security system, let us use the so-called “an island approach”. This means the establishment of regional security systems, which will become components of a global security system in the future.

A currently fashionable view maintains that the United States and Europe are currently moving away from each other. Insofar as the feeling of insecurity during the Cold War was a strong bond of the Atlantic alliance, at present, not only political differences, but also cultural and civilisation dissimilarities are becoming more and more visible. A quite popular view in the United States is that Americans are brave, determined to defend their values, tough, tenacious, while Europeans are “cowards”, hesitant people, who prefer diplomacy instead of armed forces when solving international problems.

However, one must strongly emphasise everything that now unites Europeans and Americans and what will unite them in the future. First of all, the following should be mentioned: common values, respect for democracy, human rights, and the correlation between economic interests and security. The United States and Europe are the most important economic partners for each other. Some statistical data that shows the scale of the common economic interests of Europe and the United States are presented here.¹ Europe, including the European Union, is the most significant business partner of the United States. In 2010, the trade turnover between the United States and Europe totalled 667 billion USD, including 558 billion with the European Union; U.S. exports into Europe amounted to 285 billion USD, while imports totalled 381 billion USD. The trade deficit of the United States amounted to 96 billion USD.

Out of all U.S. foreign investments in 2010, amounting to a total of 3.9 trillion USD, 2.2 trillion USD went to Europe. Whereas, among all foreign investments in the United States, amounting to a total of 2.3 trillion USD, 1.7 trillion USD came from Europe. Every day, products, services and investments worth about 2 billion USD in total flow in both directions. The share of the European Union and the United States in the global trade in products amounts to 37 percent, and as far as service industries are concerned, it amounts to 45 percent.

As can be inferred even from the above figures, the United States and the European Union are mutually interdependent and share common interests. The links between these two regions are deeper and wider than that of any other two politi-

cal regions in the modern world. As far as the interdependence of business between Europe and the United States, if the field of defence is taken into account, then, generally speaking, it comes down to the fact that Europe cannot effectively defend itself without the assistance of the United States, while the latter would not be able to solve many conflicts in the modern world without assistance from Europe.

One of the problems that have arisen in recent years among the European NATO countries is doubts as to what extent the military presence of the United States in Europe is long-lasting. At the end of 1980s 300 thousand U.S. soldiers were still stationed in Europe. In 2004, there were 116 thousand of them, while in 2010 - less than 80 thousand. In the statements of some Polish politicians the anxiety related to the prospective military presence of the United States in Europe could also be sensed. For example, on 30 January 2011, when asked by Newsweek whether the long-term tendencies would make Americans withdraw from Europe, the former Minister of National Defence, Bogdan Klich, replied: “Americans have already done that. It is an ongoing process, but still the point is that American bridgeheads should stay”. ² In his interview for Newsweek of 13 March 2011, when asked whether the withdrawal of the United States from Europe poses a risk for Poland, the President Bronisław Komorowski answered: “Yes, it is a serious risk”.³

A similar view was expressed by the Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, in his speech in the Polish Parliament (Sejm) on 16 March 2011, who stated: “the alliance with the United States within NATO remains long-lasting. Our relations with the U.S. are friendly, but mature, taking into account our incommensurate capabilities. However, we harbour no illusions - American priorities are somewhere else: in the Middle East and - to a still greater degree in Asia. We don’t know whether America will always be able to help us”.⁴

Many politicians and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean are considering the question as to whether the United States will withdraw their military presence in Europe and how it will affect NATO effectiveness and credibility. Opinion is divided. Arguments are put forward that support further reduction of the military presence of the United States in Europe, as well as those that are raised saying that the Americans will not withdraw from Europe. Let us acquaint ourselves with both sides of this argumentation. Those who anticipate a gradual reduction of the

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² A. Stankiewicz, P. Śmiłowicz, Nie lękamy się Rosji (We Are Not Afraid of Russia), “Newsweek.pl”, 22/01/2011, [www.newsweek.pl].
³ W. Maziarski, A. Stankiewicz, P. Śmiłowicz, Kto musi, niech się mnie czępi (Who Has to, May Carp at Me), “Newsweek.pl”, 05/03/2011, [www.newsweek.pl].
⁴ Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Radosława Sikorskiego na temat polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2011 r. (Information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011), Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011.
military potential of the United States in Europe, draw attention to the increasingly important role of non-European regions in Washington policy and the view that is gaining strength in the American establishment says that potential sources of risk for the United States security can be found outside Europe (for example, in China). In the Americans’ opinion, Europe is currently not threatened and it does not need such strong US military presence, as it did during the Cold War period.

Americans accuse their NATO European allies of spending too little on defence. Reduction of US contingents in Europe may mobilise Europeans to undertake greater defence efforts. The United States suffer from a chronic budget deficit and they are forced to look for savings also in the costs of stationing their armed forces abroad. The American government states that a reduction of the number of soldiers stationed in Europe below the current level of 80 thousand will not affect the reduction of the allied obligations of the United States or lower feeling of security in Europe.

And what are the arguments for the fact that the United States are not withdrawing from Europe? There are more such arguments than those supporting a significant reduction of the military presence of the United States in Europe. First of all, all American governments emphasise the significant transatlantic ties and the stability of mutual security guarantees. Washington is aware of the interdependence of Europe and North America with regards to defence. Countries form both continents have diverse business interests, in terms of trade, finance, culture and science, not mentioning political ones, which they will protect and defend with the use of military obligations. The community of Euro-Atlantic values also requires the maintenance of defence capabilities at an adequate level on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Moreover, the program of the NATO ballistic missile defence system strengthens the military presence of the United States in Europe. The American government states that a smaller, but more modern and more mobile American army in Europe is more efficient. Since, relatively, the position of Europe and the United States in modern world is weakening and everything seems to indicate that this trend will continue, it is in the common interest of Euro-Atlantic countries to keep and strengthen mutual co-operation, also in terms of defence. Consequently, having considered the arguments for and against the reduction of the military presence of the United States, I am inclined to conclude that Americans will not withdraw their military forces from Europe in the near future. However, I do not exclude the possibility of further changes in terms of the quantity and structure of the US Army stationed on the European continent.

How should Poland behave towards the military presence of the United States in Europe? It is in our interest that American commitments towards the security of their European allies are credible. This credibility is strengthened by the American
armed forces stationing in Europe. There should be no contradictions between the relationship of Poland with the United States and those with the European Union. Taking into account the various American interests in Europe and their scale, as well as common values, Poland should treat the United States as a European superpower. Can Poland also contribute to the strategic transatlantic partnership?

NATO has been facing different political, military, and financial problems for some time now. The states that have their global interests, e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom or France strive after using the Alliance to defend their interests outside the statutory area. It is worth mentioning, however, that pursuant to the Washington Treaty of 4th April 1949, the Alliance is of a defensive nature and operates within the Euro-Atlantic area. It should not be the red-cap of the world or engage in solving military conflicts in various parts of the globe.

NATO appears to become more and more political and military debate club. This relates to internal, divergent views on many issues. A new military strategy of the United States announced by the President Barack Obama in January 2012 caused certain unrest among European allies and anxiety that the United States would reduce their military presence in Europe and seemed to turn towards Asia. Washington assures that reduction of the armed forces stationing in Europe in terms of numbers, from the current 80 thousand to even less than half will not put the security of Europe at risk at all. American troops will stay in Europe on a rotational basis. Moreover, joint military exercises will be organised more frequently, which will contribute to increased operational skills of the allied armed forces.

What can we infer from the above for the security of Poland and its position in NATO? First of all, we should represent the view saying that all countries belonging to NATO have an equal level of security ensured. Demanding specific security assurances from the United States, as some Polish politicians try to do, is groundless.

Tense NATO - Russia relations do not serve the interest of Poland. The main reason of those tense relations is the NATO concept of ballistic missile defence system. If the ballistic missile defence system is to be placed as soon as in 2018 in Poland and the United States ensure it will not be directed towards Russia, we should undertake more active actions to find such variants for the operation of this object which Russia will also be able to accept. Additionally, further expansion of NATO in Europe is in our interest. The situation, in which certain countries in Europe feel safe, while others do not, is unacceptable. Europe will be safe if all countries on our continent have allied guarantees.

There is one more issue that NATO countries, including Poland, should consider in the future. It is the issue of precise content of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In Article 5 it is stated that “if such an armed attack occurs (...) will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”. This means that each party is to assist each other if a situation occurs.

I draw your attention to the expression that obliges the countries to undertake “action as it deems necessary”. This expression somehow gives discretion as to what assistance to provide. In the Treaty of Brussels of 17 March 1948, out of which the Western European Union emerged, there also was an Article 5 (accidental coincidence of numbering), in which its signatories undertook not only to provide immediate assistance to a victim under attack, but to provide “maximum” assistance. Similar wording should be included in the treaty concerning NATO.

I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that we do not have regulations involving military co-operation between NATO and the European Union. The European Economic Community was established in 1957 as an economic structure. It gradually developed towards the economic and political structure, which was reflected in the change of its name into European Communities. At present, the European Union evolves towards economic, political, and military organisation. A military pillar of the European Union is established, which the United States once supported. Today Washington expresses its fears whether it will not weaken NATO cohesion and whether it will lead to decreased demand for the American military presence in Europe.

Negotiations between the European Union and the United States have been pending for several years. However, so far, their result is not extraordinary. The issue of military co-operation of both entities still requires some regulations in the interest of both the United States and the European Union. Having good relationships with the European Union and the United States, Poland could give its greater contribution to the improvement of the transatlantic relationships, including regulation of the co-operation in the scope of security between NATO and the military pillar of the European Union.
The Widening Gap – Europe is Still a Military Pygmy

Looking at contemporary Europe, it is hard to believe that once upon a time, the nations of this small continent were able to rule almost the whole world. Today, these same nations could not independently conduct a limited operation against a state from the Third World. The overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime wrongly improved the mood of European decision-makers and some commentators. The operation was sold to the public as an action by Europeans, proof of the growing aspirations and strength of the Old Continent. Actually, the action in Libya made all of us realise that the condition of the European part of NATO is very bad. In other words, Europeans are invariably consumers of the security generated by the United States, not its founders.

Since 11 September 2001, despite the military involvement in Iraq, as well as facing the crisis in the Middle East and in North Africa, European expenditure on defence has decreased by more than 15 percent.¹ Over the last few years, European expenditure has been reduced to less than half of the amount spent by the United States, which has also lowered its spending. Despite numerous ambitious declarations, the European Union has also not become a driving force leading to a positive change in quality. All concepts involving the military strengthening of European states, starting from the “Euro-army” and finishing with EU battle-groups ended in fiasco. Since 2008, as much as two thirds of European countries have reduced the funding intended for defence. On the other end, Poland and also Norway and Turkey are listed as examples in NATO.² However, this is not enough to change the overall balance.

Signals purely to show concerning the will to build one’s own potential, to reduce the so-called “military gap” towards the United States, do not go hand in hand with actual actions. Although in 2006 NATO member states agreed to spend at least 2 percent of GDP annually on defence, one year later only five states (Bulgaria, France, Greece, United Kingdom, and the United States) had reached this

¹ N. Gardiner, America’s European allies must heed US Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ warning on the future of NATO, “The Telegraph”, 10.06.2011, [www.blogs.telegraph.co.uk].
target, and in 2012 this further reduced to only four (without France).\(^3\) Critically, last year, only five countries (France, Luxembourg, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States) met a very important condition - they allocated at least 20 percent of funds to the modernisation of their armed forces. Nine countries spent less than 10 percent (Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain).\(^4\)

In 2009, the British Secretary of State for Defence, John Hutton, summarised it explicitly as follows: “Freeloading on the back of U.S. military security is not an option if we wish to be equal partners in this transatlantic alliance. Anyone who wants to benefit from collective security must be prepared to share the ultimate price. It isn’t good enough to always look to the U.S. for political, financial and military cover. And this imbalance will not be addressed by parcelling up NATO tasks - the “hard” military ones for the U.S. and a few others and the “soft” diplomatic ones for the majority of Europeans. The campaign in Afghanistan - every bit as important to European member state’s security as it is to the security of United States - has exposed three things. A legacy of underinvestment by some European member states in their armed forces, significant variance in political commitment to the campaign and underneath it all a continued over-reliance, from certain members, on the U.S. to do the heavy lifting”\(^5\).

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & 2007 & 2012 \\
\hline
\text{United States} & 68\% & 72\% \\
\text{Europe\textsuperscript{(1)}} & 32\% & 28\% \\
\text{Canada} & 72\% & 28\% \\
\text{United States} & 68\% & 72\% \\
\text{Europe\textsuperscript{(2)}} & 32\% & 28\% \\
\text{Canada} & 72\% & 28\% \\
\hline
\text{(1)} – United Kingdom (7.3%), Canada (1.8%), France (6.6%), Germany (4.7%), Italy (2.9%), others (8.8%) \\
\text{(2)} – United Kingdom (6.9%), Canada (1.8%), France (4.9%), Germany (4.6%), Italy (2%), others (7.5%) \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Table: Percentage of NATO defence expenditures (2007/2012)\(^6\)

Twenty six member states of the EDA (\textit{European Defence Agency}) spent, in 2010, 194 billion EUR on defence, i.e., less than in 2008 (201 billion EUR), while in the case of the United States an increase was observed in the same period from 416 billion EUR to 520 billion EUR.\(^7\) Insofar as the share in defence in the United States amounted to 4.8 percent GDP (2010) and as much as 11.2 percent of all

\(^3\) \textit{The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2012}, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels 2013, p. 11.

\(^4\) \textit{Ibidem}, p. 11.


\(^6\) Quoted after: \textit{The Secretary …}, p. 10. Estimated data for 2012. The chart is based on prices and exchange rates of 2005.

federal expenditure, in Europe these indexes amounted to a meagre 1.6 and 3.2 percent, respectively. Indexes per capita are even more shocking – in 2010 the United States spent 2.222 USD per capita on defence, while within the EDA area it was only 550 USD. The EDA countries allocate half of the funds for staff - maintenance of soldiers, as well as the army of civilian officials. Only about one fifth of the overall amount is intended to purchase military weapons and equipment or research and development (R&D) work. It is no wonder then that the Old Continent seems to resemble more and more the words used by Lord Robertson, who called Europe “a military pygmy”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: The share of world military expenditures of the 10 states with the highest expenditure (2012)

The consequences of the deepening weakness of the European NATO members, and the subsequent inability to maintain capabilities for effective cooperation were clearly visible during the operation Allied Force against Serbia in 1999. A decade has passed since the war in Kosovo and it has not brought about any changes. Both up in the Balkan sky, as well as in the Libyan one, it is clear that Europeans are dependent on Americans to a great extent. Contrary to the opinions promulgated by optimists, the military action aimed at the Libyan regime under the rule of Gaddafi (2011) was for the European countries, among which United Kingdom and France perceive themselves as global superpowers, if not a total failure, then undoubtedly a painful illustration of weakness. Without the United States that ensured direct support through the satellite systems and UAVs, tanker

8 Ibidem.
9 Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, “NATO”, 24.01.2002, [www.nato.int].
aircrafts, communication and precision-guided munitions, the European operation would have finished in a few days. The new model of “burden sharing” is in fact not about that at all - at least not from Washington’s perspective, which had to provide Europe with considerable support, so that it was able to undertake action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Oceania</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western and Central Europe</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table: Regional shares of world military expenditure (2012)*

A similar example of weakness shown by the European partners is to be seen with regard to the Afghanistan issue, where the allies engaged to differing degrees. The main effort of the operation, in particular its combat dimension, rested on the Americans. In those actions they were supported by the British, Canadians, Polish and Australians (who are not NATO members). Some countries belonging to the Alliance, a clear example of which being the Germans and the Dutch, adopted the tactics of avoiding all threats, reportedly even at the expense of bribing local insurgents (Italians). As far as the available military equipment is concerned, a disproportionate situation is also seen in ISAF (*International Security Assistance Force*). Europeans do not invest in adequate means, in particular in C4ISR capabilities, systems for precision-guided munitions and tactical transport (helicopters). This does not contribute to the feeling of solidarity and the struggle for common interests. No wonder then that hardly anybody on either side of the Atlantic publicly states that soldiers are fighting under something more than just a national flag and the stake is the common good of NATO, as a whole.

For many, the hope of a well-thought-out concept of sharing potential and close, coordinated cooperation is *Smart Defence* within the framework of NATO and European Union’s *Pooling and Sharing*. Actually, this could be an impulse for development. However, relevant funds and political will are required. Neverthe-

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12 Ibidem, p. 3.
less, officials in Brussels admit that financial cuts are so great that it will prove practically impossible to execute both concepts. Consequently, military NATO-European Union cooperation does not function well - similarly, the integration role of the EDA. One can hardly be optimistic bearing in mind the gigantic problems with the Airbus A400M strategic airlifter project or NATO’s HIP helicopter initiative. The NATO AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance) project was perceived as a success, however, it is often forgotten, or - more precisely – ignored, that two decades were required to execute the project. Only the painfully exposed deficiencies during the war with Libya convinced the biggest political and military block in the world to allocate sufficient funds to this project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4400</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3034</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1741</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1521</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>8065</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>68000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: ISAF – troop contribution nations (June 2013)\(^\text{15}\)

However, this is the right way and we need to follow it. We should be pleased that there are more and more joint initiatives. European cooperation is developing. The increasingly closer French-British relationships or integration ideas on the European Union forum may be mentioned here. In 2012, Germany and France signed a Memorandum of Understanding on close cooperation in the field of new military technology and the acquisition of arms. It is assumed that this document should constitute a starting point to wider, multilateral cooperation. At this stage, Paris and Berlin are commencing cooperation in the scope of artillery systems, helicopters (including better integration of the Tiger and NH-90 helicopters projects), air and missile defences, unmanned reconnaissance systems and potential logistic cooperation in the scope of the already mentioned A400M aircrafts. The NATO programme of shared tactical and strategic transport, AWACS or missile defence is also developing. The years to come may bring about better cooperation

\(^{15}\)International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures, 01.06.2013, [www.isaf.nato.int].
in V4 (Visegrád Four/Visegrád Group)\textsuperscript{16} which would also be a good solution. The same can be said about the Nordic cooperation between NATO members (Denmark, Norway) and states such as Sweden and Finland that could end up even with joint air, naval and land forces units.\textsuperscript{17}

However, the cooperation requires funding, but there isn’t enough. The effect of the deepening atrophy of European military capabilities, as well as the indigenous potential of the defence industry is a declining innovativeness in this sector and an advanced dependency on the military means, and also on the political will, of the United States. The freedom to operate independently is decreasing meaning only insignificant operations which do not require “peace enforcement” actions through the use of force are possible. Europe may independently conduct only purely peaceful or police operations, such as the ones carried out in Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo or relatively small mission in Mali with low operational tempo. In the case of more demanding missions with high operational tempo, such as in Afghanistan and particularly in Iraq (NTM-I),\textsuperscript{18} NATO forces showed a wide-ranging dependence on the Americans, for example, as far as helicopters and force protection were concerned.

The resulting consequences are very serious. In terms of economy, European products are less and less innovative. From the political and military point of view, Europe is not able to operate independently, with no clear support on the part of the United States, which has to cover it with its protective umbrella. We have become the younger brother of America. What would happen if Washington, sometime in the future, concluded - and it has slowly come to this conclusion, taking into account the systematic reduction of forces within the Old Continent in order to increase the military presence in South and East Asia (the so-called “pivot”) - that Europe is so weak that it would be unable to defend itself in the case of serious threat? Will the neo-imperial Russian Federation, maintaining the Cold War perception of the world through the prism of the balance of power, still treat Europe as an equal partner? What will happen if Moscow tries to draw benefits increasing its political or/military pressures on Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia? How, taking into account Europe’s indolence and the fact that the United States shows no interest, should such conflicts as the one in the 1990s in the Balkans or another crisis in North Africa be resolved? What would be the reaction of Europe

\textsuperscript{16} V4 is a platform for cooperation for four Central European states – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

\textsuperscript{17} G. O’Dwyer, Sweden Looking To Build Nordic Defense Pact, “DefenseNews”, 24/01/2013, [www.defensenews.com].

\textsuperscript{18} Author visited the NTM-I (NATO Training Mission-Iraq) in 2011 as a journalist embedded to U.S. 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (“Brave Rifles”).
towards the reconstruction of Russia’s strategic and tactical forces of thermonuclear deterrence, since it does not have its own anti-missile umbrella and the whole nuclear potential of NATO is allocated by the United States?

Decreasing expenditure for defence is all the more alarming given that the two non-democratic states of the most importance and power, i.e., the Russian Federation and China, are spending more on defence. According to Jane’s analysis, by 2015, China – that generates 30 percent of all Asian expenditure – will have spent more than the eight biggest NATO members (following the United States): the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Canada, Spain and Poland.  

This obviously translates geo-strategically – China, which has been increasing its power, becomes thus a greater challenge for the United States, which in turn withdraws its forces from the increasingly marginal Europe, increasing its military presence in Asia and Oceania, for example, in Australia. At the same time, the weakened defence capabilities of Europe, when facing increasing expenditure on the part of the Russian and U.S. “pivot”, does not invoke the feeling among the European decision-makers that they should increase allocated funds. Surprisingly, to the contrary - many people in Europe think that the retreat of the Americans is a symbol of the ultimate end of the Cold War and an opportunity to withdraw from the arms race.

The conscious policy of decreasing military potential by the states from the Old Continent is contributing to the erosion of transatlantic bonds, which have been the essence of NATO’s existence since 1949, a value in itself. After all, it was this organisation that enabled Western Europe to neutralise - during the Cold War period - the threat of aggression coming from the Warsaw Pact (thanks to the conventional and strategic power of the United States). Kagan’s famous saying: “Europeans are from Venus, Americans from Mars” seems to be confirmed more and more. Consequently, the aversion towards operational cooperation with the countries from the Old Continent is growing. Why support partners who are not helpful to us? What was clearly demonstrated during the administration of George W. Bush (2001 - 2009), was that American decision-makers less and less frequently perceived rational reasons as to why they should ask Europe for military support.

The weaker Europe is in military terms the lower its significance in relation to the security policy of the United States and the less frequently Washington will seek the opinion and support of Europeans; thus, the United States will look increasingly towards the powerful countries, with capable armed forces and the will to cooperate. The future of NATO, as an effective and wanted political and

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military structure, will then be doubtful. The Alliance will collapse without the United States or, at best, it will transform into an insignificant, phoney organisation. This will have negative consequences for the safety of us all - undoubtedly, also for Poland.
CHAPTER I

NATO at the Crossroads – Choosing the Future Path
NATO after the Chicago Summit – The Condition and Prospects for Development

The NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012 was certainly not a landmark. Many factors seemed to call for it. Initially, it had been assumed that, primarily, it would constitute an opportunity for some kind of supplementation and development (“operationalization”) of previous settlements reached during the more fruitful NATO Lisbon Summit of 2010, where, among others, a new Strategic Concept was agreed. Other issues, less general in nature and importance, but no less significant for the operation of the Alliance, should have been raised during the Chicago Summit. For instance, the discussion could have focused on the planning and organization of capabilities development, cooperation with partners or reforms to the Alliance’s administrative structures. Nevertheless, even less ambitious aims than those seen at the Lisbon Summit, had to be thoroughly revised in response to the rapid changes in the external environment of the Alliance’s operations.

The ongoing economic crisis led to a situation where, in reality, financial issues became one of the most important and, at the same time, one of the most difficult topics for discussion in NATO. First of all, these discussions concerned the scale and range of the necessary cuts in the defence budgets of the member states and their possible coordination in order to minimize the negative consequences for the present and future operational capabilities of NATO. It significantly changed the context of the allied talks concerning military transformation or reforms of the organizational structure, forcing the allies to focus on their economic efficiency. Additionally, the outbreak of the Arab Spring at the beginning of 2011, in particular the Alliance’s decision regarding its military involvement in Libya in response to the civil war and the very course of this mission, showed the settlements reached in Lisbon concerning NATO expeditionary activities in a different light. Finally, the steadily increasing difficulties in the cooperation with Russia largely undermined the achievements of the Lisbon Summit, also with regard to relationships with Moscow (and, indirectly, with other partners as well), thus hindering new initiatives in Chicago.¹

As a consequence of all these factors that came to light during the months preceding the Chicago Summit, the allies quickly became concerned about its

results. It was a common fear that it would become “a meeting of accountants”,
during which the debate would focus only on financial issues (dictated by the
current budgetary needs of the individual members, in particular the bigger allies).
There were also concerns that any attempts to raise difficult issues during the
Summit would only reveal and deepen divisions between the allies. Particularly
from the perspective of the American administration, which, taking into account
the then accelerating campaign before the presidential election in November 2012,
was eager to show President Barack Obama as a successful leader in international
politics, enjoying widespread support throughout the world, such a development
in the situation would have been bound to arouse anxiety. This, in turn, could have
made it even more likely for the Chicago summit to be made “safe” in nature, e.g.,
by removing more controversial issues from its agenda and restricting it to
a simply ceremonial status.2

Ultimately, these worries proved to be largely, even if not completely, justified.
The ceremonial aspect of the Summit as “evidence of international support for
Obama”, gained in importance, while the pending debates lost their focus. Indeed,
the Allies managed to manifest their unity, even if it was more due to their avoiding
the controversial issues, rather than finding solutions for them.3 However, it
does not change the fact, regardless of any “private” successes on the part of particular
degelations (e.g., for France)4, that the whole output of the Summit proved
to be quite modest, from the point of view of the organization as a whole.
The provisions presented as its most important achievements, such as the declaration
of an interim missile defence capability, an extension of the Air Policing
mission in the Baltics or the confirmation of the AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance)
programme, were, undoubtedly, of key importance as substantial elements of the
Smart Defence initiative, though they were concerned with strictly technical issues,
and, thus, after all, the secondary, non-strategic subjects.5 In principle, the approval
of NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review also lacked a strategic perspective.
The Review diverged only slightly from the Alliance’s previous stances in this
respect, keeping, for instance, the attitude towards the sub-strategic nuclear

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4 It was with no greater difficulties that the French delegation managed to get acceptance and empathy for the
decision on withdrawing combat troops forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2012, though it constituted
a substantial departure from the seemingly commonly accepted in together, out together principle concerning
Afghanistan and decision made in in Lisbon, namely that the ISAF mission will last until the end of 2014.
5 Compare: Chicago Summit Declaration, 20 May 2012; Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO
Forces 2020, 20/05/2012.
weapons of the United States in Europe virtually unchanged and being exceptionally general in nature with regard to conventional deterrence.\(^6\)

With respect to the expeditionary activities undertaken by the Alliance, in reality only conclusions previously-reached were confirmed. They were only supplemented by insignificant modifications, subject to further negotiations. The best example would be the decisions regarding the operation in Afghanistan (a confirmation of the end of 2014 as the exit-date for ISAF, a declaration of the acceleration of the transformation of that mission into an operation primarily concerning training, and the declaration of a further commitment to Afghanistan in the post-ISAF period, after 2014, albeit in a rather general form, apart from the announcement of financial assistance to Afghans, was not bolstered however, with many details).\(^7\)

The summit brought similarly modest results concerning partnerships, including relations with countries from outside Europe, which have slightly more dynamically developed in recent years (with the participants of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the so-called partners across the world, such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan).

As a result, although the Chicago Summit did not prove to be merely an occasion to “ritually” manifest the unity of NATO and to provide a photo opportunity for European leaders with Barack Obama, who was preparing himself for re-election, it enabled progress to be made in the scope of only a few of the key issues concerning cooperation within the Alliance. That is why the meeting in Chicago was, after all, an important event, but mainly because it revealed the key problems within the organization and the scale of the challenges it faced, at the same time showing that the Alliance was at that point not yet ready to cope with them.

\textit{Main Determinants of NATO’s Development}

At for today, however, it is not the results of the Chicago Summit that are primarily decisive as far as NATO’s actual capability for taking action and its future development are concerned. Three other factors, more general in nature, are of key importance here: changes in the priorities of the U.S. security policy and Washington’s strategic shift towards the Pacific (“pivot")\(^8\); the global economic

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\(^7\) Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, 21/05/2012.

\(^8\) More on the topic see: H. Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, “Foreign Policy”, November 2011, [www.foreignpolicy.com]; Barack Obama’s Speech to Australian Parliament, Canberra, 16/11/2011,
crisis and its consequences (primarily for the European states); as well as the operational experiences of the Alliance, including the course and results so far, of its biggest missions in recent times – the ISAF operation in Afghanistan and the Unified Protector operation in Libya. At the same time, these factors (the last one to a lesser extent), representing the result of long-term trends, will probably also significantly affect the Alliance’s position in the next few years.

The importance of the Alliance, as well as that of its European members, for the foreign policy and security of the United States has been gradually decreasing for some time, along with the normalization of the situation in Europe and the simultaneous increase in tensions in other regions, particularly in Asia, where the range of European influence is today limited. A kind of “critical mass” in the said process and a clear change of priorities in American foreign and security policy took place in 2011, as a result of a combination of various factors. A certain bitterness among a significant part of the political and military elite, as well as influential circles in the United States towards the unbalanced burden-sharing within the Alliance, especially in the context of its operations, and a persistent - in their opinion - aversion of the European allies to change the current state of affairs and increase expenditure on defence certainly contributed to this fact.9

The economic difficulties that the United States itself has had to face have also exerted a big influence. Taking these into account, as well as the enormous scale of forecasted and, to a large extent, necessary savings (in the Pentagon’s budget alone, this may be as much as 1 trillion USD over 10 years), expenditure on its participation in the Alliance (including, for example, that allocated for troops stationed in Europe) has started to be perceived as relatively easy savings, even if they were disproportionate to the needs.10 No doubt, the growing importance of the generations which were not raised during the era of the “Cold War brotherhood of arms”, thus differently perceiving the European partners’ obligations (and those on the part of the United States) within the framework of NATO have turned out to be significant too.

Decisive, however, have proved to be the steadily growing U.S. political and economic interests in Asia, which have meant its foreign policy focus is now,
primarily, on relations with the countries of the Pacific Rim and South Asia regions. This “pivot”, clearly manifested during President Obama’s visit to Australia and the Far East in autumn 2011, undoubtedly accelerated global re-evaluations in favour of East-Asian states involving the distribution of economic power due to the crisis. Additionally, this decision was motivated by the security situation in Europe, which is relatively good at the moment. From Washington’s point of view, within European geostrategic space there are just a few pieces of “unfinished businesses”, or, at least, issues that could and should be relatively easily resolved. Thus, the “pivot” in Washington’s policy is probably permanent and irreversible and, at the same time, as a result of the needs and interests of Americans, it will take place regardless of the stances adopted by the European allies. Of course, it will not mean a complete breaking of the allied bonds with the European states or even their relegation to third-rate partners of the United States. The allies from Europe, liberal democracies, wealthy and free market states, believing in similar values and having, after all, significant military capabilities on a global scale and the willingness (even if it is decreasing) to become involved in the stabilization of the international situation - will remain for the United States to some degree “the allies of first choice”, i.e., the states with which cooperation can proceed relatively smoothly and whose positions should be considered while planning their own policy.11

The influence of the economic crisis on NATO’s position and the direction of its development are rather obvious. The necessity of focusing on countering the negative consequences of economic austerity and rescuing the Euro zone have distracted the attention of European leaders away from the problems of NATO, in particular those that did not have a direct impact on its current operations and functioning (e.g., the long-term modernization plans). What is more, immediately after the outbreak of the crisis in 2008, expenditure on defence in Europe became, even earlier than in the United States, one of the main victims of budgetary cuts. As a general rule, the member states carried these out with no adequate coordination or evaluation of their consequences for the Alliance as a whole. As a result, during the period 2008 - 2011, European members decreased their military spending by an amount close to the total annual expenditure for defence in Germany (about 45 billion USD). They continued this policy the following year and are planning further cuts in the future, although on a lesser scale.12 The consequences of these changes, initially restricted, gained momentum in 2011 and they began to significantly affect the directions of potential actions and the development of the

11 More on the topic see: H. Clinton, America’s Pacific Century…
Alliance. Although in 2012, the reductions in the budgets for defence made by the allies were lower, the financial difficulties have still remained one of the most important determinants of the decisions made by NATO states in the sphere of defence.\(^{13}\)

However, it has been the expeditionary missions of the Alliance that have affected NATO’s functioning most directly. The Alliance’s major stabilization missions, such as ISAF or KFOR, which were complex and long-lasting, involving all or the majority of the allies, with ambitious goals concerning post-conflict reconstruction and creation (sometimes from scratch) of the administrative and economic structures in newly established countries or those that were recovering from decline, at the same time requiring great financial outlays and, what is more important, a permanent and large military presence (mainly ground forces) - have so far brought only failure or limited success. They have seriously weakened, however, the NATO members’ potential, in particular their reserves, which has clearly dampened their enthusiasm for undertaking comparatively ambitious and exhausting tasks in the future.

At the same time, such missions as Unified Protector or counter-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa, with significantly more definite and shorter aims, involving only some of the allies (although, at the same time, numerous partners from outside the organization) and based on the use of air and naval forces (frequently involving a considerably lesser risk of casualties), have brought some successes, even if they were slightly surprising and not completely foreseeable. This indicates that, in the near future, the Alliance will be heading more in the direction delineated by the second category of actions. Missions similar to Unified Protector (a military action with no boots on the ground and not aimed at reconstruction after the conflict, but rather focusing on creating the right conditions for local actors to do that) may become the preferred model of stabilization attempts on the part of NATO, especially if the Alliance is forced to respond to an ongoing armed conflict.\(^{14}\) Supplementary to such actions, in situations that do not require the direct use of force, support and training missions would be more likely, such as, for example, the Ocean Shield counter-piracy operation, which has been underway since 2010. This is because, of course, NATO will not be inclined (or able) to undertake, in the near future, a mission, for instance, of a similar scale and complexity as ISAF in Afghanistan. Whereas, the reluctance to get involved in Syria,


despite the civil war which has been longer-lasting and bloodier than the Libyan conflict and fears it arouses in Turkey (an influential state within the Alliance) show a reduced will on part of the Alliance to become involved. Thus, if NATO thinks it necessary to intervene, it will probably do so on a limited scale, especially given that it would inevitably hinder the solution of its internal problems concerning the consequences of strategic changes in the policy of the United States and the economic crisis.

The Current Balance of Power within NATO

As a result of the simultaneous impact of all these factors, NATO is currently experiencing significant changes in the balance of power within the organization. During the debate on NATO’s new Strategic Concept before the Lisbon summit in November 2010 the most important division inside the Alliance seemed to be around the hierarchy of its tasks and the degree of the globalization of the activities undertaken by NATO. The central theme of the corresponding dispute focused on the Alliance’s degree of expeditionary activity and its involvement in regions far beyond the territory of its membership states (or, rather, the territory stipulated in the Treaty), in particular towards traditional missions, related to the more conventionally understood concept of collective defence. On the basis of the differences revealed then as to how to solve that issue (as well as some others, such as the future of the open door policy, cooperation with partners outside Europe or NATO’s involvement in responding to non-military challenges, e.g., climate change or in the realm of energy security), three groups of members could be distinguished within the organization in that period.

Globalists, also called reformers, constituted the first group. These states, while not completely negating the importance of the Alliance’s function as a tool for the collective defence of the territory belonging to all the member states, but underlining the extremely low probability of such threats, supported, first of all, the development of NATO’s capability to shape the international security environment. This would mean focusing on developing the expeditionary capabilities of NATO, undertaking such activities even in regions geographically far from the Treaty area as well as more intensive cooperation with partners from outside the organization, especially with non-European states. Among the globalists, we can count a large number of the most influential members of the organization, such as the United States or United Kingdom, and also such states as Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands. Even France, traditionally perceived as being conservative in its views, displayed a similar stance on many issues concerning the Alliance. Thus,
among the globalists were mainly the members, who have the most modern and the most valuable military assets in the Alliance.\textsuperscript{15}

States belonging to the so-called the “5 Article coalition”, sometimes also called traditionalists, represented a specific counterweight to the first group.\textsuperscript{16} They were interested in the actual, not just stated, primacy of the traditional tasks, involving the defence of the territory and populations of the member states, rather than the expeditionary activities of NATO. Basically, they did not question the need for NATO to be involved in regions outside Europe and to shape the global security order. However, they emphasized that this kind of activity should not adversely affect capabilities of the Alliance to perform its basic or original functions. Poland, the Baltic member states, and, many of the remaining members who were admitted to NATO after 1999 belonged to this group. However, some “older” members, like Turkey or Norway, also presented quite similar positions.

Probably the most peculiar, and at the same time relatively numerous, though diversified, group is the passive, the undecided or the silent.\textsuperscript{17} Members of this group were the least active and interested in the debate on the tasks of NATO itself, although for various reasons. Therefore, they mostly did not present an unambiguous position in this respect. Basically, they judged their situation in terms of security as good, thus focusing rather on the minimization of the cost (material and non-material) of their participation in the Alliance, or trying as much as possible to reconcile the positions of the globalists and the traditionalists. As a result, the majority of states belonging to this faction displayed a conservative stance towards possible changes in the hierarchy of NATO tasks (hence the other name for this group - the \textit{status quo countries}\textsuperscript{18}). Among such states we can include not only those affected by the consequences of the then developing economic crisis, i.e., the states of the southern flank of NATO (Portugal, Spain, Greece, and, to some extent, Italy), but also some “new” members (e.g., Hungary and Slovakia to some extent), as well as Germany, which did not present a clear vision of NATO and its role in the Alliance, but still retains considerable influence within the organization.

The adoption of a new \textit{Strategic Concept} (closer, at least in a formal sense, to the position taken by the traditionalists, though sufficiently general in nature, as to


\textsuperscript{18} K. Malinowski, \textit{op. cit.} p. 155.
encourage all the members to approve its provisions) slightly softened those divisions. However, it did not mean that the underlying differences disappeared, especially those concerning the hierarchy of NATO tasks and interrelations between traditional and expeditionary tasks. That is why also currently these differences significantly affect internal relationships and the balance of power within the organization, although they no longer constitute a key factor.

Additionally, in recent times, taking into account the above-mentioned reasons, the function performed by the United States within the Alliance has begun to considerably evolve. Until recently, the United States remained, basically, the indubitable leader, simply a hegemonic power within the Alliance, which, at the decisive moments, usually took the initiative in decision-making processes and decided on the fundamental directions of NATO’s strategic evolution (sometimes in consultation with the rest of allies, albeit equally often in a more or less unilateralist way). Obviously, taking into consideration American military power and its nuclear capabilities, this was the case during the Cold War period. Nevertheless, also in post-Cold War times, the leadership role of Washington in the Alliance was, basically, not challenged by the other NATO members, while the United States itself did not avoid the responsibility of leadership. In the 1990s, maybe the clearest evidence of this was the role it played in making the decision to expand the Alliance to the east. However, in the first decade of this century NATO has turned its attention towards global interests and the fight against asymmetrical threats, such as terrorism. This turn came about, primarily, following the American initiative and fell in line with the dominant assessments at that time in Washington of the global strategic situation and of the hierarchy of challenges to the security of the Alliance. During this period, the U.S. government had tried, at least to some extent, to take into account the fears shown by some allies with regard to capabilities of the Alliance to fulfil its more traditional tasks in such conditions.

Nevertheless, along with the already mentioned changes in the security policy of the United States, as well as the costs (rapidly rising in the last decade) of the increased American military involvement worldwide, including difficult missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington’s willingness to play the role of an active leader, which, should the need arise, either makes strategic decisions or covers the lack of funds for their implementation, began to diminish. The imbalance in the expenses incurred for expeditionary operations and the overall functioning of the Alliance, formerly tolerated by the Americans, became under such circumstances more noticeable, as well as burdensome and hard to justify from their perspective.  

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19 Compare: E. Hallams, B. Schreer, Towards a ‘Post-American’ Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya, “International Affairs”, 2012 (Vol. 88), No. 2. While, at the beginning of the post-Cold War period the costs of Alliance operation and missions undertaken were distributed more or less fifty-fifty between the European
In other words, although the United States remains the biggest and most powerful of all the NATO members, still able to make independent decisions as to the direction in which the Alliance should develop and indispensable to the successful completion of its undertakings (the operation in Libya being proof of this), it does not necessarily intend to use its superior position with the same frequency as before. At the same time, it will also expect the other allies to accept greater responsibility than they have so far, including the financial liability for the operations of the Alliance. The “back seat driver” (“leading from behind”) position that it adopted during the course of the Libyan operation, where it did not openly lead the actions of the Alliance, but remained on alert to respond in the case of need and to modify the direction undertaken by the organization, simultaneously providing other states with adequate means in the case of shortfalls, may gradually become the preferred form of engagement for the Americans in NATO initiatives, especially in Europe and its vicinity.

Consequently, a new balance of power is developing within NATO, at present, shaped by slightly different factors than those in the past. With the United States less inclined to shape NATO’s policy and take over the biggest burdens, the importance and influence of the remaining “capables”, i.e., other member states which have sufficiently large, modern or diversified military and financial means to contribute considerably to NATO’s operational activities, have been growing. The operation in Libya clearly showed that along the already noticed (and worrying for the members, in particular the United States) “transatlantic gap” in military capabilities between Europe and America, recently a different gap, less visible, but causing equally serious consequences, has grown – between more and less capable European allies. This particularly relates to operations which are not just primarily land operations which require technologically advanced equipment (unmanned vehicles, reconnaissance equipment and multi-purpose aircrafts). This specific intra-European capability gap seems to significantly strengthen the positions of those states that currently already possess expeditionary capabilities of that kind. Particularly, given the current situation, where economic factors are of growing significance and the United States is not inclined to financially assist (at least, not at the previous level) less capable allies in their engagement, in particular, in NATO actions.20 Thus, the term “capables” refers to such states as United Kingdom, France, the Nordic countries or the Netherlands. These, in turn, belong to

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the group of countries considered also as globalists (reformists) or, at least, close to such positions. That is why they are likely to perceive NATO, first of all, as an instrument for expeditionary actions and a response to emerging threats: terrorism, WMD proliferation, challenges to cyber-security or problems involving maritime security, such as piracy and ensuring safety of navigation for merchant shipping (security of SLOC – Sea Lines of Communications).  

This, in turn, means a simultaneous decrease in capabilities to influence the direction of the evolution of NATO on the part of states more concerned with traditional NATO tasks and who emphasize the role of collective defence, especially taking into account the fact that the majority of these countries (maybe with the exception of Turkey which has started to become more and more independent and “distinct” as a player within the Alliance and - to some extent - Poland and Norway) have rather limited material resources and military capabilities. What is more, although it may seem paradoxical, the growing importance of the “capables” is actually not undermined by the fact that almost all of them have recently reduced their defence budgets seriously, which have been often bigger than those cuts made by states treating the tasks of NATO more traditionally. The concentration on the part of the majority of the European “capables” on countering the economic crisis and stabilizing the Euro zone, rather than on issues involving the operation of NATO, also does not weaken their position in the organization. As a result, they may be, after all, able to set the tone in the Alliance in the years to come, determining the main directions of its internal changes and fields of activity, although subject, of course, to the more or less clearly expressed consent of Washington.

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Meanwhile, at present, the United States is not showing the willingness to do it as it did before, and the remaining allies are not capable, independently or collectively, of playing the role of “leader” and “decision-maker” equally as efficiently.

Some will see in the current situation the chance for “NATO to go back to its roots”, focusing on its fundamental functions and limiting its expeditionary activities (since a full withdrawal from these would be neither realistic nor desirable these days). It may seem tempting, especially for countries like Poland, consistently demanding that the traditional tasks, i.e., those relating to the defence (though not necessarily traditionally understood) of the territory and the population of the member states, be “properly addressed”. However, two serious concerns would accompany such a scenario. The first involves the fact that from the point of view of a significant portion of the members (with the number probably still growing in the long run), NATO’s focus on its role as a specific “insurance policy” in case of dangerous, in terms of consequences, but improbable traditional threats (armed invasion by third countries, especially, mass invasions), makes for its limited usefulness (also in the view of the public) and, thus, its reduced strategic significance. The second, in turn, results from the fact that attempts to more flexibly interpret collective defence, for instance by considering non-traditional threats (terrorism, energy sector, cyber-security), will lead to a considerable expansion of its forms and expressions (as far as the means and methods of response are concerned). Consequently, the differences between the actions which fall within the scope of collective defence and missions out of area, allegedly of a secondary role, will be blurred. As a result, regardless of the limited number of allies (particularly of the influential ones), who are in favour of such a vision of NATO, the attempts to focus on the original functions pose a gradual (if not complete) threat for NATO of losing in strategic importance for its members, which would pose concerns about their willingness to engage in a joint action. What is more, they may also simply prove to be hard to accomplish, considering the fact that the traditional form of NATO missions and the “additional” ones (unassociated with collective defence) would become more and more similar. In other words, “going back to the roots”, understood in such way, would prove to be strategically unprofitable or only an ostensible solution.

That is why, a scenario in which NATO remains not only the “insurance policy” for the allies, but also an instrument for shaping the international reality and the defence of the wider security-related interests of its members, their capability

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to act in a more and more polycentric world, seems to be more realistic. Of course, the economic crisis, a change of attitude in Washington and the previous experiences of NATO will cause the Alliance to be more cautious about making decisions regarding its expeditionary engagements. It will also be more willing to seek external partners (international organizations and countries) to share either responsibility or the costs of activities undertaken. Surely, it will be more interested in developing the capabilities of such partners to act independently, so as in future the stabilization role of NATO in a given region could be limited just to supporting local forces and would not mean taking over full responsibility for management and leadership.

Fortunately, this trend will be unlikely to reduce the Alliance purely to an international discussion club, offering possible good solutions, but not necessarily being capable of implementing them. NATO still is and will continue to be for some time the most powerful alliance in history. Nevertheless, both changes in its internal balance of power and the growing interest in engaging external actors in its stabilization activities will probably transform the Alliance into a specific platform for building various coalitions of the willing, goal- or task-oriented and with both members and partners from the outside as participants. It will then become, to some extent, a reservoir of assets for such coalitions (common capabilities or those belonging to individual members), but first and foremost a source of political legitimization. It would mean a partial return to the concept of NATO as a “toolbox” for more active members, but also a considerably deeper internal diversity inside the organization. Since the Alliance will gradually become a “multi-speed organization”, which the already-mentioned Smart Defence concept – i.e., the development of NATO capabilities through various forms of closer cooperation with variable geometry, with the participation of members not only interested, but simultaneously sufficiently capable to do this – seems to indicate.

The contribution that any given state will be able to add to the specific actions undertaken by NATO will determine the actual “voting power” of that state within the organization, its impact and role in decision-making processes in the Alliance. Under such circumstances, even assuming the formal preservation of the principle of consensus in these processes (although the voices talking of the necessity to limit it may increase with time), those who will not participate in the majority of operations or initiatives or will be participating to an insignificant extent, could not be perceived as being in a position to articulate their objections, apart from in really exceptional situations, where their most vital interests will be on the line. Without the ability to support their expectations and demands with “hard”, “tangible” arguments in the form of relevant resources and military capabilities or significant contributions to NATO operations and joint transformation projects, getting support (real and not half-hearted) for their own positions among the
majority of allies may prove difficult. Participation in the Alliance will resemble, even more than today, a poker game, in which it will be necessary to “add something to the pool” before “joining the betting” and saying anything.

*Instead of the Summary – Conclusions for Poland*

From the Polish perspective, a country still in need of the Alliance and genuinely interested in its consolidation, also in traditional terms, and, at the same time, basically lacking credible alternatives, the current direction of NATO’s evolution, in particular the changes to the internal balance of power, will mean a substantial modification of its security environment and will necessitate the adjusting of its security policy. On the one hand, these changes would indicate that, in the context of the traditional function of the Alliance, the emphasis should be put on strengthening and manifesting both to the members, as well as to countries outside of the organization, its faith in the vitality of mutual pledges to provide assistance in case of need, rather than issuing repeated expectations of new “tangible” proof of allied solidarity (i.e., allied bases or installations on Polish territory). From the point of view of many allies, the latter would only mean the increased costs of “insurance against extreme, but unlikely events”, while for Poland currently achievable “tangible” proofs of that kind would not be enough to constitute a fully satisfactory assurance. In other words, putting forward, in order to strengthen the Alliance’s readiness to perform its traditional functions in Central Europe, some new postulates concerning reassurances would not prove effective, especially when considering the relatively large set of the reassurances agreed in Lisbon and immediately after it. Additionally it could discourage some allies from engaging in closer cooperation with Poland, also concerning various programs within the framework of the *Smart Defence* initiative.

On the other hand, the current directions of the evolution of the internal situation in NATO indicate the need for Polish expeditionary activity, as well as the required resources, to be remodelled. The fact that Poland did not participate in the operation in Libya revealed the significant limitations of Polish capabilities in this respect. In particular, it demonstrated Poland’s limited capabilities to participate in expeditionary missions by armed forces in any form other than using ground troops and special units and, thus, the difficulty of getting involved in operations which do not involve the deployment of contingents within the theatre of operations. However, at the same time, the reactions of many allies, namely with some kind of astonishment at the absence of Poland in the *Unified Protector* operation, but with no open criticism as there was in the case of Germany for
instance proved that there were certain expectations towards Poland, supported by the conviction that it may be capable of and willing to meet them (due to our security-related interests, not because we want to “gain recognition” or “endear ourselves” to our partners). Of course, such changes in the strategy of involvement in foreign missions should fall within the bounds determined by the Polish raison d’etat. This is because it is all about “being able to add to the pool”, and thus actually, not symbolically, “joining in the bidding”, i.e., making decisions in NATO. It does not necessarily mean playing for the highest stakes and trying, probably without success, to assume the role of the “main bidder” in the organization. If the Alliance were to become a multi-speed structure, for a country like Poland, keenly interested in the survival of the organization under the best possible conditions, it would be risky to stay in the slowest train.

Evolution of NATO’s Identity in the 21st Century

It is not easy to define identity, even though everyone feels it by instinct. We can talk about collective identity if there are common characteristics that appear that distinguish one group from the others. Identity perceived in this way – as a process – is dynamic in nature. It is not based on the conviction that there exists some invariable “essence”, which determines, once and for all, who “we” are and who “they” are. An affiliation to a given collective identity is based on common aims and values, developed through interactions. Constant changes are not only the consequence of conscious choices, but also a series of random events. Self-identification, i.e., the process of which the final result is reflection, shaping specifically one’s image of oneself, self-interpretation, is of key importance here.

There is an extensive amount of literature that deals with the issue of collective identity, in terms of sociology, psychology, philosophy and even economy. Theories of international relations address this problem less intensively and only rarely directly. Realism rejects the possibility of intergovernmental organizations possessing an identity. The only actors on the international stage are states. This means alliances are interpreted as tools of the foreign policies of states. They are a short-term phenomenon and today’s partners realize that they may become tomorrow’s enemies. Self-interest constitutes a powerful stimulus leading them to seek their own advantage over others. Being aware that there exist such stimuli, combined with a rational desire to defend one’s own interest usually excludes the possibility of there being long-lasting cooperation between countries.

J. Mearsheimer clearly emphasizes that using collective criteria towards countries is

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1 At the same time, identity is not, either, a phenomenon so variable that is almost capricious. Edmund Husserl determined this notion as being the “awareness of continuance” – despite changes in the surroundings and the evolution of the subject him/herself, he/she is aware of the existence of his/her own “self”. M. Malicka, Ja – to znaczy kto? (Me – Who am I?), Warsaw 1996, p. 39; Z. Mach, Symbols, Conflict and Identity, New York 1993.
5 K. Mingst, Podstawy stosunków międzynarodowych (Introduction to International Relations), Warsaw 2006, p. 49-52, 70-79.
a “fruitless task”. According to institutional liberalism, not only are countries themselves the main actors on the international stage, but also entities in a social context, either governments or international institutions. The latter are perceived by this trend in two ways – firstly, as separate entities, and secondly – as sets of rules, i.e., regimes. Institutions constitute an important element of the international environment and, as such, they may directly affect its shape. Thus, they are actual actors, which implies they possess the ability to shape their collective identity. However, it was not before constructivism that the notion was developed. Collective identity involves the identification of the interests of one entity with the well-being of another actor. Feelings of solidarity, community and loyalty constitute the basis for the common determination of interests. Then, the security community may develop. This notion refers to such relations as exist between states, which completely exclude the chance of any armed conflicts occurring between them. Any possible disputes will be resolved by other means. The concept of a security community was first presented by Richard W. Van Wagenen, although it was popularized by K. Deutsch.

As has already been mentioned, identity is a result of certain processes. This phenomenon is a consequence of relations, which change in various contexts. In practice, identity experiences numerous crises caused by evolving situations, the meaning assigned to them and visualizations. A change of identity is a consequence of changes in the entity’s environment. A crisis of identity usually appears during transitory periods or periods of great transformations. Because the old methods of establishing identity are no longer valid, it is necessary to look for

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a new way to search for and consolidate one’s own identity. Institutional liberalism and social constructivism assume that a common threat is the particular element that initiates the process of collective identity development. It may have a specific form – for instance, an aggressive state or a military bloc – or an abstract form, such as the danger of an environmental disaster. The common threat conditions the possession of a common, important interest. If this factor changes or disappears then the collective identity must also change. On the other hand, we have very specific feedback – it has been noted that a community that wishes to manifest its unity and diversity frequently indicates “the other”, namely an enemy; these are threats that may be fought only in cooperation with other members of the community.14 In conflict situations, the distinction between the different individuals who form a community are pushed into the background and the discrepancies between “us” and “them” are emphasized. The “others” are perceived in terms of a single, heightened aspect of identity – i.e., the aspect that determines the differences between them and a group, which constitutes a symbolic basis for the underlying conflict.15 Quoting E. Luttwak’s an iron law of coalition (“…formed to resist enemies, they do not long outlast them”)16 the majority of neo-realists believe that a common threat is a constituent aspect of alliances.17 However, NATO did not collapse after the Cold War. What is more, the Alliance began a process of transformation. S. Walt admitted that alliances might last even when the underlying original reason for their establishment had considerably changed. Nevertheless, the scholar remained sceptical about the future of NATO and predicted its gradual decay.18

14 “It is proper here to remind that confirmation of one’s own identity (...) involves danger of aggression and aspiration to control other nations; a nation protects its identity through hostility against other nations, through conquest and dominance; a religious body, as an advocate of the truth par excellence, easily succumbs to the temptation of thinking that it has the right and obligation to destroy all the other religious communities and forms of faith. It may sound slightly like Nietzsche, however, even if we acknowledge that this desire to confirm one’s own identity through expansion is not always and everywhere inevitable, it still remains the material the history of the world has been woven of.” L. Kołakowski, O tożsamości zbiorowej... (About Collective identity ...), p. 168-169.
17 R. McCalla, NATO’s Persistence After the Cold War, “International Organization”, June 22, 1996, p. 450-452; according to the literature review by Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan of 1973: “Most likely, the most widespread opinion on alliances holds that internal cohesion is shaped by external threat; it weakens when the threat is diminishing”. R. Holsti, T. Hopmann, J. Sullivan, Unity And Disintegration In International Alliances: Comparative Studies, New York 1973, p. 25.
18 In his case study of NATO, S. Walt showed four aspects that contribute to persistence of alliances: great asymmetry of forces among the Allies, common values, high level of institutionaliza-
Undoubtedly, NATO’s character has changed since the Cold War. A traditional alliance is established against a specific enemy and NATO does not have one. What initially was a political obligation, in the course of time became a complex political and military structure, providing a forum for debates concerning common problems, decision-making on the form of responses to challenges, as well as the methods and means of implementing these decisions. The evolution involves the fact that collective defence is no longer the basis of NATO’s identity. Gradually, collective security has become the underlying foundation. Translating theory into practice, the conclusion may be easily drawn that, during the Cold War period, NATO almost perfectly fitted the definition of a collective defence organization. This started to change after 1989.

A reconstruction of the process of the Alliance’s self-definition can be done by tracking its terms and the hierarchy of its objectives, as well as the corresponding grounds for these in the documents, papers, analyses and statements made by the leaders of member states and Alliance officials. Articulation of the entity’s interests involves the crystallization of its identity in international relations. During its 60 years of operation, the Alliance has frequently faced crises, ground-breaking in terms of their consequences. These have most often required reformulating or redefining its goals and tasks. According to the famous words of Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General, the role of the Alliance during the Cold War was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. It seemed that this was a universal task. However, the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November, 1989 and Germany was unified eleven months later. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were dissolved in 1991. It is no wonder that the beginning of the 1990s witnessed a lot of scepticism concerning the Alliance’s existence. The basic question was:
had the organization, established to defend the Western European states against Russian attack, become an anachronism?24 Facing such problems, a debate was initiated as to the possible evolution of NATO’s identity towards that of an institution with a wider role than that of collective defence. Determined to maintain NATO, the Unites States tried to redefine its role. It was also determined not to allow any autonomous European structure, for instance in the form presented by M. Gorbachev in his idea of a Common European Home, also including Russia, to emerge from it.25

However, the following years did not produce any widely accepted idea for the shape of the Alliance. The trends that were weakening its cohesion deepened, strengthened by additional factors.26 The end of NATO was being systematically announced.27 There was no stimulus which could have mobilized the member states to commence a dialogue concerning its transformation. Nevertheless, the Western states were not as secure as they might have thought they were. The two aircraft that struck the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September, 2001 turned out to be the harbingers of a phenomenon which significantly affected international security, at least, in the psychological sense, namely, terrorism. The Alliances’ response was instantaneous. The allied states invoked Article 5 within 24 hours of the attacks, for the first time in history. The obligation to support the United States was not limited territorially. Some admitted that it was the moment NATO de facto became a global alliance, i.e., that it had the ability to operate throughout the entire world.28 The Alliance demonstrated its determination to respond: on 9 October the NATO states deployed airborne early warning and control aircrafts (AWACS) in the United States within the framework of operation Eagle Assist and on 6 October they sent their forces to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, commencing operation Active Endeavour.29 NATO’s involvement, as a whole organization, in the events that took place in the United States, was con-

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24 I. Kiwerska, op. cit., p. 9-10.
26 For instance, one of the so-called “traps of expansion” is accepting new Allies that have a different perception of threats.
27 The analysis of popularity involving the announcement of a subsequent crisis of NATO: W. Thies, op. cit.
firmed during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held on 21 November, 2002 in Prague.\(^{30}\)

As has already been mentioned, the identification of the “collective self” is inseparably bound with the identification of “the others”, who are usually perceived as a threat.\(^{31}\) The identification of the threat – in this case being international terrorism – provided arguments for the following: firstly, for the sense of NATO’s existence; secondly – for the intensification of the debate involving the evolution of NATO’s identity in order to adapt it to the new circumstances. Taking into account these conditions, the Alliance had to perform its traditional tasks and assume new functions as well. Traditionally, the concept of security referred to the political and military spheres, called “hard security”. Now, however, the states identify “soft security” as covering new levels – economic, environmental, and social; thus, the military aspect has receded into the background.\(^{32}\)

The very essence of the changes in the contemporary security environment consists of the shifting of the “centre of gravity” from classic threats, such as an armed invasion, into new ones, such as international terrorism, WMD proliferation, consequences arising from the phenomenon of failed or failing states. Thus,

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\(^{30}\) In the Prague Summit Declaration, we can find direct references to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center: “Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO’s Strategic Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come. Today's decisions will provide for balanced and effective capabilities within the Alliance so that NATO can better carry out the full range of its missions and respond collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” The Prague Summit Declaration, text available on www.bbn.gov.pl.


\(^{32}\) M. Brown, Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century, Washington 2003, p. 310-312; the notion of non-military aspects of security was introduced to this subject by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who, in their work titled Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition stated that increasing correlations between states, tight bonds, not only the political ones, but also economical or social, lead to a situation in which the internal stability of a state may be threatened not only by armed conflicts, but also by economic and social crises which take on a transnational dimension. Actually, there is a wide literature concerning the phenomenon of expanding the scope of security. R. Keohane, J. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston 1989, p. 76. The complex description of the scale and scope of changes in the perception of the notion of security after the Cold War was proposed by the scientists representing the Copenhagen school. They distinguish five fundamental dimensions of security: military, political, economic, socio-cultural and ecological and three levels of analysis: systemic, national and sub-national. B. Buzan, J. Wilde, O. Waever, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder 1998.
new light is cast upon the issue of the classic instruments of defence against aggression. The importance of security services and police has increased. The role of armed forces has changed, because an effective defence against threats must frequently begin outside the territory of a given state. As a result, such a situation makes necessary the globalization of tasks, including military and preventive operations. The main dangers states may be faced with at present do not correspond to the classic conceptions of aggression. Previously, aggression had been determined by three main conditions. Firstly, the aggressor was a state, secondly, the invasion came from outside, thirdly – the aggressor had armed forces at its disposal. Terrorist attacks did not correspond to any of these three criteria. Nevertheless, their effects were comparable to the consequences of the use of modern weapons of mass destruction of limited power.  

However, the discussed events and transformations did not have only a positive, stimulating effect on the cooperation within the Alliance. In particular, the dispute over the intervention in Iraq and the subsequent series of unilateral moves by the United States within the framework of the “war against terrorism” have weakened NATO’s cohesion. Once more, as just after the end of the Cold War, there appeared many publications announcing the advent of the end of transatlantic cooperation. Donald Rumsfeld went on at length about there being two Europes – the “old Europe”, weak and unwilling to cooperate and the “new Europe”, oriented towards the same global goals that motivated Washington. The specific feeling of NATO’s irrelevance was also problematic. The American vision of the “mission defining coalition” was the opposite of what the European Allies wanted to hear. It took almost two years for the Alliance to become involved in Afghanistan to a greater extent. However, the biggest obstacle involved an increasing awareness among the Allies about their growing differences with regards to their perception of the threats to security and the required means and methods of responding to them. Consequently, the members had differing visions of what NATO should be and what spectrum of tasks it should carry out. It may be

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34 Both the diplomatic efforts and the operation itself showed fundamental differences in political views among the most important pillars of the Alliance, namely France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. The events also revealed deep discrepancies among the European powers and between bigger and smaller states in Europe. These discrepancies will not be removed quickly.
35 The study of the “transatlantic panic”: W. Thies, op. cit.
assumed that the Allies split into at least three main groups composed of states with similar visions of the goals and tasks for NATO. Such a division was adopted by experts from the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM – Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych), elaborating a review of the positions of member states concerning the new *Strategic Concept* that was approved in November 2010.\(^\text{37}\)

The first group of states was described as globalists. These members are primarily in favour of the greater involvement globally in the stabilization of the international situation on part of NATO. These states do not question the necessity of maintaining high-level operations relating to collective defence. Nevertheless, assuming the low likelihood of armed aggression in the traditional sense, NATO should focus on its potential to shape the international order and prevent the occurrence of threats to the security of its members, not only in the immediate vicinity of the NATO area, but also in regions that are remote in geographic terms. The position taken by the “globalists” is relatively close to that of the United States and Great Britain, as well as certain Western European states (Denmark and the Netherlands to some extent) and Canada.

The second group of states constitutes a kind of counterbalance – it is conventionally called the “Article 5 Coalition”. The members belonging to this group try to actually ensure the primacy of NATO’s fundamental functions, i.e., its capability to defend its territory and vicinity, as well as the population of the member states, over the remaining tasks. However, these states do not oppose the development of allied capacity in the scope of international stabilization. They only emphasize that the execution of these tasks should not adversely affect the fundamental functions. This position has been adopted by the majority of the states that have acceded to the Alliance since 1990, including Poland, and some Allies with longer experience, e.g., Norway and Turkey.

The third and last group of states was determined in the PISM report as being “passive, wavering and silent”. These states show little interest in the debate on the form of NATO’s identity. These states mainly assess their position in the context of traditional military threats. They focus on their own particular interests and, therefore, they may not perceive NATO as the only or the main instrument for meeting these interests. They are, first of all, interested in limiting the material and non-material costs of their participation in the Alliance. This is, for instance, the position taken by the southern states – Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy. Germany belongs to this group as well.

\(^{37}\) *Ibidem.*
New Threats as a Factor of NATO’s Evolution

NATO documents frequently mention four “new threats” that may have the greatest impact on the future of the Alliance: terrorism, WMD proliferation, cyber threats and threats related to the security of energy transport lines.\textsuperscript{38} They also list weakened or failed states, piracy and ecological threats. The new \textit{Strategic Concept} adopted during the Lisbon Summit in 2010, in the “Security Environment” section refers to such new threats as WMD proliferation, terrorism, and instability outside of the NATO area, cyber threats and threats to energy transport lines.

One of the most important features of those new threats is their global nature – they are global in terms of causes, scope of action and consequences. Therefore, they may require a global response. Otherwise, it may lead to a situation, in which they will be knocking directly at our door and become even more dangerous, as was vividly underlined many times by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the former Secretary General. There is no doubt that NATO will be faced more often with the dilemma of whether to deploy its military forces outside the Euro-Atlantic region. New threats often have a destabilizing effect on the whole state system. They frequently do not pose any threat to the independence, sovereignty or integrity of states, but to their citizens or infrastructures.\textsuperscript{39} Consequently they do not match the \textit{casus foederis} as defined in Article 5. The issue concerning the interpretation of NATO’s obligation resulting from this Article in the context of new threats remains open. The fact that NATO regarded the 9/11 attacks as an “armed attack” aroused great controversy.\textsuperscript{40} The doubts were partially dispelled with the adoption of the Lisbon concept, however, only practice will show the significance of the obligations assumed at the end of 2010. Still, it is highly dangerous to leave Article 5 undetermined. Different standards of responses allowed in similar situations will inevitably lead to the erosion of this, the key mechanism.

Moreover, new threats may not always exert a direct impact on hard security. They often, or even primarily, affect the political, economic, ecological or humanitarian spheres. The question then emerges as to whether NATO should address such threats at all, since it is mainly a military Pact using military tools. Supporters argue that the stability of states may be threatened not only by armed conflicts, but

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} For example, Raport Grupy Ekspertów (Expert Group’s Report) of 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{39} R. Kuźniar, \textit{Bezpieczeństwo – realizm oceny, dylematy polityki} (Security – Realism of Evaluation, Dilemmas of Politics), „Polska w Europie”, No. 3(41), 2002, p. 15-16.
\item \textsuperscript{40} The UN Security Council has never directly recognized in its resolutions No. 1368 and 1373 that the 9/11 attacks constituted an “armed attack” For more information on the topic cf. D. Svarc, \textit{Military Response to Terrorism and the Jus ad Bellum}, “Defence Against Terrorism Review”, No. 1/2008.
\end{itemize}
also economic and social crises of a transnational character.\textsuperscript{41} Whereas, opponents indicate, on the one hand, the danger of NATO becoming “blurred” and, on the other hand, they do not want to bear increased costs for their membership in the Alliance.

**NATO’s New Strategic Concept**

As has already been mentioned, the identity of an entity is expressed in the adoption of specific interests and goals and their prioritization. The interests of an entity show the identity, its values, historical output, traditions, current needs, aims and aspirations.\textsuperscript{42} They are primarily compared to the goals. They express a required state of affairs to be achieved or protected by these entities. The interests illustrate relations between the entities and their external environment.\textsuperscript{43} At the end of the last decade it became obvious that the Alliance required a new *Strategic Concept* corresponding to the changed international security environment. There was a need to define the relations between the traditional functions of the Alliance, i.e., deterrence, defence of member states and maintenance of the transatlantic bonds and the tasks resulting from the evolving role of NATO as an organization operating globally, i.e., out-of-area missions as well as cooperation with partners and international organizations. It was also important that the dispute over the functions to be assumed by the Alliance determined the extent to which it should consider non-military security aspects, such as energy security or cyberspace control.\textsuperscript{44}

The necessity of determining a hierarchy of interests and threats was one of the reasons why the process of creating the new Concept was so long and laborious.\textsuperscript{45} The Summit, which sought to adopt a new *Strategic Concept*, was held on 19-20 November in the capital of Portugal. The full title of the new *Strategic Concept* is: *Active Engagement. Modern Defence. The Strategic Concept of the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. The main assumption of this document is

\textsuperscript{41} R. Keohane, J. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*..., p. 76.
\textsuperscript{42} S. Koziej, *Wstęp do teorii i historii bezpieczeństwa*... (*Introduction to the Theory and History of Security* ...), p. 11.
\textsuperscript{44} M. Madej, *NATO przed szczytem jubileuszowym w Strasburgu/Kehl – główne wyzwania* (*NATO Before the Jubilee Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl – the Main Challenges*), Biuletyn PISM, No. 14 (546), 2009.
that the Alliance should still serve as the guarantor of the Allies’ security and an important element of global security in the new strategic environment.\textsuperscript{46} With regard to the Alliance’s self-definition, it must be stated that the new Concept has not explicitly prejuged the direction of NATO’s evolution. The ambiguity of the document provides, among other things, for the already-mentioned description of the international security environment. While not excluding the possibility of the occurrence of military threats, the priority challenges the Alliance faces are as follows: the proliferation of missile technologies and WMD, terrorism and all types of activities characteristic of cross-border organized crime, the security of data communication networks, and communication routes and energy resource supply routes. The militarization of outer space, outbreaks of disease, climatic changes and a shortage of water were also listed, to a lesser extent.

However, the above were regarded only as the areas for concern. As for the tasks – the status quo was maintained with regard to the three traditional missions of the Alliance. Collective defence and deterrence were listed first, with reference to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The subsequent two tasks involved crisis management and shaping the security environment. Defence still remains the main mission for the Alliance. Nevertheless, its definition is very broad and provides for new threats. Crisis management and preventive actions take up the biggest volume. It was stressed that distant events may pose a direct threat to the security of the Allies. Finally, when considering the third task, namely the formation of the international environment, the document seems to be at its least precise.\textsuperscript{47} The actual significance of this mission will be shaped in the Alliance’s future operations.\textsuperscript{48}

As to the method of execution, emphasis will be put on a comprehensive approach, through a deeper integration of the political and military instruments with the increasingly more important non-military preventive measures.\textsuperscript{49} Preparations for defence and joint actions may also cover such an event as a cyber attack or a terrorist attack on a gas or oil pipeline. Nevertheless, such acts will tend more to


\textsuperscript{48} The following activities were qualified as the elements of such missions: arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and cooperation (partnership) with states outside NATO (first of all, Russia) and international organizations in the scope of security consolidation, assuming the so-called “open door” policy (the possibility of admitting other European states to NATO, the ones that meet democratic standards).

\textsuperscript{49} E. Smolar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 92-93.
involve consultations based on Article 4. This sphere remains undefined. Secretary General Rasmussen explained that “he advocates a constructive ambiguity as to the application of Article 5 with regards to new threats, since it is difficult to determine in advance the scale of a cyber-attack that would be required to qualify it as requiring collective self-defence”.

To sum up, it must be emphasized again that the new Concept does not prejudge the Alliance’s evolution in any of the afore-mentioned directions and the final verification of the document will be made against the actual development of the international situation and based on the political interests of the main Allies. The Concept is a result of a compromise which is, in turn, the consequence of the necessity of meeting diverse and frequently contradictory demands relating to the majority of the aspects underlying NATO’s operation. At the same time, it illustrates the actual agreement achieved with regards to the most important issues – the tasks and goals of the Alliance.

With regards to the fundamental task of NATO – collective self-defence – the afore-mentioned changes have entailed a kind of de-territorialization of Article 5. The very nature of the new threats requires effective defence to be undertaken, sometimes far from the borders of the allied states. Other actions carried out by the Alliance, such as for instance, crisis management in situations similar to the events in Libya at the beginning of 2011, will require the Alliance to go outside of its immediate geographical area. By operating globally the Alliance surpasses the traditional scope of the definition of a military alliance. Going beyond its geographical area, coupled with NATO’s mandate to combat the new threats, constitutes a prevention factor. The globalization of tasks requires taking into consideration – from a new perspective – aspects related to the use of force and carrying out operations by using this force. It will also be necessary to develop relationships with new partners – other states and organizations. The fact of its globalization will make NATO into one element of a broader system, a platform of security for the Western states. Secretary General Rasmussen also envisages NATO becoming “the hub of a network for security partnerships and a centre for consultation on international security issues – even issues on which the Alliance might never take action”. To some extent, the Alliance serves as a security platform in


52 R. Kuźniar, NATO w nowym środowisku strategicznym… p. 21.

53 Quoted from: R. Weitz, To Deal with New Challenges, Should NATO Go Global?, “YaleGlobal”, February 2010, [www.yaleglobal.yale.edu].
Afghanistan, since it has coordinated the efforts of many states, international organizations and the remaining actors.

A New Identity for the Alliance?

As has been outlined in this paper, NATO’s identity may evolve in two general directions: it may return to the traditional tasks of a collective defence organization or transform into a collective security organization. Either option will entail transformations of the interests, goals, methods and means of operation. In turn, these changes condition the set of opportunities, challenges, risks and threats. If NATO returned to its original form – the classic collective self-defence organization – it would focus on the well-recognized achievable tasks, which ensure credibility and effectiveness. Some of the dilemmas would be solved. In order to counteract new threats, the Allies would concentrate, first of all, on closer cooperation and the coordination of actions carried out together with other international organizations. Although most member states are of the opinion that certain new threats pose a potential great danger, and the corresponding response must sometimes commence out-of-area, not all interests and hierarchies of goals coincide. Moreover, NATO states possess neither the potential nor the budget required to harmonize political aims with military and civil measures. If the Alliance were to revert to its narrow task of collective defence, these restrictions would be respected, at least partially. Moreover, assuming such a scenario would calm the concerns shown by those members who are worried about the perspective of the “watering down” of NATO’s functions resulting from Article 5. Then, the Alliance would focus on the defensive military missions and operate only within the direct vicinity of Europe. This static plan of development, however, does not provide for the new realities and needs of member states, which could result in a danger of the Alliance being marginalized.

Following the end of the Cold War, Washington put forward the concept of NATO as the “global policeman”, which would address complex security-related issues worldwide. In line with the vision of the Alliance as a collective self-defence organization, it would extend its missions so as to include more non-military tasks. NATO would develop its capabilities to address the whole spectrum of crises. The Alliance would extend its geographical area, also responding to needs arising outside the Euro-Atlantic region. In line with the vision of some experts, it would even admit democratic countries located outside Europe, such as Japan, Australia or South Korea. At the political level, the dialogue with other entities would be intensified. Such a scenario provides the main opportunity for providing complex security to all the member states. If the new challenges of the 21st century concerning terrorism or WMD proliferation were to become the most important pri-
orities for the Alliance, the American concept of extending its tasks should be its logical consequence. Nevertheless, the number of challenges, risks and threats is growing along with the increased activity. The described option of the evolution of NATO’s identity would require a clear definition of what is required by security itself. The original focus on Article 5 would be blurred. The political cohesion would diminish. It would prove an increasingly difficult task to achieve consensus. The Alliance’s ambitions would also face a lack of funds and means.\textsuperscript{54}

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Is a New Identity for NATO Possible?

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991 made the politicians and military leaders of NATO member states, and particularly of the United States, wonder about the future of the Alliance. The opinions of Russian politicians and military leaders that NATO should be dissolved because its traditional adversary had ceased to exist seemed rational, but only from the point of view of the Russian Federation. In turn, for most of the former Communist Bloc states, NATO was the only actual guarantor of peace and stability in the region and, in the long term, the alliance that they wanted to join as soon as possible. In addition, the “old” members were of the opinion that the existence of the Alliance would ensure the desired stability and control of the region in the time of “turbulent changes” in Central and Eastern Europe, although it seemed obvious to them that NATO would need to be transformed in the new geopolitical environment.

Subsequent expansions in 1999, 2004 and 2009 caused the number of member states to increase from 16 to 28, whereas the quality of the armed forces of the new members and the development of their economies varied and were at a much lower level than of those of the “old” sixteen. These new countries undoubtedly perceived the Alliance as an “insurance policy” for their security. At the same time, the military structures of the Alliance were changing so as to be ready for new challenges, especially to implement the lessons learned during previous operations.\(^1\) If we are to have the full picture, we must remember that, during the period discussed, the military budgets of the European NATO member states were shrinking, and the technology gap between the weaponry and equipment of the armed forces of the United States and other (especially European) member states was growing. Moreover, the world economic crisis of 2008 made things even more complicated.

During the two decades following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Alliance, having fought four wars during that time, seemed to be less aware than ever of its current and prospective identity. Neither the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the support for the insurgents in Libya, nor the ten-year war in Afghanistan have brought the Alliance together and given it an incentive to look for its

new identity. Were the issue not such a grave one, one might joke, by paraphrasing the famous line from the *Three Musketeers*, that NATO’s new motto should be: “all for themselves and none for all”. What is common for all NATO members is the tendency to hush problems up. The partners lack a common position as to what security is, what threats there are, and what the reaction to those threats should be in the world following the changes. There are as many opinions as there are member states on the issues involving fighting terrorism, intervention in civil wars, or conflicts emerging over the increasingly more difficult access to natural resources. It is worth stressing that geopolitical interests do not always overlap, especially for the largest members. The Alliance has turned into a multinational organization with military capabilities which exists merely for the sake of its existence.

The above-mentioned issues beg the question as to whether, in the context of the dynamic geopolitical situation, a new identity for NATO can be found which could be adapted to the present and future international security environment. This paper is an attempt to answer this question. The dissertation encompasses the period between the Lisbon Summit in 2010 and the Chicago Summit in 2012.

**Looking for a New Identity**

The new *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Active Engagement, Modern Defence)* is beyond any doubt the most intriguing aspect of the Lisbon Summit. The basis for the final version of the *Strategic Concept* was a report by twelve NATO experts, called by the press, the *Wise Men Group*. The changes that have occurred in the international security environment since the end of the Cold War forced heads of the member states to address the questions: if and if yes, to what extent, was the NATO *Strategic Concept* adopted in April 1999 an adequate response to the challenges and needs of the second decade of the 21st century? What is the role of the Alliance in the new international security environment in which risk and threats come from a sense of uncertainty, ambiguity, and instability and, consequently, unpredictability? There were further questions: is NATO still a defence alliance or is it being transformed into

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*See: Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Adopted by Heads of States and Governments at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, NATO, 19-20/11/2010, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int). The establishment of the *Wise Men Group* facilitated drafting the new strategy as they were not constrained by procedural limitations as opposed to the ambassadors of the 28 states in the NATO Council.*
a collective security organization? If so, to what extent does it fulfil its new function in this system and as a mechanism for crisis prevention and solution?\textsuperscript{3}

The strategy adopted in Lisbon defined three fundamental tasks for NATO:

- *collective defence* – a commitment to aid each other in the event of an attack in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, stressing the role of deterrence and protection against any threats of aggression;
- *crisis management* – using the appropriate political and military tools to help manage emerging crises and containing on-going conflicts which could interfere with the security of the Alliance, as well as supporting and strengthening stability in post-conflict situations;
- *security cooperation* – actions taken to strengthen international security, including: partnerships with the relevant states and other international organizations; contribution to arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament; keeping the “door open” for all European democratic states that meet NATO standards to join the Alliance.

The *Strategic Concept* has redefined the threats to the Alliance’s security, among which it counts: conventional threats (a military attack), including the proliferation of ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; terrorism; instability or conflicts out of area; cyber attacks; threats to transport routes supporting international trade and energy security (including reliance on foreign energy suppliers); technological threats (including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare, and technologies restricting access to outer space); restrictions in the area of the natural environment and resources (including health risks, climate change, shortage of drinking water, and increasing energy demand). The new political philosophy of NATO is expressed in its comprehensive approach and a new type of partnership with states and multilateral security institutions with which the Alliance should work (the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, etc.).

An agreement on conventional (*Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*) and nuclear arms control, increasing the importance of the partnership relations between NATO and the European Union, and differentiating partnerships with various states are undoubtedly great achievements of the Lisbon Summit. Equally important was the confirmation of the decisions of the Bucharest Summit on the

“open door” policy (concerning the prospective membership of Ukraine and Georgia). Furthermore, decisions were made as to the shape of the cooperation between NATO and Russia in the area of security. It is worth noting that NATO - Russian relations should be perceived as an integral part of the global political process, which is not simply an implementation of the above-mentioned assumptions and models. Still, for Russia, the expansion constitutes a threat to its security, and what is more, it calls for differentiation in the approach to the issue of the security of “old” and “new” member states in the proposed internal NATO regulations.4

The joint list of challenges and threats adopted in Lisbon which opens up new perspectives on combating terrorism, piracy, WMD proliferation, cooperation on disaster management, and Russia helping NATO in its missions in Afghanistan, is of vital importance for NATO - Russia cooperation. NATO has declared its readiness to cooperate with Russia on missile defence on a basis of cooperation and communication, as opposed to establishing a common ballistic missile defence system.

Referring back to the strategy adopted in Lisbon, NATO should fulfil some basic functions under the new circumstances: providing member states with protection (ensuring security), deterring any potential aggressor (mainly by nuclear deterrence), ensuring intervention capabilities, particularly in the areas of terrorist threats (expeditionary missions), crisis management and prevention in the Alliance border zones (partnership), and ensuring stability both within the Transatlantic area and worldwide.5 The end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan on December 31, 2014 is yet another noteworthy result of the Lisbon Summit.

To sum up the report on the Lisbon Summit, it is worth quoting the words of Madeleine Albright, head of the Wise Men Group, from her letter to the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in connection with the submission of the Report of the Group of Experts: NATO “remains without peer, a powerful military alliance that has safeguarded and promoted the democratic values of its members. It provides a crucial link binding North America and Europe (...) The combination of assured security at home and dynamic engagement abroad will be NATO’s touchstone in the decades to come”.6

The next NATO Summit took place in Chicago and was preceded by the Unified Protector operation in Libya (March 27 - October 31, 2011)7 with only a few

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5 A.D. Rotfeld, op. cit., p. 22.
6 Ibidem, p. 24-25.
7 The Unified Protector operation – a sea and air operation devised to enforce the UN SC resolutions nos. 1970 and 1973. It was taken over by NATO on March 25, 2011 from the coalition states which initiated an intervention in Libya on March 19. The full responsibility for the supervision of the no-flight zone was entrusted
European members involved (10 states, of which only eight were involved in combat operations). The Summit was called during a difficult period for NATO: the United States were clearly less interested in Europe, the economic crisis had considerably affected military budgets, and the most important matter for NATO was how to withdraw from Afghanistan without losing face. Furthermore, of the states invited from outside NATO, Russia and its allies, Belarus and Armenia, boycotted the Summit which was indicative of the tensions in the NATO - Russian relationship. The significance of this fact, however, should not be taken out of proportion and be perceived rather as a “set piece” of Russian diplomacy. Due to the above-mentioned factors, it would not have been expected to be a kind of a breakthrough or a meeting of strategic importance. It is also possible that it was held because of the elections in the United States. Undoubtedly, the Chicago Summit was a great media and logistics operation, with approximately 60 decision-makers from the member states, aspirants, and other countries important to NATO for military and political reasons, including the presidents of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, and of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari.

Four documents were adopted by the NATO heads of states and governments at the Chicago Summit: the general Summit Declaration, the Declaration on Defence Capabilities, the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, and the Declaration on Afghanistan (made by the states involved in the ISAF mission). The contents of the declarations are not classified. Hence the paper will be limited to the most important issues for the creation of a new identity for NATO that results from the contents of the declarations and the proceedings during the Chicago Summit.

It was concluded during the Lisbon Summit that the “stabilization mission” in Afghanistan is the focal point of the Alliance’s attention as an important task but it should not under any circumstances be treated as a kind of NATO credibility test. The Chicago Summit confirmed the date of the end of the ISAF mission and the commencement of a new one involving training, consultations, and support which would be backed up by a resolution to be adopted by the UN Security Council. The Declaration on Afghanistan includes the arrangements for the handing over of responsibility for the country to the Afghans but it does not suggest a hasty evacuation of the coalition forces. French withdrawal of 3,300 soldiers by the end of 2012 indicates the lack of a common, believable and feasible direction in the long

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8 From among the NATO member states, the following contributed their forces to the sea component: Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and to the air component: Norway and Spain.

9 More on this topic cf. P. Wroński, Przed szczytem w Chicago. NATO po przejściach, (Before the Chicago Summit. NATO with Bad Experience), “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 18/05/2012, [www.wyborcza.pl].
term, concerning the withdrawal from Afghanistan\(^{10}\) and the subsequent aid for this country. It is expected that the Afghan government will continue to increase its spending on the prospective 228 thousand soldiers and policemen of the Afghan security forces (of which there are currently 335 thousand) which is currently estimated to total USD 4.1 billion. Kabul is supposed to contribute initially at least USD 500 million in 2015 and take over the financial responsibility for security by no later than 2024. The United States would contribute approximately USD 2.3 billion but wants other allies to undertake to cover the rest, approximately USD 1.3 billion, a target they did not achieve during the Chicago Summit.\(^{11}\) None of the member states are particularly keen on making multimillion dollar contributions, particularly in a time of economic crisis and having made long-term outlays regarding the War in Afghanistan. The Chicago Summit was intended to send a message to the West that the unpopular war was close to an end and, on the other hand, to assure the Afghan community that it would not be left alone. It is quite probable that the societies of the West and Asia are well aware that the road to stability in this country is long and winding.\(^{12}\)

The second issue concerning Afghanistan is Pakistan’s position on reopening the ISAF ground supply routes in its territory. President Zardari did not announce the end of the blockade on this most convenient supply line to Afghanistan at the Chicago Summit. The withdrawal of NATO forces will require the movement of approximately 130 thousand soldiers. In light of this, President Obama mentioned only Russia and the states in Central Asia as the countries willing to assist with the transportation. This fact is of great importance for the future of NATO, particularly in the context of its eastward expansion as well as to U.S. policy. The more strained the relations with Islamabad, the more important good relations with Moscow are.

The ballistic missile defence system was the second main topic of the Summit. The Secretary General announced the “preliminary capability” of the missile defence, meaning the end of the first phase out of the four planned for the initiative in Europe. The fact is that the possibility of discontinuing the project at a later stage, depending on the international situation, particularly the Iranian nuclear programme was discussed during the Summit. The core element of the current antiballistic defence is the SM-3 missiles carried by the U.S. Navy vessels in the Mediterranean Sea. Hence the proclamation of the operational readiness of the

\(^{10}\) Berlin does not support the French stance and nothing indicates that after the election victory in the autumn 2013 the position of the CDU/CSU will change.

\(^{11}\) See: Decyzje szczytu NATO w Chicago (The Decisions of the Chicago NATO Summit), “Stosunki Międzynarodowe”, 22/05/2012, [www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info](http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info).

\(^{12}\) See: M. Rogus, Dokąd zmierza Sojusz? (Where is the Alliance Heading for?), “ARMIA”, 6/2012, p. 11.
system seems to be a propaganda manoeuvre rather than a statement of fact as the
ships may be needed elsewhere and the only reliable element is the radar station in
Turkey and the AN/TPY-2 mobile radars based at the Ramstein base. That is why
the prospect of establishing a ballistic missile defence system in Europe still
remains only a possibility for the future. This is especially true, given that the Rus-
sian stance does not seem to be about to change in the near future. It perceives the
shield as a threat to the effectiveness of its strategic nuclear forces. Let us just
recall that before the Chicago Summit, General Nikolai Makarov (the then Chief
of the General Staff and the First Deputy Minister of Defence) warned that a pre-
ventive strike on the ballistic missile defence system installations in Central Europe
was possible if Russian – United States - NATO relations deteriorated.\textsuperscript{13}

The leaders of the Alliance reiterated in the general declaration that “NATO’s
door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our
Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations
of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and
whose inclusion can contribute to security in the North Atlantic area.” General
support for the aspiring candidate states was also declared: Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Georgia. The Euro - Atlantic integration of
Serbia and further partnership with Ukraine also received positive responses.
It should be remembered, however, that no formal decisions as to the acceptance
of new members were made, no one was officially invited, and no one was given
a specific promise. This may even raise a question as to whether NATO’s capabili-
ties in this regard are not depleted, although the position taken by Hillary Clinton,
former United States Secretary of State, during the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council on May 21, 2012 might be indicative of the will to enlarge the Alliance
further and the Chicago Summit being just a dishonourable exception.\textsuperscript{14} Realistical-
ly addressing the possibility of expansion in the near future, it is obvious that it is
possible for a few Balkan states to be admitted but the only rational direction
eastwards is inaccessible due to Russia becoming increasingly more important to
the Alliance.\textsuperscript{15}

Judging from the “legacy” of the Chicago Summit, it may be concluded that,
contrary to the assurances of its participants, particularly President Barack Obama,
the Alliance is no longer a unified organization and is surely heading towards
a crisis. According to Stratfor, the American research centre, “the NATO mission,
at least in Europe, is not precisely defined. In the context of deep economic, polit-

\textsuperscript{13} Decyzje szczęścia...

\textsuperscript{14} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{15} See: K. Neumann, \textit{Jaka jest przyszłość NATO i czy Rosja powinna zostać członkiem Sojuszu? (What is the Future of NATO and Should Russia Become a Member?)}, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Issue 20, 2011.
ical and social changes going on around the world, NATO is in a state of limbo and relegated to the background”. Europe is busy with its own internal economic and political crisis and, for the time being, ignoring its declining role in the Alliance, reducing defence budgets, and underestimating the increasing threat on the part of Russia. The difference in the stances presented by the U.S. and other NATO members has been becoming more apparent. All the NATO operations since the beginning of the enlargement have been exhibiting great difficulties both in the spheres of decision-making and logistics (materials). The U.S. is aware that it can count only on itself when it comes to military interventions around the world. Additional difficulties result from the fact that today, NATO has become an instrument used, and often abused by its “owners” (Afghanistan: the United States; Libya: France and United Kingdom). Probably, the United States and other member states will be reluctant to get involved in new interventions after the Afghan “experience”.

The two most important and positive outcomes of the Chicago Summit are: the establishment of permanent NATO air patrols over the Baltic member states and the Steadfast Jazz exercises in Poland and the Baltic states which may be understood as a token of support for the NATO border states. Although it does not mean a return to the Cold War situation, Russia has no reason to be enthusiastic about it. Additionally, the Smart Defence idea is worthy of note as a tool for building the Alliances’ task-handling capability. Together with the European Union’s Pooling and Sharing concept, it offers the chance to improve the military capabilities of the European states, particularly the new NATO members.

It is high time that the fundamental question of this paper was answered: did the Lisbon and Chicago Summits manage to create and bestow a new identity upon NATO? Unfortunately, the answer is no, as all of the attempts to give NATO a new identity have so far failed. Despite the positive publicity in the Polish media around both Summits, the reorientation of the Alliance’s strategy towards a new

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16 “Drogi europejskich członków NATO i USA rozchodzą się” (“The Paths of the European Member States and the US Diverge”), “Wirtualna Polska”, 22/05/2012, [www.konflikty.wp.pl].
17 It is the so-called Robertson’s Index (adopted during the Prague Summit in 2002) defining the defence national budget as 2 percent of the national income 20 percent of which should be allocated to weaponry. This group comprises: Poland, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey. In absolute values, the largest budgets have (starting with the largest one): United Kingdom, Turkey, France, Germany, and Italy. It is worth noting that the ratio of the U.S. defence budget and the largest European budget (United Kingdom) is 10:1. See also: M. Leonard, Will the Europeans ever get their act together on security?, European Council on Foreign Relations, 15/02/2012, [www.ecfr.eu].
direction: \textit{home first}), both the \textit{Strategic Concept} and the subsequent declarations have been drawn up very skilfully in terms of their blurring of the differences among NATO members. Yet, its transformation and attempts to address the emerging challenges of our times (cyber security, freedom of navigation, and the use of air-space and outer space) are evident. It is difficult to judge what “holds NATO together” at the moment. Is it its expansion and relations with Russia or the response to the threats of the globalized world? What is worse, it does not seem that Russia is going to change its attitude towards the role of NATO and after the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan it appears that Russia has “better cards” in this game.\footnote{An example of this mode of thought: A. Первушин, \textit{Кто угрожает России? Вызовы будущего}, Moscow 2011, especially the chapter: Варианты Третьей мировой: НАТО против России, p. 277-288.}

While appreciating the role and importance of the documents adopted at the two Summits and of their subsequent implementation, the question needs to be answered as to what the decisive factors are for NATO’s future form and status. Two fundamental elements seem to be apparent. First and foremost, the economic factors (crisis-related austerity and political decisions to reduce armed forces) and secondly, geopolitical reasons (the United States shifting their focus from the Atlantic area to the Pacific). The above situation has been aptly summed up by the \textit{Stratfor} research centre and the \textit{Financial Times}: “The U.S. and NATO members in Europe are taking increasingly divergent paths as military actors. The U.S. is styling itself as a Pacific rather than a European power, one focused on the challenge from China. Meanwhile, European governments are slashing defence budgets to cope with the economic maelstrom. Taken together, these trends are pushing NATO towards a crisis. The U.S. is finding Europe less and less relevant to its own defensive needs. Europe, meanwhile, appears to be deaf to warnings from America that the old continent needs to spend more on its security needs”.\footnote{Quoted in: \textit{Stratfor i brytyjskie media o szczycie NATO (Stratfor and the British Media on the NATO Summit)}, \textit{Onet.pl}, 22/05/2012, \url{www.biznes.onet.pl}. More on the topics discussed here can be found in: G. Friedman, \textit{Następna dekada. Gdzie byliśmy i dokąd zmierzamy (The Next Decade. Where we’ve been... and where we’re going)}, Kraków 2012, p. 161-205.}

Obviously, the question about the new identity of NATO will be answered with time, probably not too far in the future. Bearing in mind the “list” of disputed territories of unrecognized states, terrorism, piracy, energy deficiency, access to drinking water, food, and climate change, the ways that NATO can respond to the threats present in a globalized world will be greatly limited. NATO’s potential to implement a credible intervention in places where threats to the Alliance occur in the framework of the very broad range of possible actions included in the
Lisbon strategy, are questionable. The matters are further complicated by the fact that the Western communities do not want their professional soldiers to die in wars (this is a completely new social aspect of military strategy), whereas in unstable states, societies are more willing to make sacrifices because their attitude towards violence has not changed and demographic indices are high.\textsuperscript{21} It is also important for the United States to continue to be involved in Europe in the long term to maintain the Transatlantic bonds. There are two underlying reasons: first, to ensure long-term peace and stability in relations with Russia and second, because Europe does not have (and will not have for some time) capabilities to respond globally, yet the challenges it faces are of a global nature, hence the need for a partner that could act globally. From the U.S. perspective, NATO can play a double role: it can be the decisive instrument for providing stability to the area, including Russia and North Africa, and as one of the tools the U.S. needs to reduce its financial burden (putting its security in danger) to ensure global stability.\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{Conclusions}

Defining a new identity for NATO requires the consideration of many factors. These are the factors influencing the quality of the Alliance and, subsequently, the effectiveness of its struggle with the threats to security in the 21st century. One of the basic factors is the uniform and unambiguous perception of Article 5 (the key mission of NATO) and the appropriate methods of its implementation in the conditions of the “new type of warfare” with both states and non-state groups in play which are structurally vague and decentralized and which use asymmetric weaponry and means ranging from the technologically advanced down to the “primitive”. It should be noted that such groups do not follow NATO (or Western) concepts of war: minimizing causalities, avoiding civilian losses, and terminating operations as soon as feasible. Another weighty question is: is it possible for non-state actors to be “empowered” by state actors to attack NATO? Because of the unambiguous interpretation of Article 5 (“... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force ...”) that such assistance could be limited (for various reasons).

Another dilemma involving Article 5 is the false dispute over the priority of the Alliance: should it focus on territorial defence or expeditionary capabilities? The eastern member states still perceive Russia as the greatest threat and are more interested in territorial defence planning, whereas the western states would like to see Moscow as a close partner. As many members point out, the defence of


NATO’s territory (especially its borders) requires expeditionary capabilities (mobility, precision, interoperability) which actually strengthen defence rather than weaken it. What is more, NATO territorial defence is still the focal point of defence planning. Yet, the modern challenges to security are increasingly at odds with this assumption (ballistic missiles, cyber threats). How to defend against these types of threats in an era of constrained resources (and lower defence spending) is the central question for the Alliance at a time when there is not always a consensus on future threats, necessary capabilities (missile defence), and on the use of force itself (national caveats).

The current problems stemming from the financial crisis that the European Union has to tackle suggest that it will not be able to create a credible identity in the area of security and defence, so the European territory of NATO seems to be the most reliable mechanism for joint actions that can cater for these needs. This does not rule out the possibility of the two organizations cooperating with each other. An important step will be to introduce savings in defence using methods based on cooperation, which will surely be a difficult task for many NATO members. The experience suggests also that there will be no political will among the Alliance members in the near future to lead “ambitious” operations outside of the NATO area of responsibility and even less to support the stabilization phase after the end of a conflict.

The U.S. stance on the maintenance of the Transatlantic bonds (the Transatlantic dialogue) will play a key role in creating NATO’s new identity. The experience following the end of the two-bloc division, especially with regard to the involvement of NATO armed forces in military conflicts indicates beyond any doubt that without the assistance of this member, the military capabilities of the European states (even the big ones) are limited, especially in the area of intelligence, reconnaissance, command systems, and, most of all, logistics. The shift of focus of the U.S.’s security policy to South-East Asia would be the worst solution for the European security system. The future of NATO will be decided in Europe and by the relations between Europe and the United States.

It is possible to create a new identity for NATO but it will most probably be forced in the course of practice (geopolitics, finances, and threats) and not by a brilliant intellectual idea or a compromise between members of the Alliance. Today, it is difficult to predict what could be the fundamental “adhesive” binding NATO together as there was from 1949 - 1991. It seems that despite the Lisbon and Chicago Summits, NATO is still in statu nascendi when it comes to building its identity and in the best scenario the role of the adhesive is played by the expansion of the security zone in Europe by enlarging (strengthening) NATO and through relations with Russia.
At the time of an apparent identity crisis in NATO, its leaders should assess the situation and indicate weak spots rather than make optimistic declarations. This would be the most rational solution and would enable member states to take appropriate actions to their defence needs. Large organizations such as NATO which lost their purpose and *raison d'etre* do not cease to exist but vegetate despite the fact that there are reasons for them to be active in the modern world. It would be wise to have an efficient Alliance when facing the threats of the 21st century. If NATO still wants to achieve something, it needs to assess its status thoroughly. This may lead to the conclusion that the Alliance is no longer the Alliance but this risk is easier to bear than the perspective of more years in a political coma.
CHAPTER II

NATO – the Polish Perspective
Evolution of NATO and Poland’s Security

The subject of the evolution of NATO and the security of Poland are particularly important in the context of the ever greater uncertainty, lack of clarity and unpredictability in international relations, phenomena often described as chaos or even anarchy, with certain qualities of the return to geopolitics. If one was to look at similar analyses from not more than ten years ago, it would be obvious that the spectrum of new phenomena that need to be taken into consideration in the context of security is much wider now.¹

The Transformation of NATO

Even during the time of Poland’s accession in 1999, NATO was becoming something other than a standard military alliance to protect the territories of the member-states from a clearly defined enemy (during the Cold War: the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact) in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949. The North Atlantic Alliance has been transforming into a new entity. What has emerged from the cocoon is not unambiguous for Poland. Apart from collective defence, NATO responsibilities comprise: enhancing global and regional stability, pursuing security interests outside the strictly military domain, and facing up to new, often non-military, security threats and challenges, e.g., cyber-attacks, latest generation missiles or blockages of gas and oil pipe lines.

Some of the main justifications for the continuation of NATO’s transformation, in addition to the above-mentioned threats, are: the worldwide financial crisis, the need to reduce the number and scope of stabilisation operations, the development of missile technology, the crises over the conventional armed forces regime in Europe, Russia - NATO relations, including missile defence, and an increasing number of cross-border and unconventional threats to which military solutions are not applicable. Confrontations with unconventional trans-border threats, e.g., terrorism, cyber attacks, and piracy, have forced NATO to reach “out

of area”. The assumption of the need for this was the basis for NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan as a part of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force).

For at least a decade NATO has become increasingly interested in collective security, shaping the right culture for using force and developing standards with regard to security and nations’ internal policies, not just for defence but also for maintaining a balance in military security (the classical geostrategy approach) and affirming blocks and divisions.

Collective defence (including military operations without the United Nations Security Council’s authorization despite being more and more internal disputes) and defence planning are officially still the main aspect of the Alliance’s acquis, but are no longer NATO’s only mode of activity, as it used to be during the Cold War. Putting the ISAF operations in Afghanistan aside, the priorities are now stabilisation and peacekeeping, supporting governments in countries facing challenges connected with the and democratisation of defence policy, especially in terms of civil control over armed forces in partner countries.

Instead of focusing solely on a strategic enemy that does not exist anymore, the Alliance attempts to face trans-border threats and challenges such as terrorism, piracy, protection of civilian populations during armed conflicts (Libya) and energy security. The same pertains to fighting organised crime, drugs and providing help in the case of disasters, such as the flood in New Orleans or the earthquake in Pakistan. Accordingly, the Alliance has offered its members and countries working with NATO a kind of a “security service”, e.g., stabilisation missions, protective operations (helping the Balkan countries maintain the security of their airspace – with Air Police operation), counter-terrorist and counter-piracy measures (e.g., in the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea), broad cooperation concerning security issues (the Mediterranean Dialogue or cooperation with the Gulf states), many collective activities in the framework of the Partnership for Peace (including civil control over armed forces and the so-called interoperability), the training of armed forces (Iraq, Afghanistan), countermeasures for cyber attacks, etc.

NATO’s Non-military Tasks

The Alliance’s comprehensive approach to tasks in the case of stabilisation and peacekeeping missions that is, in principle, based on American experience, means in practice combining military measures with aid for rebuilding state structures and economical, educational, and environmental protection. For example, in 2011, the Polish contingent in Ghazni province, Afghanistan, aside from its purely military tasks, spent PLN 55 million of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych) budget between 2008 and 2011 on 72 civil institutional projects: roads, bridges, wells, sewage treatment plants, landfills, health care, and even
bazaars, so popular among the locals. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) system facilitates such an approach in Afghanistan as it combines military and civil measures, especially in consolidating the state structure and in state restructuring. New means of war, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), also pose new challenges. The main concern is the manner of warning and the duty to warn civilians of a planned attack, so that civilian casualties can be avoided. The issue is at an early stage of discussion, but it is important to be aware of the need to control this type of force.

It is worth mentioning the popularity of NATO’s measures that fall outside the strictly military domain, e.g., the above-mentioned partnership, training external armed forces of various kinds, assistance with the restructuring of transportation and communication systems, and applying the “comprehensive approach to crisis management”. This approach involves the comprehensive utilisation of non-military measures, such as help with rebuilding a state and the state’s organisation, financial aid, expertise, etc. These measures are of a different quality compared to the Cold War period when the threat, defence capabilities and analysis of enemy actions were the main focus of interest. Finally, the dialogue of the Alliance has changed, from confrontational to cooperative.

The new, developing NATO strategic culture reflects in broader terms its new profile: it facilitates not only a “civilized” use of limited force, but also reinforces a new, wider sense of security. It does not fully confirm to Roman Kuźniar’s theory from a few years back (Warsaw, 2005) that the Alliance was evolving towards a kind of security community or organization. At the eve of the first decade of the 21st century, another, parallel, tendency is the strengthening of the traditional defensive function of the Alliance, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The decisions of the Lisbon and Chicago Summits, especially the so-called new Strategic Concept, and events, including joint military exercises, serve to prove this tendency. It is worth mentioning that the new Strategic Concept includes three goals: collective self-defence, conflict management and the development of a collective security system. Only the first of the above was included in the Washington Treaty. It should be noted that, during the disputes, some of the Western allies were against retaining the reference to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

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2 “Polska Zbrojna”, Issue 1 (792), April 2012.
3 More on this topic, see: J.M. Nowak, “…i nie będą się już uczyć sztuki wojennej”, Wzmocnienie czy osłabienie tendencji do używania siły w strefie euroatlantyckiej (“…Neither Shall They Learn the Art of War Any More.” Increase or Decrease in the Tendency to Use Force in the Euro Atlantic Area), “Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, Issue 1 (63), 2012.
Treaty saying that there was no enemy (a strategic enemy; terrorism and piracy are still enemies) and no reason to mention collective self-defence.

Some Current Issues

According to most analysts, NATO is weakened and is searching for its identity in the new international environment. A lack of political will and differences on many issues, especially on its policy towards Russia, are more and more apparent. The situation may become worse after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 when it will be the first time in many years that NATO has had no major stabilisation operation to run and a much smaller budget. Thus, new issues and challenges have arisen, some of which are: how to ensure effective deterrence and territorial defence? Can the Alliance afford to ignore global challenges and security threats? How to set operational priorities in times of austerity? How to cope with the reduction of the American presence in Europe? How to ensure unity towards the Russian Federation? Is enlargement, especially the admission of Ukraine, a realistic option? Under these new circumstances, more political will to keep NATO in good shape as the basis for security in the Euro-Atlantic area will probably be generated.

Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges warns that, regardless of the difficulties, the Alliance will have to retain its operational capabilities, at least in the form of a “50/50 challenge”, i.e., covering at least half the cost and efforts of an emergency stabilisation operation. The other half could be provided by the allies from their national force structures. What will undoubtedly be retained are: the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the integrated air defence system, the collective protection of the airspace of the Baltic states, the ballistic missile defence systems, AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance) and cyber defence will be further developed. It would be unwise not to take advantage of the AWACS aircrafts and air-to-air refuelling capabilities. New missile technologies and unmanned combat air vehicles cannot be underestimated in their role as a new offensive capability in special conditions. The need to combat terrorism and global crime will also force intelligence services to engage in more advanced forms of cooperation.

The economic and financial crisis has forced NATO to rationalize its expenditures and revisit its existing structures, although in comparison to other international organisations, the Alliance is neither a high-cost nor overly bureaucratic

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institutions. The current development of the *Smart Defence* plan suggests that it will become a long-term method for the cost-effective shaping of the Alliance’s military capabilities and cooperation in a manner similar to the European Union’s *Pooling and Sharing*. Any projects in this domain require members to overcome their own psychologically based reluctance resulting from the traditional approach to such matters where countries maintain a self-reliant and independent defence and they do not share their own technologies and intelligence with partners, even allies. The latter mentality is characteristic of the United States.

Keeping the United States engaged in NATO despite their strategic attention being shifted towards Asia will require great political and diplomatic skills. Let us not forget that the United States still provides 75 percent of NATO’s budget, has the greatest military capabilities, and the latest military technology and transport. Adjusting to American policy requirements should involve, among other things: retaining at least one American brigade on the continent (preferably one assigned to NATO), strengthening Washington’s readiness for immediate cooperation with its European allies in case of a threat (*contingency posture*), especially with states similar to Poland, which are on the border of the Alliance, where the balance of conventional forces is locally disadvantageous. Europe needs to strengthen its European defence pillar, including improving its defensive capabilities and allocating rational defence funds.

Relations with Russia are and will continue to be a particular challenge. The hopes for the increased democratisation of Russia (not necessarily according to Western standards) have faded, making Moscow’s military policy more difficult to predict. The war with Georgia in 2008 and military exercises, which were threatening towards NATO and were especially aggressive towards Poland and Lithuania, *Zapad 2009* were a form of wake-up call for the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The first months of another term of the presidency of Vladimir Putin chilled the relations with the West (Iran, Syria). NATO remained the main opponent, if not the enemy in Russia’s doctrine, with the CFE (*Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe*) being suspended and tactical missiles and intermediate-range missiles developed without any transparency towards European partners. Not only have the Allies’ ballistic missile defence system projects been declined (as well as their demands to be able to take part in the decision process), but they have also become the subject of threats by high-ranking politicians and military officials.

All this does not mean there is a threat of a mass-attack on NATO, but the challenges cannot be ignored. As a result, the call by some Western allies and by a part of NATO’s bureaucracy not to concentrate at this very moment on the
divisions but on quick “historic accommodation”\textsuperscript{7} seems slightly unrealistic. A double-track policy is thus unavoidable: on the one hand NATO needs to continue the “strategic partnership” and on the other hand, it has to take into consideration all the negative aspects of Russia’s policy towards the Alliance in its calculations and defence planning. If this policy bears fruit, the “historic accommodation” will be possible.

Special attention must be paid to stimulating the political will to strengthen NATO in the new international environment. It would mean, among other things, a smart harmonisation of the allies’ security policies by giving more value to political consultation and improving the operation of services responsible for developing good political prognosis of international affairs and threats, etc. What is more, in the context of reforming NATO, it would be a miscalculation to weaken or reduce well developed partnership arrangements that facilitate the functioning of the Alliance\textsuperscript{8}. These evidently strengthen the Alliance, belying their relatively low material costs.

Enlargement has been dropped in importance in the agenda, but it should not be ignored. It mainly concerns Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Georgia. This is of particular interest to Poland, especially in light of Poland and others’ search for a practical answer to the question: how to include Ukraine in the transatlantic universe when it is in such a problematical internal condition?

\textit{A New Model for NATO?}

The above-mentioned Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, Jamie Shea, whose views reflect the thinking of the NATO International Secretariat’s intellectual hub, even mentions a “strategic dilemma” in his analysis of NATO’s relevance. This dilemma consists of the desire to de-prioritize territorial defence in favour of orientating towards new threats in a time of austerity when it is difficult to find assets and personnel for stabilization operations. In his opinion NATO has evolved from a defence into a security organisation.\textsuperscript{9} Without jumping too far ahead, it should be mentioned that such a statement triggered red alerts in the offices of Polish strategists.

British political scientist and high-ranking European Commission official, Robert Cooper, proposes viewing NATO as being in the process of gradually

\textsuperscript{7} Ibidem, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{8} I.e. the “strategic partnership” with Russia, “distinct partnership” with Ukraine, partnerships with Afghanistan and Georgia, EAPC, \textit{Mediterranean Dialogue}, \textit{Istanbul Cooperation Initiative} (cooperation with the Persian Gulf states), cooperation with other states (Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand).

\textsuperscript{9} Ibidem, p. 1.
becoming an increasingly global, rather postmodern defence-stabilisation alliance. According to Cooper, a postmodern system is characterized by a drifting away from the traditional ideas of the balance of power, the sacrosanct character of sovereignty, and separating internal and international affairs. In such a system, cooperation, confidence-building measures, transparency, a legitimate insight into partners’ internal affairs, common institutions (including international institutions), and a focus on resolving arguments and peaceful conflict management, play a particularly significant role.\(^\text{10}\)

This current position of the Alliance results from its constant transformations throughout the first and second decade of the 21st century. Whether this new organisation will be successful depends on several factors, such as, whether NATO can become the centre of the West’s efficient strategy coordination and effective defence policy pertaining to so-called hard security (soft security becoming more and more the domain of the European Union) and whether it can successfully move away from the apathy of the western allies characteristic of the first decade of the 21st century, exhibited in attempts at renationalizing security policy, especially with relation to Russia, among other things.

The fact is, it is the United States that inspires (not completely flawlessly, as in the case of George W. Bush) transformation and dialogue, when Europe, Western Europe to be precise, is passive, pacifistic or reactive, demanding “peace bonuses”, such as radical defence budget cuts, in connection with the end of the Cold War. All this is increased by the European Union’s strategic culture (“emanation of good and peace”, according to European jargon). This culture is not very distinct from that of NATO, yet it places even more emphasis on peaceful and cooperative methods, peaceful crisis management, a reliance on civil power and financial help for crisis-ridden states. Unfortunately, the chaotic development of modern international relations does not allow for the exclusion of force, even if legitimate and as limited as possible. This is especially regretful in light of civilian casualties.

It is no coincidence that the term “Western” is fast disappearing from the Western European allies’ lexicon. Its disappearance may be attributed to the increase of consumerist and pacifist public feeling in Western Europe and to the lack of a common enemy in the collective consciousness, among other factors. The idea of “the West” which was so useful in creating the democratic community of western states as a subject of international relations and force design is now ever more frequently being replaced with the slightly bland term, “the Euro-Atlantic area”. From the Polish perspective, a return of the term “the West” or “the Western Community” and a change to its meaning would be advantageous.

as a symbolic renewing of the position of the, currently broader, West in global politics. NATO could be a modern “military arm” of such a community, supplemented by the European Union’s “soft security”.

The new Strategic Concept formulated by the decisions of the NATO summits in Lisbon 2011 and Chicago 2012 encompasses ideas such as: the new nature of threats and challenges to security and stabilisation, Euro-Atlantic solidarity in the new environment, defining the direction of the transformation, the nature and efficiency of commitments to collective defence against a possible attack, and the so-called “visible assurances”, i.e.: developing projects which facilitate the meaningful acceptance of support in the case of a threat, increasing the presence of Allied structures.\textsuperscript{11} The latter is of particular importance to Central Europe; it would be a strengthening of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in such a way that the allies would react immediately, automatically and with all available assets in times of difficulty.

Without going into too much detail, it is possible to plausibly predict that, despite the allies’ large number of contradictory interests and unless unforeseen circumstances arise, NATO will evolve into a more global organisation, better adapted to new challenges and will retain its “expeditionary” and territorial defence capabilities as well as be able to organise effective modern stabilisation and humanitarian missions. The Alliance should be a strong supporter of the strategic links between the United States, Europe and Turkey. It seems, therefore, that rumours of NATO’s imminent death were seriously exaggerated.

\textit{Central European Concerns}

There is considerable anxiety in Central Europe over NATO’s excessive evolution towards a collective security organisation. It would divert the Alliance away from its main task, namely, efficient and immediate collective military defence in case of a threat or external aggression. Central European politicians and analysts, in particular in Poland, stress that the Alliance should not limit the functioning of its collective and autonomic defence. They say it is, and surely will remain for a long time, a sacrosanct and integral part of the organisation, especially given the unstable and unpredictable situation in Russia and in the area of the former Soviet Union. For Poland and other countries of the region, the East is the key in terms of security and the fundamental factor shaping regional security systems. This is especially so in the context of Russian attempts to use any strategic capabilities gap

\footnote{More on the topic in: J. Durkalec, \textit{New Strategic Concept and NATO’s “visible assurances” towards Central and Eastern Europe}, PISM, Bulletin No. 140 (216), 15/12/2010.}
that might arise if the military presence of the United States in Europe is limited and the European Union weakened.

The unexpected scepticism of Poles towards NATO (only 45 percent of Poles see the Alliance as the key security institution; whereas in the European Union it is 56 percent), their increasing pacifistic trends (in the opinion of 49 percent of Poles, current defence spending is sufficient and only 28 percent are willing to accept war in the name of just causes), and the increasing suspicion towards the United States (only 38 percent of Poles think U.S. leadership crucial) may be disturbing.\textsuperscript{12} There are feelings that the younger generation of Poles is unwilling to support increased defence spending, as they perceive the armed forces as one of the vestiges of the Cold War. Additionally, they are sceptical of NATO and the expeditionary nature of the Polish armed forces.\textsuperscript{13} This is alarming news as one may almost speak of a kind of increasing Polish isolationism. It seems that the scale and repercussions of this process for Polish security policy are not yet well recognised and nor realized. This is, however, vital as it may influence the direction and content of Polish security policy. Polish research centres may play a crucial role in this matter. There is also a shortage of information on the part of the Polish government; simply speaking, after Poland’s accession, basic security demands were deemed as having been satisfied and no attention was paid to their functioning in the new environment.

An issue for concern, not only for the states in the region, is also NATO’s internal differences, especially those pertaining to the crucial security issues of the states on NATO’s eastern flank. Namely, the differences in assessing threats (including those related to instability in the East) in terms of the need for constant military capabilities, the nature of NATO - Russian relations and the out-of-area tasks profile. What could be worrying is that some allies, especially the Mediterranean ones, tend to marginalise Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This is reflected in attempts made to persuade the Alliance to abandon its contingency plans and in the biased attitude towards NATO - Russian relations, i.e., focusing on cooperation only and ignoring the rivalry and instability on the part of this strategically demanding partner.

\textsuperscript{12} According to the \textit{German Marshall Fund} survey on reception of Euro - Atlantic relations in the United States, Europe, and Russia: \textit{Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2012}.

The current national interests in terms of security are laid out in the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (*Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*) of 2007. It states that Poland is secure (many politicians often say it is more secure than ever). Recent international complications, however, undermine this view, particularly in the context of the discussion presented above, and call for a revision and a broadening of the strategy. It is worth reflecting on the interests that Poland and states in the region have in mind.

First, according to the Polish Constitution, Polish interests, like the interests of other states in the region, are universal and are concerned with independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders; the safety of citizens, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and strengthening democracy.

Second, due to their size and potential, Poland and the states in the region are particularly interested in international institutions which have strong positions: NATO for collective defence, the European Union for developing security policy, OSCE for sustaining collective security, the United Nations for sustaining peace, international law and international cooperation, the stabilising role of sub-regional organisations, and in consolidating power, viability, and respect for international law.

Third, the Poland’s interests require real, not declarative, defence, solidarity among allies with reliable security guarantees, supported by defence planning and other specific military measures. They also require the prevention of inequalities in the status of members within the Alliance and the division into “old” and “new” members which could lead to a recurrence of the so-called grey zones or marginalization of the weaker states.

Fourth, the security interests of the whole region require the reinforcing of transatlantic links, the constant presence of the United States in Europe as a factor of strategic balance, close cooperation between NATO and the European Union, and the strategic presence of Turkey in the transatlantic security system.

Fifth, it is in the interest of the states in the region that democratisation in Russia continue and its policy becomes de-militarised (in particular in the Kaliningrad Oblast). At the same time it is important to involve Russia in the European security system as it would bring about an increased sense of security as well as decrease the cost of security.

The Security Environment and Basic Requirements of Polish Security Policy

When analysing the links between the evolution of NATO and Polish security interests, it is worth remembering the wider context in which these interests are
pursued, both on a regional and global level, where non-military aspects also need to be taken into consideration. For example: the European Union, an institution which denotes its members as being part of the West, is, to a large extent, a political guarantee of security for Poland.

If the above wider context and strictly military aspects of security are taken into consideration, Poland can be said to operate in a system of seven main elements of the external security environment (not including the above-mentioned internal capabilities):

- The North Atlantic Treaty with its external cooperation institutions and involvement in peacekeeping and stabilisation beyond its borders;
- The European Union’s *Common Security and Defence Policy* and its stabilisation operations;
- The strategic presence, including the military presence, of the United States in Europe and NATO (the United States as a “European power”) and maintaining “strategic” bilateral relations between the United States and Poland;
- A collective security system promoted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); based mainly on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), and conventional arms control measures (CFE);
- Bilateral relations with immediate neighbours concerning security (four of Poland’s neighbours are members of NATO and in the case of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus we need to cooperate in a bilateral manner apart from just being involved in multilateral forums) and participation in sub-regional organisations, i.e., the Visegrád Group, the Weimar Triangle, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States;
- Institutionalised forms of multilateral cooperation with Russia in security through NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE;
- Various systems of arms control agreements, disarmament schemes and military confidence-building measures under the auspices of the framework of the UN and OSCE, especially in terms of conventional arms in accordance with the CFE Treaty.

Changes within these seven elements (e.g., a weakened NATO or a shift in Washington’s priorities away from Europe to Asia) would influence Poland’s security as does the presence and role of Poland in shaping and operating within these domains.

The task of Polish security policy is to integrate all these elements, provided that no action infringes on its commitments to NATO. The order of the elements reflects also their importance for the security of Poland, although there have been internal disputes as to their significance in recent years. For example: according to
official government announcements, NATO is the basis of Poland’s external security; whereas in a Polish right-wing party’s programmes (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) Washington’s involvement in Europe and “strategic relations” with the United States are portrayed as key elements. The Head of the National Security Bureau (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego), General Stanisław Koziej, rightly points to the importance of common security interests (not just common values), prioritises more and more clearly the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy, and stresses the significance of national defence capabilities. Still, the security strategy hierarchy proposed by General Koziej: the European security community (based on the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy), NATO, and partners (especially the OSCE), is not convincing. The author does not take the role of the European Union in Poland’s security fully into consideration, yet he admits that constructing a common defence system based on the European Union is, for the time being, “still a very remote vision”.14

There is no disagreement about the fact that Poland’s current capabilities and geographic position mean that a prolonged territorial defence on its own would not be possible without allied support. The Polish discussion, particularly the increased interest in defence at the European level, has been noticed and there are those who feel that the lack of interest in Polish concerns on the part of Western states with external security guarantees may lead to Poland being reluctant to take an active part in NATO and the European Union stabilisation missions.15

Irrespective of any differences on priorities, Polish security policy needs to treat the above-mentioned elements integrally and in close relation to the nature of its defence capabilities, bearing in mind that the North Atlantic Treaty remains a priority.16

Challenges and Threats to the Security of Poland and NATO

New threats and challenges to the security of Poland need to be viewed in connection with threats to NATO’s security, and that of other allies. Still, the nature

14 S. Koziej, Pierwsza dekada funkcjonowania w strukturach bezpieczeństwa NATO i UE – strategiczne doświadczenia Polski (First Decade of Poland In NATO and EU Security Structures – Strategic Experience), “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, 22/2012, p. 43.
15 See: C.M. O’Donnell, Poland’s U-turn on European defence: A missed opportunity? Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief, March 2012. It was even more explicitly expressed by a commentator, Judy Dempsey, in her article Europe fails to defend its backyard, “International Herald Tribune”, 17/04/2012.
16 There was no disagreement in this matter during the discussion in 2011 and 2012 about the National Security Strategic Review (Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego). This document (with the author being one of the coordinators) resulted in the White Paper on National Security of Poland (Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP), published in Warsaw 2013 by the National Security Bureau (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego).
of Poland’s security position, especially as a frontline state, has to be kept in mind. The growing non-military threats, mentioned before, need to be taken into consideration. The financial crisis is forcing governments to cut expenses, including defence spending. Some of the political threats and challenges Poland has to face are:

- The unfavourable, both for the Alliance and the West, strategic balance in the region, changes (strategic gap), may be taken advantage of by the Russian Federation, in particular as the presence of the United States decreases (it should be noted that there have been many voices calling for Washington to halt its shifts in priority);\(^1\)
- An unequal security level at the heart of NATO resulting from some allies giving in to Russian demands to stop installing military structures and installations in Central and North Europe and an increase in internal differences in NATO is making it impotent. What is disturbing in this context is that France is abandoning its role as the advocate for building a wide security community on the basis of the Alliance, in favour of narrower, bilateral agreements (France - United Kingdom - Germany);
- A severe crisis and divisions in the European Union are hampering not only cooperation, but also the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy;
- The possibility that in Poland power may fall into the hands of political groups leaning towards a kind of neo-isolationism and would seek to distance Poland from NATO and the European Union or disrupt the intrinsic nature of the above-mentioned system of the seven main elements of Poland’s external security and focus mainly on internal defence capabilities.

As Poland lies on the peripheries of NATO, it is particularly exposed to any changes in the conventional balance of power (disturbed in particular by the development of missile technology). The balance is also disrupted directly by the increasing military capabilities of Russia and the “suspension” of the CFE Treaty.

Bearing in mind that NATO is a political-military alliance, military threats need to be discussed more extensively and, in this case, from the Polish perspective. The main military threat is the missile threat, both in terms of offence and defence. Development of missile technology, particularly the constantly increasing precision and speed of strikes and the development of missile and ballistic missile defence completely changes warfare in modern conditions. Today, air threats are particular-

ly relevant challenges to Poland’s security. Hence, President Bronisław Komorowski announced that a modern air defence system, including missile defence, would be constructed in Poland. It is a complex issue as it concerns the close relations between United States, NATO and Polish ballistic missile defence system projects.\(^{18}\)

The missile threats are connected with the Russian Federation’s stance in two ways: the possible challenge posed by Russian capabilities in this area (particularly short- and intermediate-range missiles) and the manner in which relations and cooperation with Russia are shaped, including the joint building of continental and global missile defences. As a result of the above-mentioned disillusions regarding Russian policy, there is a new element growing in popularity to the western allies’ attitude towards the potential missile threat: no more political correctness with regards to Russia and a tendency to consider all possible scenarios. In the above-mentioned paper by Jamie Shea, the issue of relations with Russia is just a matter of cooperation, accommodation and warning allies against Cold War attitudes; last year’s report by the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) - ELN (European Leadership Network) partnership, titled *Poland, NATO and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe* says in turn that there is a “major concern over the Russian attempts at intimidating allies, particularly Poland, with missiles”.\(^{19}\) The authors admit that “NATO does not fully meet Central European allies’ expectations as to ensuring security” and what is more, “their requirements and concerns are played down”.\(^{20}\) The paper focuses on Poland as the country the most exposed to Russian security policy unpredictability.

The Polish Institute of International Affairs (*Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych*) experts went even one step further. Based on the assumptions that NATO is weakened, the United States’ involvement outside Europe has increased, Russian security policy is unstable and unpredictable, and the missile’s role in modern warfare has increased, they have reached the conclusion that the security of Central and North European states may be impaired. They identified four potential scenarios of military tensions and crises in relations to Russia in which Poland would play a role. Briefly speaking, they are:

\(^{18}\) More on this topic and details of Poland’s stance on this matter see interview with Robert Kupiecki, Under-Secretary of State for Defence Policy, in “Polska Zbrojna”: Przeciwrakietowa Układanka (*Anti-Ballistic Missile Puzzle*), Issue 7, October 2012.


\(^{20}\) Ibidem, p. 3.
• “Sabre-rattling” in the form of recurring threats, made by high-ranking Russian armed forces officers addressed mainly to Poland, concerning the possibility of installing new missile batteries in Kaliningrad Oblast, or even using them if a ballistic missile defence system, deemed by Moscow a threat to its security, were to be built in Poland;
• “Fishing out” of allies using various forms of military pressure in accordance with the doctrine giving the Russian Federation the right to pre-emptive strikes in order to protect its citizens;
• The conflict “spilling” over into the region in the case of a military confrontation, for example in the Arctic Ocean area;
• A Zapad 2009-like military action, i.e., large-scale operations modelled on the above-mentioned Russian military exercises in 2009 simulating an attack on Poland, even using intermediate-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.21

As a result, the authors call for an increase of the effectiveness of deterrents, making the use of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty more plausible and believable, taking the region’s interests into consideration when designing NATO’s ballistic missile defence systems.

Of course, one may think up more scenarios; they exist in potential, but every serious state should be prepared for the worst. As a NATO border state, Poland needs to be prepared for various potential forms of military threat, e.g., in the form of blackmail, pressure, or military provocation, attempts at extorting a specific political stand, etc. It needs to effectively protect the so-called three Cs: command, control and communications in its territory.

Polish security policy cannot ignore these potential challenges and threats, even though they seem less likely to occur in the next 10 - 15 years, and even if the Russian Federation is being kept busy mainly with securing its territorial integrity and modernisation the state. Polish and foreign analyses show, however, that after 15 years’ time (approximately one generation), it is not inconceivable that we would have to face them. Polish security policy needs to remain reasonable and reserved; not to become obsessed with the threats as this is only one of the scenarios. One cannot rule out a positive resolution where Russia no longer perceives NATO as its main enemy and cooperates closely with the West to build a common Euro-Atlantic security system. Such an option should be encouraged. To sum up, the key issue for Poland is playing a constructive role in NATO - Russian relations despite the problematical trends in Moscow’s security policy, especially in terms of

ballistic missile defence systems. This task is not an easy one as our perceptions of security and those of our neighbours differ.

*What Kind of NATO Do We Need?*

First and foremost, Poland needs to make sure that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is implemented properly. It needs to be sure that if Poland or one of the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) is attacked, assistance from other allies will come without the slightest delay and automatically (for the purposes of defending strategic positions, command centres, airports, bases and warehouses, the infrastructure, sea and river ports, etc.). Otherwise, concerns may be justified as to whether in the moment of truth, the “zero hour”, the North Atlantic Council will turn out to be just a coffee shop, a constantly debating body with no decision-making powers.

Second, we need the Alliance to be trustworthy in implementing Article 5 and for it to have sufficient defence capabilities, also with regards to territorial defence, including, first of all, a credible deterrence system, contingency plans that function correctly, and defence planning in the case of a threat to the Alliance that requires it to act in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, including suitable military exercises and sustaining the viability of the *Defence and Deterrence Posture Review* (DDPR). This also requires that the integrated air and ballistic missile defence systems evolve in the right direction, as well as the efficient NRF (*NATO Response Force*), and other forces to be used also for territorial defence. Considerable weaknesses may be observed in NATO’s exercises in these areas. What is important is not to cut out during the NATO “slimming operation” that which is particularly important for Poland: investments in defence infrastructure, assistance capabilities in case of aggression and the right kind of military exercises and training.

Third, it should be an alliance that will keep the United States interested in Europe and NATO in particular, something which is heavily stressed by Polish external security policy.

Fourth, Poland needs a military alliance that would make the various security levels of its members theoretically and practically equal; eradicate formal, informal and psychological differences between “old” and “new” members. An alliance that would cooperate closely with the European Union’s *Common Security and Defence Policy* as a kind of “military arm” and with the OSCE.

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23 *Ibidem.*
Fifth, Poland needs an alliance that would ensure the implementation of the already mentioned effective, common double-track policy towards the Russian Federation (its inclusion into Europe) that takes into account the nature of the strategic situation of Poland and other states in the region and the need for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia to be closer to NATO in the context of their potential membership.

Sixth, it is in the interest of Poland and other states in the region that they take part in NATO’s policy decision-making process, especially as regards a common policy towards the East. Whether or not NATO is shaped in this way depends also to certain extent on the activity of Polish diplomats, assuming the position of a subject, designing smart internal coalitions to pursue constructive goals, playing the role of the advocate of the states in the region and Ukraine, and Polish experts being appointed to influential positions in the International Secretariat on a larger scale.

It is feasible to implement the Polish vision of NATO as a strong, successful collective and cooperative defence partner, empathetic towards the security needs in the Central European region, operating effectively as a political body with international partners and institutions delivering as promised. Polish security policy needs to make sure these goals are achieved, build internal public support for the Alliance and strengthen its defence and deterrence capabilities as an integral contribution to NATO’s defence capabilities.
The Military Aspect of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2007 and the Programme of Professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces of 2008 in the Context of NATO

The concept of national security is broadening. More and more areas of life are being securitized, i.e., included by the state into the design of its security policy. Thus, this notion is multidimensional. Traditional military security aside, one may point to cyber, demographic, environmental, epidemiological, cultural, social and IT - ICT security, and many kinds of economic security (energy, financial, trade), etc. Each of them is influenced by international determinants as no state exists in a geopolitical vacuum. Thus, even internal security has an international aspect; illegal immigrants or cross-border crime pose threats in this area.

This paper focuses on the traditional, military aspect of Poland’s security. The dissertation is based on the latest and current conceptual documents that shape Poland’s policy as regards military security: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski) of 13 November, 2007 and the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland. Sector Strategy of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Strategia sektorowa do Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) of 2009. The authors of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland considered at length the non-military aspects of national security as well. However, due to the nature of this paper, the sections of the Strategy not concerned with defence issues are not considered.

In order to analyse national security and try to assess whether the conceptual documentation concerning this issue adopted by Poland, the condition of the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) and the directions of military policy guiding its evolution are an adequate answer to the existing and potential challenges, one needs to define the very concept of a threat to national security. Only after defining this can

2 Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland), Warsaw 2007, p. 3.
we analyse the contents of the documentation and the understanding behind the choices regarding military reform and its consequences. Let us assume that a threat to national security in the broadest possible sense means all potential or existing phenomena, situations, or actions that pose a threat to life, health, living conditions, property, the natural environment, rules of social coexistence, laws, freedom of civilizational development (economic, cultural, social, etc.), citizens’ rights and freedoms or a threat to limit political choices by the governmental or nongovernmental institutions within a state.4

National security, as well as its military aspect, should be assessed mainly using political not military criteria. After all, the security of the Benelux countries does not depend on the capabilities of their military forces in comparison to the capabilities of the German and French armed forces, but on trans-Atlantic relations and political relations between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg and both of their larger neighbours, who fought three great wars between 1870 and 1945. Nonetheless, any military conflict between them is inconceivable. Conceding the unidimensionality of the remarks presented here and generally leaving aside (although not completely) the current political situation in Central and Eastern Europe regarding security, I wish to highlight the uniqueness of Polish military policy in comparison to the other states in our region. In order to describe the situation in the Republic of Poland from an international perspective, one would need to produce a separate paper. Due to these limitations, I must omit this topic and direct those interested to other papers.5

The Evolution of Poland’s Security Strategy

The aim of this paper is to provide answers to a number of questions vital to Poland’s national security. Some of the most important are:

- What are the definitions of national security and the threats to it both in a broad sense and as understood in the framework of the conceptual documentation created by the state during the period 2007 - 2009, which will be analysed here with a particular focus on military issues?
- What is the general condition of the Polish Armed Forces and its mobilization capabilities as compared to other NATO members and Poland’s neighbours?

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What is the essence of the Polish defence policy, i.e., what are its basic assumptions and goals and to what extent does the policy fit the current conditions in terms of the state of the Polish Armed Forces, the concept of operation, and what potential challenges Poland and its armed forces may face?

Answering these questions will facilitate conclusions. The profile of the Polish Armed Forces based on the answers to these questions will be compared to the military profiles of other NATO members and Poland’s neighbours. Such a solution is used in accordance with the assumption that no state is weak or strong in of itself; it may only be weaker or stronger than the other actors on the international stage. The conclusions will be used to substantiate the proposed hypothesis of this paper: Polish national security policy has suffered because of its enormous and overwhelming false sense of security and its belief in the absence of any threats, and as such military issues are ignored, and the level of disarmament in Poland cannot be compared to any other state in a similar situation and with similar capabilities.

The People’s Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL) did not have a national security policy as it was a satellite state of the Soviet Union throughout its existence. The military was particularly dependent on decisions made in Moscow. During the era of Soviet dominance, there was no independent Polish defence strategy or doctrine; Poland had no influence on the Warsaw Pact doctrine. The Republic of Poland, reborn and independent after 1989, inherited from the PRL a defence doctrine, military assets, and a structure of a defence system drafted during the times of the Warsaw Pact. In subsequent years, due to internal transformations in Poland and the revolution in its geopolitical situation, Polish defence policy and its armed forces underwent a constant process of evolution. This was reflected in the conceptual documentation adopted after the regaining of independence (Defence Doctrine of the Republic of Poland [Doktryna obronna RP] in 1990) and later in the Principles of Poland’s Security Policy [Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa], the Security Policy and Defence Strategy of Poland [Polityka bezpieczeństwa...

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and also in the National Security Strategies of the Republic of Poland [Strategie bezpieczeństwa narodowego] of 2000\(^9\), 2003\(^10\), and 2007\(^11\) and in the evolution of the structure and nature of the Polish Armed Forces. Both processes were accompanied by a political swing towards the West by Poland.\(^12\)

Poland’s accession to NATO in 1999 was a turning point in its military security.\(^13\) In the period 1990-2009, security strategies and defence strategies underwent extensive transformations, just as the Polish Armed Forces evolved from a mass invasion force characteristic of the Warsaw Pact, to a defence force based on national military service\(^14\) with a developing territorial defence concept,\(^15\) and again developed further into a numerically smaller, professional-volunteer expeditionary formation of the first government under Donald Tusk (November 16, 2007).

The shortening of the term of the Sejm pursuant to the Resolution (Uchwała) of 7 September, 2007, the resulting early elections of 21 October, 2007, and the formation of the first government under Donald Tusk (November 16, 2007)
formed the backdrop to the announcement of the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* of 13 November, 2007. The process of the creation of the document started during the term of the previous government, was finalized in times of parliamentary crisis and announced after the elections were conceded by *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (a Polish right-wing party). It was a declaration of the outgoing government’s idea of security policy. In the *Strategy* adopted at that time, it is stated that “In the first decade of the new millennium, the Republic of Poland is a safe country [...] (still - P.Z.G.) (In life) nothing should be taken for granted” and “International order is not a frozen, rigid form”. In the context of Poland’s NATO and EU memberships it was highlighted that the Polish *Strategy* is in line with NATO’s *Strategic Concept* of April 1999\(^{16}\) and with the *European Security Strategy*\(^{17}\) of December 2003.\(^{18}\)

The authors of the *Strategy* of 2007 described Poland as a border state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union with a significant demographic capacity and strategically important geographical location. NATO and the United States were deemed to be the pillars of international security. Recognizing the diminishing global role of Washington, the authors still declared that Poland was keen for the United States to have a strong political and military presence in Europe. They also pointed to Russia’s aspirations to strengthen its international position and highlighted the fact that “Russia’s efforts to establish closer contacts with selected Western countries” were accompanied by “discrimination against some European Union and NATO members”. They also cited tensions in the Middle East, Iran's nuclear ambitions, terrorism, and Muslim fundamentalism as problematical for the security of Poland.\(^{19}\)

International terrorism was described in the *Strategy* as a two-dimensional threat; it exists externally, as a responsibility of the Polish Military Contingents (*Polskie Kontyngenty Wojskowe, PKW*) during international operations; and internally, i.e., there exists the possibility of retaliation by terrorist organizations targeting Poland in connection with the operations of PMCs abroad.

Cyber security was discussed separately. It was undoubtedly related to the impression the attack by Russian hackers on Estonian governmental institutions

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16 *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, 24/04/1999. [www.nato.int].
had on the authors of the *Strategy*.\(^{20}\) It was carried out as part of the Russo-
Estonian conflict over the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn monument in May 2007.\(^{21}\) In
this way, the authors of the *Strategy* included Poland in the then newly developed
NATO cyber security policy. As a result of this incident, The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization deemed cyber space a military activity area that should be its respon-
sibility as much as land, sea, air, and space. The basis for including cyber space within the area of the alliance’s responsibility was Article 40 of the *Lisbon
Summit Declaration*\(^{22}\) adopted on 20 November, 2010 in the capital of Portugal. It
constituted a confirmation of the decision of 14 May, 2008 on establishing the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) in
Tallinn.\(^{23}\) The authors of Poland’s *Strategy* of 2007 could not have known this yet
their concern with cyber security reflects well on their analytical skills that allowed
Poland to anticipate or even inspire NATO’s moves in accordance with this point
of view.

The defence industry and international cooperation on military technology were
also given special consideration in the *Strategy*. The importance of IT and commu-
nication security was highlighted and cooperation with NATO declared in this
regard. This could also be seen as another direct consequence of the cyber attack
by Russian hackers on the Estonian government’s IT system. The possibility of
a collapse of the process of European integration and the states returning to pur-
suing their own national interests, the ambition to treat the European Union as
a counterweight to the United States,\(^{24}\) the European Union’s inability to create
a common policy, the weakening of ties linking the transatlantic community, and
the growth of authoritarian tendencies around Poland were deemed strategic


\(^{22}\) Lisbon Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, 20/11/2010. [www.nato.int].


\(^{24}\) More on the influence of this trend on Poland see: P. Żurowski vel Grajewski, *Czy Unia Europejska może/powinna mieć spójną politykę wobec USA? (Can/Should the European Union Have a Common Policy towards the USA?)*, [in:] J. Klochkowski (ed.), *Polska w grzy międzynarodowej. Geopolityka i sprawy wewnętrzne (Poland in International Game. Geopolitics and Internal Affairs)*, Kraków 2010, p. 91-133.
political threats. Were they to have crystallized, this could have led to dangerous changes in Poland’s international environment. Considering that the text was written before the Euro Zone crisis, the list proves the remarkable insight abilities of the authors of the *Strategy*. The crisis really did threaten the political unity of the European Union and increased the extent of clashes of national interests between members to an unprecedented level.25

The Caucasus, Transnistria, and (to a lesser extent) the Balkans were described as regions with a potential to create instability (the 2008 Russia-Georgia war confirmed the diagnosis for the first area). The European Union and its European Security and Defence Policy (currently the Common Security and Defence Policy) and regional cooperation (Visegrad Group)26 and the United Nations were described as important instruments for building the security of Poland.27 The latter was probably a result of political correctness in a public document rather than a conclusion after a realistic assessment of the situation and the importance of the organizations.

In terms of military security, the main task that the state and the military had to face was defending Poland’s independence and territory. A goal in line with the declarations in previous conceptual documents of this kind, adopted after 1989.

An analysis of the *Strategy* of 2007 concludes that Poland’s defence policy is based on alliances. The solidarity among NATO members and its defence capabilities, deterring potential aggressors, are described as its central pillar. The most popular opinion among the Polish elite responsible for national defence policy is that the outbreak of a serious war or major regional and local conflicts is not likely and Poland would not be directly involved in such operations. As a result, the prevailing assumption is that the Polish Armed Forces would take part in military operations in accordance with collective defence as per Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and not in order to repel an attack on the territory of Poland.


In this case “For military operations to be successful [Polish] armed forces, [must] be provided with technical equipment that is more modern than the enemy’s”.  

Although it is not explicitly stated, based on the above-mentioned thesis, it may be concluded that from among the three main military capabilities NATO members have to provide:

- Assistance to an ally under attack with their own armed forces;
- Ability of an attacked state to sustain its own defense until allied assistance arrives;
- Support as a host nation, i.e., when accepting military assistance from allies on one’s own territory;

Poland *de facto* prioritizes the first one. This is in contrast with numerous declarations by the ruling party and other parts of the *Strategy*, but in line with the actual direction of investments and structural reforms in the Polish Armed Forces.

The authors of the *Strategy* recognize the Polish Armed Forces as the fundamental element of national defence and define its main task as defending the state (alone and in cooperation with NATO) and being ready to fulfil the obligations of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. They also allow for the Polish Armed Forces to take part in multinational asymmetric (e.g., counter-terrorist) missions as part of a group of allies from NATO, the European Union or an *ad hoc* coalition and in NATO, European Union, and United Nations crisis response operations. A separate set of tasks for the Polish Armed Forces’ defined in the *Strategy* pertains to the ensuring of internal security, counterintelligence, supporting the state in the case of natural disasters, pollution, clearing up explosives, search-and-rescue operations, etc.

The plans in the *Strategy* envisage further modernization of the equipment and command systems of the Polish Armed Forces and an increase in their mobility and level of professionalism. It is worth noting that the continuing trend to reduce the number of troops in the Polish Armed Forces that began in 1989 has ceased. Further reduction of the number of troops and the amount of equipment in the Polish Armed Forces was deemed as a risk to national security. It is hard to disagree with this statement.

After 2008, Poland reached an unprecedented level of demilitarization as measured against the percentage of citizens that could be called-up into the army to defend the state if need be. There are, naturally, trained reservists, but due to the lack of training for consecutive age-groups after 2008 and not fully using the

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28 *Ibidem*, p. 15.
potential of conscription in a few of the preceding years, the number of reservists available has diminished rapidly, and in 2013, the number of first-class reservists (those who were trained at most five years ago) will be limited to the former regular troops who left the armed forces in the last five years. Consequently, with 38.4 million citizens, Poland will theoretically be able to call-up approximately 102,000 - 110,000 troops. In practice, as a result of the professionalization, the number of active soldiers fell after 2008 by approximately 25% and the size of the Armed Forces totalled between 97.7 and 98.5 thousand in 2011 - 2012, including only 45.7 thousand in the army. This leaves a lot to be desired in terms of manning individual units as compared to their theoretical personnel count. The result is a drastically low quotient of the number of citizens that can be called-up to the total size of the population: only 0.27 per cent. Only the Czech Republic and Luxembourg have lower indices. The latter is at the centre of NATO and the European Union, and due to its size has no options to build significant military capabilities. Our southern neighbours, on the other hand, may be, unlike the border-state, Poland, considered a kind of “large Luxembourg” as all of its neighbours are members of European Union and NATO, apart from Austria which is a neutral EU member state. The index is a few times higher for states from our culture that value the defence function of their armed forces (from Finland belonging to the “old” West to Israel, de facto on the front line). The average in our area is 1.66 per cent. Thus, the fact that our planned mobilization capability is around six times smaller than the average in this group leads us to one conclusion: the defence capabilities of the Republic of Poland are cause for great alarm.

The situation is even worse if the condition of personnel is taken into account. As of 30 April, 2011 there were 20,943 (21%) officers, 38,610 (40%) non-commissioned officers, 35,849 (37%) regular and re-enlisted private soldiers, and 2,312 (2%) cadets of the military schools in the Polish Armed Forces. Therefore, the commanding ranks (officers and non-commissioned officers) account for 61% of the active force, overwhelming the number of private soldiers. It would be justified, if the forces were based on conscription and had to be ready to take in and command a large number of private reservists. In a professional army it is a disas-

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29 The situation is worst in the 34th Armoured Cavalry Brigade in Zagań (at 53% of its personnel, of which 22% are private soldiers) and in the 5th Artillery Regiment in Sulechów (at 56% of its personnel, of which 37% are private soldiers). The best manned Polish Armed Forces unit, the 18th Airborne Battalion in Bielsko-Biała, had 87% of personnel, of which 90% were private soldiers. Stan profesjonalizacji Sił Zbrojnych na przykładzie wybranych jednostek wojskowych. Informacja o wynikach kontroli (State of Professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces Based on Selected Units. Review Results), Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, KOB-4101-05-00/2010, Reg. no. 173/2011/P10/086/KON, Warsaw 2010, p. 21.
30 Ibidem, p. 20.
trous situation. The only positive aspect of the professionalization so far has been the positive change of the ratio of combat forces to support from 66:33 to 76:24.

In terms of the types of armed forces (land forces, air force, navy, special forces) and the Inspectorate for Armed Forces Support (Inspektorat Wsparcia Sił Zbrojnych), the Strategy puts greater emphasis on special forces that are particularly helpful in counter-terrorist operations and in cooperation with allies.\(^{31}\) It was in this document that the National Reserve Forces (Narodowe Siły Rezerwowe, NSR) being ready to “carry out tasks during emergency situations and to increase the country’s defence potential” were mentioned for the first time.\(^{32}\)

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2007 is a comprehensive and open document and as such is by its nature rather general. From the military aspect, the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2009\(^{33}\), adopted by the new government, which is a sectoral strategy for the National Security Strategy of 2007 is its valuable supplement.

The Defence Strategy formally defines the role of armed forces in Poland’s security policy.\(^{34}\) The authors of this document advocate the view that Poland has a strong position both in NATO and the European Union. For them, the key elements of Poland’s security are: its membership in these organizations and its partnership with the United States. Just as in the Security Strategy of 2007, there is an opinion expressed in the Defence Strategy that the outbreak of a serious war and major local conflicts is not probable. It is worth noting that the authors of the Defence Strategy predict a change in the course of military conflict: the strictly military operations will take less time and the post-conflict phase of stabilization and reconstruction - more time. Such an observation unambiguously means that Polish military planning is dominated by thinking concerning cooperative expeditionary missions, not of defending national territory.

The influence that globalization has had on the international security environment and asymmetrical threats resulting from foreign perpetrators are discussed in very general terms in the document. On the other hand, the section concerning the

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\(^{31}\) More on the topic of Special Forces in the Polish system of defence see: R. Jakubczak, J. Flis, op. cit., p. 308-313.


factors influencing Poland’s security directly is rather specific. The following factors are presented: the situation in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia as well as the latter’s policy.

“To protect the state and to participate in the protection of its allies” are considered the main tasks of the Polish Armed Forces, for the completion of which “A transformation process in the Polish Armed Forces involving their professionalization and technical modernization is now underway”. The authors of the Defence Strategy assume that “In the event that a crisis leads inexorably to a military confrontation, Allied Forces reinforcements will be deployed in the territory of Poland, at the request of the Polish national authorities”. 35 According to the objectives in the document, Polish Armed Forces need to provide, as necessary:

- “During peacetime - territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders, as well as the protection and defence of the country’s air space which is an absolute priority; effective transition to [the] implementation of tasks in the event of armed conflict; the possibility of engagement in international operations in line with commitments [undertaken];
- In the event of a small-scale armed conflict - the defence of the state with the defence capabilities maintained during peacetime in one operational direction;
- In the event of a large-scale armed conflict - strategic deployment of the entire force and strategic holding of important areas of the state, acceptance of allied reinforcement forces in the territory of Poland and participation in a strategic Allied defence operation in order to create conditions for the political resolution of the conflict in line with the Polish raison d'état”.
- Conducting “counterterrorist operations, in countering asymmetrical and non-military threats and [carrying out] tasks in crisis situations in support of operations led by civil authorities”. 36

According to the authors of the Defence Strategy, carrying out operations defending Polish territory excludes the simultaneous participation of the Polish Armed Forces in crisis response operations abroad. As Polish decision-makers deem the probability of Poland facing a serious defensive war as being low (as stated above), the main anticipated task of the Polish Armed Forces is to participate in international missions in cooperation with other allies. Thus, the needs that

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35 Ibidem, p. 12. The Polish Armed Forces must be ready to perform three types of missions: “guaranteeing defence of the state and countering aggression; participation in the process of stabilization of the international situation and in crisis response and humanitarian operations; supporting the internal situation and assisting the population.” Ibidem, p. 16.
36 Ibidem, p. 17.
arise are concerned with developing the ability to move forces (on the brigade scale) and ensure interoperability with Allied forces.

The *Defence Strategy* of 2009 is the first conceptual document drawn up by the Polish state with no reference to national military service. The possibility of the need to defend the state on our own in the event of no support from allies is not addressed in the document. It does not contain any mention of the possibility of reintroducing conscription and the military training of civilians. It is most probably connected with the very foundation of the concept: the above-mentioned rejection of a serious defensive war scenario. It was the objective underlying the decision implemented in 2009 to suspend conscription and build armed forces focused on the development of expeditionary capabilities. Such a model of the armed forces is supposed to be an instrument for establishing a strong position for Poland in the system of alliances, built by the active participation of the Polish Armed Forces’ contingents in international missions.

A practical summary of both of the above-mentioned strategies are the conclusions drawn from them and translated into the language of staff planning in the plan of the Strategic Defence Operation (*Strategiczna Operacja Obronna*, SOO), a plan prepared in case of a large-scale conflict in which the enemy would seek to breach the territorial integrity of the Republic of Poland by seizing a large part or the whole of its territory. The plan, however, is a classified document. Its contents may only be inferred from the accompanying unclassified documents such as the discussed strategies, from armed forces development plans, and a number of instructions and regulations which can be found in publications by the National Defense University (*Akademia Obrony Narodowej*, AON).

Conclusions regarding the plan of Strategic Defence Operations do not instil one with much optimism. The plan assumes that the main opponent of Poland in a possible large-scale conflict will be most probably Russia. It is a correct assumption, yet it is highly improbable that the territories of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine would remain operationally dead. The experience of the Russia-Belarus exercises in September 2009 in the area stretching from Murmansk to Brest, including the Leningrad Military District (sic!), Kaliningrad Oblast, Belarus, and the entrance to the Bay of Gdańsk was informative. The exercises, codenamed *Zapad* and *Ladoga*, involved approximately 30,000 troops practicing the suppression of a Polish uprising in the Hrodna district and repelling an assault on the Nord

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37 Despite the change of the name of Leningrad to Saint Petersburg, the name of the Leningrad Military District, which is inevitably associated with the Soviet Union, was retained until 2010 when it became part of the Western Military District.

Another exceptionally optimistic assumption is that Allied forces would provide assistance within 14 days. George Friedman (president and founder of a private-owned intelligence and analysis company STRATFOR) in an interview for \textit{"Rzeczpospolita"} on 25 November, 2012, stated that “from the American point of view it is important that Poland be able to defend itself alone for three months”\footnote{G. Friedman, \textit{Polska musi bronić się sama (Poland Needs to Defend Itself Alone)}, "Rzeczpospolita", Issue 235 (9345), September 26, 2012, p. A12.}.

Regulations state that a brigade may operate on a line 5 - 6 km wide. The maximum width of the area of defensive operations for a tactical unit of this size is 10 km. Yet, during the Polish Armed Forces’ exercises, such operations are practiced over a width of 100 km. What this means is that the planned operations are not of a defensive nature but are designed to delay the enemy. Taking into account the current size of the Polish Armed Forces, they would be able to defend only approximately 10 - 15% of our eastern border. As a result, in the case of an attack from the north-east, with the current disparity between the forces that could potentially defend Poland and those which could attack it amounting to 14:85, experts anticipate that Warsaw would fall on the seventh day, and 2/3 of the territory would be under enemy control by the end of the second week of the campaign.\footnote{G. Kwaśniak, \textit{Analiza sytuacji w zakresie bezpieczeństwa militarnego RP (Analysis of the Military Security of the Republic of Poland)}, Fundacja Republikańska, Warsaw 2012, (typescript in author’s possession), p. 14.}

\textit{Evolution of the Polish Armed Forces to a Professional Army}

The end of the Cold War led to a reduction in the number of armed forces in all European states, making use of the so-called peace rent, i.e., reassigning budgetary resources from defence to other areas. This process did not pass Poland by. Thus, the Polish Armed Forces underwent a big reduction in size in the period 1989-2012. Until 2009, this was as a result of planned state policy. In recent years, however, it has been related to the insufficient attractiveness of professional military service and many disgruntled soldiers leaving the forces.
At the beginning of the process of reducing the size of the Polish Army, during the first years of the 1990s, it was agreed that it was necessary and justified. The overinflated military, enlarged to fit in with the Soviet imperial policy in the times of the PRL, was a heavy burden on the state’s finances. Initially, the legal framework for international arms control, including in Poland, was provided by the treaties on conventional armed forces in Europe - CFE (19 November, 1990) defining the arms limitations and CFE1A (10 July, 1992) regulating military personnel. The importance of these treaties would vary with time and was influenced by a diverse range of political turbulences which only ceased in June 2007 when they were suspended by Russia. Nevertheless, they were a noticeable starting point and a framework for reducing the number of soldiers and weaponry in the Polish Armed Forces (mainly for armoured equipment. The limits on air forces, e.g., helicopters set by CFE were higher than their actual number). The assumption was that the reduction in the fixed costs of the maintenance of forces resulting from limiting the number of personnel, among others, would be used to modernize the equipment. The modernization was fairly limited and the reductions excessively large.

The end of conscription and the establishment of professional armed forces were introduced by the government’s decision on 5 August, 2008 to adopt the Programme of Professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces for the Period 2008 - 2010 (Program profesjonalizacji Sił Zbrojnych RP na lata 2008 - 2010). It was implemented by September 2009 when the last conscripted troops completed their compulsory military service and left their barracks. Since that day there have been three types of military service in the Polish Armed Forces: permanent regular military service and contractual service (active and reserve) with contracts not exceeding 12 years with the option of joining the permanent regular service.

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42 Program profesjonalizacji Sił Zbrojnych RP na lata 2008 - 2010 (Programme of Professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces for 2008 - 2010), [www.premier.gov.pl].
The plans for the development of the Polish Armed Forces are defined in the Strategic Defence Review (Strategiczny Przegląd Obrony) of April 2011 and the Programme for development of the Polish Armed Forces in 2009 - 2018 (Program rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych RP w latach 2009 - 2018). The Polish Armed Forces were divided into operational forces (for operations within the territory of Poland and abroad as part of NATO and international security organizations or an ad hoc coalition) and support forces (for supporting operational forces and defensive operations within the territory of Poland in cooperation with non-military elements of the System of State Defence (System Obrony Państwa). Part of the support forces that operate in the area of direct operations within the national boundaries could, in exceptional circumstances, be temporally controlled by Allied and coalition commanders. NSR are a separate type of soldier, but not of the armed forces because, unlike the U.S. National Guard, they do not constitute separate units, but serve in both of the above-mentioned types of the Polish Armed Forces.

The assumptions are that the Polish Armed Forces should consist of 100,000 regular soldiers and 20,000 personnel in the National Reserve Forces. The operational - support unit ratio should be 60:40 which is supposed to enhance the combat capabilities of the armed forces. Theoretically, 1.95% of GDP should be allocated to defence. In fact, such a budget has never been executed. In 2008, there was a large deficit in the Ministry of National Defence (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej) budget (approximately PLN 3.393 billion). The provisions of the Act were breached and defence spending amounted to 1.67% of GDP. Consequently, approximately PLN 2.1 billion was used to pay off the debt and this was in combination with the government’s decision to freeze PLN 1.743 billion of the MND


budget. This had repercussions on the technical modernization of the armed forces.\footnote{Analiza wykonania budżetu państwa i założeń polityki pieniężnej w 2009 roku (2009 Government Budget and Monetary Policy Execution Analysis), Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Ref. no. 141/2010/KBF, Ref. no. 142/2010/KBF, Warsaw -June 2010, p. 98.}

The MND budget execution constituted yet another breach of the Act, as it amounted to only 1.81% of GDP.\footnote{Informacja. Stan profesjonalizacji Sił Zbrojnych RP, p. 7.} The same thing happened in 2010 when the defence budget was allocated only 1.88% of GDP.\footnote{Analiza wykonania budżetu państwa i założeń polityki pieniężnej w 2010 roku (2010 Government Budget and Monetary Policy Execution Analysis), Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Ref. no. 111/2011/KBF, Ref. no. 112/2011/KBF, Warsaw -June 2011, p. 102.} In 2011, the MND budget was planned to be PLN 27.5 billion\footnote{Strategiczny Przegląd Obrony. Profesjonalne Siły Zbrojne RP w nowoczesnym państwie. Raport - Analiza Strategiczną Sił Zbrojnych RP (Strategic Defence Review. Professional Polish Armed Forces in a Modern State. Report - Polish Armed Forces Strategic Analysis), Warsaw: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, April 2011, p. 9-11.} and for 2012 - PLN 29.2 billion\footnote{Podstawowe informacje o budżecie resortu obrony narodowej na 2012 r. (Basic Information on the Ministry of National Defence Budget for 2012), Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej Departament Budżetowy, Warsaw, March 2012, p. 2.} which would be in line with the expected level of 1.95% of the previous year’s GDP. No data concerning the execution of these plans have yet been made public. As is apparent from the above-mentioned information, the norm was met according to the planned budget in previous years. In practice this proved to be otherwise. The financial deficit resulted in shortages of equipment, weaponry, and the training of soldiers, undermining their professional status.\footnote{N. Bączyk, Widmo kryzysu, czyli o profesjonalizacji raz jeszcze (The Spectre of Crisis or Professionalisation again), "Nowa Technika Wojskowa", 2/2009.} The National Reserve Forces recruitment programme turned out to be a complete failure.\footnote{E. Januła, J. Wolny-Majewska, Fikcja Narodowych Sił Rezerwy (The Fiction of National Reserve Forces), "Przegląd" 14/2011.}

**Conclusions**

*The National Security Strategy* of 2007 is a positive contrast to the conceptual documentation from the previous years. It includes lessons learned from the Estonia-Russian conflict in 2007 (cyberspace security). Its authors rightly present Russia as a potential threat and point to certain areas of Poland’s security as potential destabilization points. The *Strategy* is the first document after 1989 to show a desire to stop the process of reducing the size of the Polish Armed Forces.

The Republic of Poland, according to the vision of the authors of its defence policy as defined in both documents, is unthreatened by any traditional military security challenge (i.e., state-to-state war). The Polish Armed Forces are the military forces of a state operating with a sense of permanent stability of its securi-
ty and so entertaining a conviction that the probability of a large-scale military conflict is low. According to this vision, the only task of the Polish Armed Forces is to sustain this state by participating in the promotion of the prestige of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, the real or, as in the case of the European Union, imagined military and political power of which maintains it and works as an effective deterrent to potential aggressors.

After 1989, Poland underwent one of the largest armed forces reductions in Europe. It adopted the model of a small, professional all-volunteer armed force, according to the dominant trend in NATO. This, the direction of technical investments, and the anticipated capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces prove that Poland is building expeditionary forces to be used in cooperation with allies on missions in remote areas. The fact that soldiers in the Polish Armed Forces are drastically outnumbered by commanders cannot be explained by anything other than administrative chaos and “corporate” interest. The actual function of the Polish Armed Forces is not the defence of the state or expeditionary missions, but providing work for numerous senior officers. Thus, Poland has built a small armed force with a defective structure, unable to defend its own territory on a scale greater than delaying a potential invader. The trust in the power of their allies and the reliability of their guarantees has resulted in assigning not military, but actually political tasks to the Polish Armed Forces (strengthening ties within the Alliance by taking part in Allied expeditionary missions). In terms of defending their homeland, they would only play a supportive role (defending until alliance assistance arrives and fighting in a coalition).

These assumptions have resulted in the suspension of compulsory national service (conscripted armed forces, territorial defence forces, significant reserves). It should, however, be combined with political activity aimed at strengthening the solidarity among allies, taking part in NATO expeditionary missions in the hope that the favour will be returned, and in seeking to maintain the Alliance’s prestige, which is a condition of effective deterrence, ergo the security of Poland. Yet, the professionalization of the armed forces occurred at almost exactly the same time as the withdrawal of Polish Military Contingents from Iraq and the election

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promise by the then-acting President Bronisław Komorowski to withdraw Polish forces from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{58}

The credibility of the NATO deterrence requires the Alliance to act automatically in case of possible aggression towards Poland. Thus, there were attempts to include Poland and the Baltic states in contingency plans, and for the same reason the U.S. ballistic missile defence system was to be installed in Poland. An idea which the Polish government, after 2007, looked upon negatively and the United States finally withdrew from.\textsuperscript{59} The political essence of such an operation is the fact that with an important defensive military installation located in Polish territory, the United States would undoubtedly defend it for the sake of their own security.

The form and condition of the Polish Armed Forces were decided by internal and external factors. To the first group belong: the strong (especially in the 1990s) influence of personnel inherited from the PRL, a low actual defence budget, social aversion to compulsory military service (and thus the attractiveness of election promises regarding its abolishment), and side-lining the issue of the military security of the state in political debates during subsequent electoral campaigns in Poland. To the second group belong: a pan-European tendency to professionalize the armed forces in relation to new tasks (out-of-area missions), the performance of which the territorial defence armed forces stemming from the Cold War were not prepared, and pressure from the allies to professionalize the armed forces to be used in expeditionary missions.


Thus, the form, structure, and nature of the Polish Armed Forces and the position of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Polish concepts of national security were decided by a series of historical circumstances and modern internal and external factors. The dominating one was the sense of security both in the case of Polish leaders and the public opinion and the trust of Polish decision-makers in external security pillars, as can be seen in the conceptual documents which appeared after 2007. This foundation may be shattered by a possible decrease in NATO unity or the military capabilities of its greatest instrument: the United States Armed Forces or the political withdrawal of the United States from credible guarantees of security in Central Europe.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{60} More on the possible military threats scenarios for Poland cf.: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, \textit{Po co Polsce Armia? (What does Poland Need Armed Forces For?)}, "Arcana" 2010, Issue 1 (91), p. 35-42.
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**NATO Strategic Assumptions. Implications for the Polish Armed Forces**

Although it has been fourteen years since Poland joined NATO and our leading politicians regularly take part in the work of the Alliance, its fundamental assumptions do not translate well into the concepts behind the development of the Polish Armed Forces. They are also absent from public debate and public opinion, as widely understood, has no views on them. It may be a result of a superficial, or even opportunistic, understanding of the NATO requirements which, though formally accepted by the Polish government, have not been fully realized in practice. In light of this, questions surrounding the Polish Armed Forces and their purpose become vitally important.

The Chicago 2012 NATO Summit confirmed beyond any doubt that the Alliance is, and for the next few years will be, an efficient instrument for stabilizing the international security environment. Aside from the unanimously adopted declarations, the above thesis is supported by the fact that representatives of over 60 states (such as Japan, Morocco, Qatar, Australia) and international organizations (the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank) took part in the Summit. Even more certainty comes from experience: NATO is the longest existing international security alliance in history, a factor which has ensured long-lasting peace in Europe, and the Alliance has carried out many successful defence, stabilization, and humanitarian missions.

The declarations defined the main aspects of the main strategic assumptions to be adopted which resulted from the new *Strategic Concept* adopted in Lisbon. The three main tasks of NATO, as listed there, remain unchanged. First, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance will prevent and take a stand on any threats of aggression and new challenges to the Alliance as a whole and to its individual members. Second, the Alliance has a unique and concrete set of political and military capabilities with which to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ those capabilities to help manage developing crises before they escalate into conflicts, to stop on-going conflicts, and to help consolidate stability. Third, the Alliance is affected by, and can affect security developments beyond its borders. With regards to the main prerogatives of the Alliance, such as arms control, non-proliferation and disarma-
ment of weapons, it will cooperate with the relevant countries and international organizations.\(^1\)

The strategy highlights that the efficiency of the allied forces depends on two factors: the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces and the ability to resolve unconventional crises and threats, such as terrorism, cyber terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, and energy security. This part of its capability will require a comprehensive approach, i.e., integrating alongside military forces, also civilian institutions and partners, both governmental and non-governmental in the completion of tasks.\(^2\) The U.S. regional command for Africa (AFRICOM), established in 2008, in which approximately 50 percent of the staff is civilian, is the best example of this.

Along these lines, another declaration was drawn up during the Chicago Summit, *Deterrence and Defence Posture Review*, which highlighted the fundamental capabilities of conventional forces (as opposed to nuclear) that armed forces should have.\(^3\) Yet another declaration, *The Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, defined the intended direction for the further development of the forces as “modern tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment”.\(^4\) The overly polished diplomatic wording of the declarations, which makes it possible for the heads of 28 member states to adopt them, is so vague that it might be of little use to an average citizen. Let us, however, reflect on what they mean specifically for the Polish Armed Forces with regards to two aspects: operational capabilities and operating.

First, with regards to capabilities, the specifications in the declarations are indeed similar to what they were when Poland first joined NATO. We also hear all the time about the modernization, reorganization, or even transformation of the armed forces. Let us look more closely at the three features listed in the Chicago declaration. The first is modernization. Taking into consideration what might be deemed modern in our armed forces, F-16 Block 52+ multirole fighters and CASA C-295M transport aircrafts, Rosomak armoured personnel carriers, and Spike anti-tank guided missiles, the modernization index equals approximately 10 - 12 percent. It should be noted that F-16 aircrafts were designed in the 1980s and have

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\(^2\) Ibidem, p. 29

\(^3\) *Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. Part III*, [www.nato.int], access: 23/10/2012.

\(^4\) *The Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, point 5, [www.nato.int], access: 23/10/2012.
been modernized. The Rosomak wheeled armoured personnel carrier is in most cases equipped with a 30 mm calibre gun. The initial plans to equip it with Spike anti-tank guided missiles, which would radically enhance its combat capabilities, were cancelled, allegedly for financial reasons, as if it was cost-effective to save money on human well-being and lives, and most importantly – the defensive capabilities of the Republic of Poland. As to the Spike anti-tank missiles, Poland acquired only one version: the intermediate-ranged (4 km) missile, which makes them rather problematic in their use due to the natural topography and prevailing terrain type in Poland. We do not have the long-ranged version (8 - 10 km) which could be mounted on helicopters and used with maximum efficiency.

The second feature is interoperability which means the forces are equipped, trained and capable of working with allies and partners. The best indicator of interoperability is the degree of the implementation of the NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs). These regulate the fundamental aspects of armed forces cooperation in the Alliance: from common understanding, i.e., using the same language, in this case English, through communication to doctrines and procedures. The degree of STANAG implementation in Poland was 17 percent in 2008. It means in practice that our interoperability is poor. For example, English should be commonly used by the lower ranks: non-commissioned officers and privates, not just officers in the NATO staff. This need stems from the requirements of the modern battlefield, the domain we are involved in.

This issue relates to all the NATO standards, which we should have been working towards meeting right from the first day of our membership, that in principle concern:

- Command and reconnaissance systems coherence;
- Air defence, including integrating military and civil air traffic control;
- Modernization of naval forces and integration of the command system;
- Cooperation in intelligence and counter-intelligence and the implementation of an information exchange system.5

In practice, these standards have not been met and it was only recently that the President officially declared the need to build an efficient air defence when speaking about a “ballistic missile defence system”. The announced Navy reform is an illusion and is supposed to commence after 2018.

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The budget is the third element. In absolute numbers, it is increasing and amounted to PLN 29.5 billion in 2012. According to the Act of 2001, it will be equal to 1.95 percent of GDP, but of the previous year’s GDP, a fact which is often forgotten. In relation to the current budget, it amounts to slightly over 1.8 percent. This percentage is even lower if the rate of inflation is taken into consideration. This proves that we are not meeting the main NATO requirement, the so-called Robertson’s Index, that defence spending should amount to 2 percent of GDP (including 20 percent for modernization). In Poland, modernization is an aspect of asset-related spending that comprises munitions, on-going armament acquisitions, equipment repairs and infrastructure renovation. The Robertson’s Index also includes qualitative requirements: 40 percent of the army should be capable of taking part in operations within a strategic radius of 12 thousand km from Brussels, 8 percent of which should be maintained at high readiness or be taking part in operations. With regards to air forces, the percentages are 50 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Another interesting indicator is the average military spending per soldier. According to the Ministry of National Defence, in 2011, it was half the level of the spending by the European NATO members. This directly affects equipment, training and the professionalism of our soldiers.

Second apart from the required military capabilities, the efficiency of the armed forces requires functional assumptions which, as the Ministry of National Defence interdepartmental project Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2012 - 2022 (Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP 2012 - 2022) made public in April 2012, rightly points out, should be interdisciplinary. In other words: they should be capable of performing certain tasks defined in the NATO strategy: collective defence, crisis-response, and cooperation with partners. Armed forces should operate within the framework of national security using common operational procedures integrated within the Allied security system. As of today, there is no such system in Poland. Some security tasks are carried out by separate departments. Furthermore, the Polish legal system has no notion of a national security system as a separate entity. Yet it is vital to define, most of all, the goals of the state’s security policy. President Bronisław Komorowski has recently mentioned the need to define Poland’s interests, as they are not clearly unequivocal.

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8 Ibidem, p. 11.
In light of the officially recognized threats to Polish security, which are almost identical to the threats described at the Chicago Summit, according to the *Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2012 - 2022*: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, the increasing number of failed states, and the operations of foreign special forces, it is obvious that armed forces alone are not enough to cope with these. The armed forces must operate in an integrated state security system comprising all the national powers, measures and resources. The system, its operation and integrative role was to be described in the *National Security Strategic Review (Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego)* which was begun in 2010 and was supposed to be completed by the National Security Bureau (*Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*) by June 2012. It has been compiled, but according to the Head of the National Security Bureau, it will not be made public due to its classified status. It is reminiscent of the first *Strategic Defence Review (Strategiczny Przegląd Obrony)* completed in 2006. Not only was it rejected but it remains classified which is indicative of a lack of political culture in terms of military matters so often criticized by our partners, among them the United States.¹⁰

**Conclusion**

In the light of Poland’s documentation of its armed forces, the initial question in the introduction about the Polish Armed Forces and their role with regards to NATO requirements still has no answer. What conclusions can be drawn from the above?

Taking into account the failure to implement the current concept for the armed forces with 100 thousand professional soldiers and 20 thousand of separate formation (*Narodowe Siły Rezerwowe*) and our objective conditions, geographical, demographic, financial, and having considered the integrated efforts of all governmental agendas and resources from the perspective of security, it might be appropriate to reverse the current proportions when planning our armed forces. If this were to be done, there would be 20 thousand - 40 thousand professional soldiers trained, equipped and rehearsed in accordance with NATO standards able to take part in NATO operations and a much larger reserve force properly trained and prepared for territorial defence. They could be recruited and managed by local administrations. Both types of forces would be synchronized and could support each other, if the need arose. Such a solution is undoubtedly less expensive and

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more effective than maintaining the current state of affairs which, as exemplified by our Navy, is sinking slowly, yet surely. Other states, such as Finland and the Scandinavian countries, have successfully implemented this solution. The U.S. National Guard proves extremely effective when resolving various crises within the territory of the United States. What is more, it is able to carry out tasks in remote locations just as successfully as the regular armed forces in the most extreme of conditions.

In summary, modern security threats are no longer of a military nature and do not require the sort of armed forces seen in the industrial era, based on Warsaw Pact-like assumptions, models and doctrines. Those times are long gone. What we need is modern thinking, breaking with the old patterns of thought that are indicative of our parochialism. Instead we need to focus on actual integration with the security systems, which are, as official documents rightly emphasize, guaranteed by NATO and the European Union.
CHAPTER III

The Past, the Present, and the Future of the Operational Involvement of NATO and its Members
NATO - Russian RENEGADE Aircraft Joint Initiative

Terrorism is a particular type of crime aimed at both the state (which it seeks to destroy) and society, which it attacks causing causalities and instilling fear.\(^1\) What terrorists have always wanted to achieve is to spread fear and this has been made possible by the fact that they gain publicity for their acts of violence. During the initial phase of terrorism on a global scale, abductions, hijacks, assassination attempts, or kidnapping influential persons “was enough” to achieve this goal. With time, the violence had to be increased for terrorists to hit the headlines. What could generate publicity was the killing of a large number of causalities identified with the ideological enemy. Gradually, innocent civilians became the target.\(^2\)

Today’s terrorist organizations have a wide arsenal of modern weaponry, from traditional weapons and explosives, to chemical weapons. The breakthrough moment in the qualitative perception of terrorism was the attacks on September 11, 2001 when hijacked airplanes were used to attack the United States. The attacks were carried out by hijackers who took control of four airplanes on domestic flights belonging to American airlines and directed them at structures within the territory of the United States. Approximately three thousand people died in these attacks. It became clear that the terrorists did not want to resolve any issue but to kill as many people as possible, without any specific reason.

The World Trade Center attacks (2001) were the first successful operation of this type. They caused more causalities and losses than any other terrorist event in the history of the United States and the world. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. resulted in the civilizational redefinition of the perception of terrorist threats and the combating of terrorism on a global scale.\(^3\)

As a member of the UN and NATO, Poland is perceived as belonging to the so-called North, and above all as being a good ally of the United States, directly involved in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is obvious that our military activity in those areas increases the probability of a “return visit” of some kind. Poland is

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\(^{1}\) W. Zubrzycki (ed.), *Przeciwdziałanie zagrożenia terrorystycznym w Polsce (Preventing Terrorist Threats in Poland)*, Warsaw 2011, p. 9.


also the first state of the eastern wall of the European Union. Its role as a border state of both the European Union and NATO is another factor increasing the threat of a terrorist attack on Poland. As a result, Polish international policy must take the right steps in order to internally prepare the state and citizens for a possible attack.\footnote{4}

**Air Terrorism**

Aircraft hijacking used to be a popular method of terrorism. The few hijackings that happened in Poland were not of an organized nature; rather they were connected with Polish citizens wanting to flee the country to Western Europe and apply for political asylum.\footnote{5} Twenty hijacking attempts on Polish national airlines, PLL-\textsc{lot}, airplanes took place between 1980 and 1982, eight of which were successful. The change in the internal situation in Poland and European integration took away the motives that induced such desperate perpetrators to make these individual hijacking attempts.\footnote{6}

Nowadays, due to heavy air traffic, aircraft (including cargo and passengers) that would be able to cause substantial losses if they were to be used as a deadly weapon pose the main threat.\footnote{7} Not even small and medium-sized privately-owned aircraft, nor ultra-light radio- or remote-controlled aircraft should be taken lightly, especially if they were to be used in combination with explosives or biological/chemical substances.

For the first, and so far the only, time, aircraft were used by terrorists as giant “missiles” in the United States as mentioned above. A number of initiatives have been undertaken to prevent this happening again in the future. One of these is the increased security checks carried out on passengers at airports aimed at preventing them from smuggling on board any objects which might be used to destroy or take over the craft. A number of other measures to prevent attacks and respond appropriately in case of an attack have been implemented.

\footnote{5}{E.g. June 5, 1970 - hijacking of an Antonov An-24 PLL-\textsc{lot} aircraft to Copenhagen, flight Szczecin - Gdańsk; June 9, 1970 - hijacking attempt of an Antonov An-24 PLL-\textsc{lot} aircraft, flight Katowice - Warsaw; August 7, 1970 - hijacking of an Antonov An-24 PLL-\textsc{lot} aircraft to Berlin, flight Szczecin - Katowice; August 19, 1970 hijacking of an Ilyushin Il-14 PLL-\textsc{lot} aircraft to Bornholm, flight Gdańsk - Warszawa; August 26, 1970 - hijacking attempt of an Antonov An-24 PLL-\textsc{lot} aircraft, flight Katowice - Warsaw, a bomb exploded on board, injured passenger, the hijacker suffered the worst injuries.}
\footnote{6}{W. Zubrzycki, *Wybrane zagadnienia...*, p. 91.}
The events of 9/11 disturbed the traditional perception of air threats and caused the line between peace, crisis and war to become blurred. As a result, all international military alliances were forced to take a different perspective on the issue of aviation threats.\textsuperscript{8}

\textit{RENEGADE Aircrafts}

Action had to be taken and phenomena defined due to the use of air transport for terrorist purposes. This is why the term RENEGADE aircraft was coined, used to describe an aircraft which may be used in a terrorist attack from the air. There are three categories of renegade aircraft: \textit{Suspected RENEGADE}, \textit{Probable RENEGADE}, and \textit{Confirmed RENEGADE}.

A \textit{Suspected RENEGADE} is an aircraft of undetermined intent or a hijacked aircraft, meeting at least two of the following criteria:

- A substantial violation of the restrictions and prohibitions of air traffic set by law;
- violation by a civilian aircraft pilot of the conditions of air traffic permission given by air traffic control, especially if the crew is not abiding by the current flight plan;
- refusal to carry out an order or no reaction to an order from air traffic control;
- unexpected change in the flight profile of an aircraft (course, altitude, speed);
- interruption of radio communication, especially when accompanied by a change of flight characteristics;
- unjustified change of SSR transponder code or excessive use of the identification signal, without authorization from air traffic control;
- the crew using non-standard phraseology or other changes in radio communication (change in the tone of voice, change in the language used for communication);
- the pilot sending a radio failure or emergency code;
- conversation irrelevant to aviation (e.g.: political issues, religion);
- notification by other national authorities (e.g.: border guard, the police, etc.) or the authorities of neighbouring countries;
- notification by other non-governmental institutions and individuals;
- a threat made by a third party.

\textsuperscript{8} W. Zubrzycki, \textit{Wybrane zagadnienia...}, p. 91-92.
Probable RENEGADE is an aircraft which meets at least two of the above conditions and information gathered indicating that it may be used for unlawful actions or a terrorist attack. Additionally:

- the aircraft commander (pilot) has sent the accepted code for unlawful interference - or aircraft hijacking code;
- the aircraft has been hijacked as part of a series of hijacks and the gathered data indicate that it may be used in an air terrorist attack;
- the aircraft continues to fail to carry out orders from air traffic control, or from other air traffic authorities, or from the military;
- the aircraft ignores or does not carry out orders from an intervening aircraft performing visual identification.

Confirmed RENEGADE is an aircraft for which all the gathered data confirm beyond any doubt that it is to be used in a terrorist attack, in particular if:

- the crew have activated emergency signals to transmit a message confirming the above;
- it may be deduced from the communications that there is a renegade situation on board;
- the manoeuvres and behaviour of the aircraft in airspace indicate (confirm) that the hijacked aircraft will be used in an air attack on state infrastructure.  

Reaction by NATO and Poland to RENEGADE Aircrafts

If faced with RENEGADE threats, NATO members have devised a strategy for action aimed at involving the national authorities of each member state in a direct intervention in the crisis management phase. As a result, a set of legal norms and procedures has been established creating a basis for developing a common approach to the issue and defining the most suitable and effective intervention methods in case a crisis situation in connection with terrorist activity occurs.  

Polish Air Forces have been an active participant in airspace control missions since Poland’s accession to NATO (1999). Consequently, it has been possible to develop a Polish RENEGADE-threat reaction subsystem, synchronized with the national airspace defence system.

Data from command posts, the air traffic control systems of neighbouring countries, civil national air area control services or any other sources in possession

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9 Ibidem, p. 92-93.
of evidence of a RENEGADE threat may be used as sources of information concerning the threat of an aircraft being used in a terrorist attack or being used unlawfully. In particular, the information may come from: civil air traffic services, military airport air traffic services, or authorized military or state services (the police, border guard, etc.).

After identifying such an aircraft as RENEGADE, actions are taken to provide an on-going analysis and assessment of the situation. Based on the gathered information, reports are drawn up along with the options for potential actions to be taken together with the suitable air defence system reactions presented to the Air Force Commander. The decisions are then communicated to any cooperating military forces, including the Duty Operations Service of the Polish Armed Forces (Dyżurna Służba Operacyjna Sił Zbrojnych RP) and services managing the airspace. As required by the situation, governmental agencies may take actions as per their competencies: the police, National Fire Service, Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego), Military Gendarmerie (Żandarmeria Wojskowa), Foreign Intelligence Agency (Agencja Wywiadu), Government Protection Bureau (Biuro Ochrony Rządu) and other institutions.

The Operator (Dyżurny Operacyjny) at the Air Operations Centre (Centrum Operacji Powietrznych) coordinates the actions taken in regard to the RENEGADE aircraft. They carry out orders from their superiors and the Air Defence Commander (Dowódca Obrony Powietrznej) and give orders to their subordinate forces. If the Air Defence Commander decides to use military aircraft on duty, the Operator at the Air Operations Centre will give the relevant orders, regarding sorties procedures. In practice, the reaction consists of a pair of fighters on standby being scrambled to intercept the aircraft and carry out reconnaissance. The fighters attempt to contact the pilot of the RENEGADE aircraft by radio or using international aviation signals: gestures made in the cockpit or a specific movement of an aircraft. After interception, the fighters follow the aircraft and escort it to the landing location indicated or chosen by the aircraft pilot.11

The Constitutional Tribunal on the Issue of RENEGADE Aircrafts

In relation to the Polish state’s response to RENEGADE aircrafts, the Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny) ruling stating that it is illegal to shoot down a civilian aircraft used in a terrorist attack plays a significant role.12 On

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11 W. Zubrzycki, Wybrane zagadnienia..., p. 94.
12 In relation to Art. 122a of the Aviation Law Act: “If state security demands it and air defence authority decides, having considered in particular the information from states air traffic control authority, that a civilian aircraft is being used unlawfully, and in particular in a terrorist air attack, the aircraft may be destroyed in
September 30, 2008 the Constitutional Tribunal examined the motion by the First President of the Supreme Court (Pierwszy Prezes Sądu Najwyższego) concerning the right of the public administration to make a decision regarding the destruction of a civilian aircraft. This regulation was introduced into Polish legislation by the Act of 2 July, 2004 amending the Act on state border protection, initiated by the Ministry of National Defence (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej) as a reaction to the threat of a terrorist attack from the air as exemplified by the September 11, 2011 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.

In the above case, the Constitutional Tribunal ruling was that Art. 122a pertaining to the consent given by the air defence authority (Ministry of National Defence) to destroy a civilian aircraft being used for unlawful action and in particular in a terrorist attack is unconstitutional and violates the regulations regarding basic human and citizen’s rights and freedoms (Poland is a democratic state ruled by law, human dignity is inviolable and should be respected, human life should be protected, and rights and freedoms should not be overly limited without a reason).

Among other arguments, the Tribunal held that human life must not be valued on the basis of age, health, life expectancy, or any other criteria. Hence, all individuals, including the passengers of an airplane in Polish airspace, have the right to have their lives protected by the state. The Tribunal opposed a solution whereby innocent people on board the aircraft become merely a means to an end, i.e., the protection of state security. It should be noted that the assessment of the threat to people on the ground is always hypothetical and the decision to have an aircraft shot down poses a real, unavoidable threat to those on board; it means, in fact, certain death. The duty to ensure security as a part of the state’s legal obligation to protect life pertains both to those on the ground and on board aircraft.

In the light of this ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal, it is forbidden to destroy a civilian aircraft being used in a terrorist attack in Poland. However, the information about a RENEGADE aircraft is itself extremely valuable. It would be of particular interest to services directly subordinate to the Minister of Internal Affairs (Minister Spraw Wewnętrznych). It would allow the relevant services to prepare to neutralize threats, reduce their potential results and take action in the

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13 Art. 122a: “If state security demands it and air defence authority decides, having considered in particular the information from states air traffic control authority, that a civilian aircraft is being used unlawfully, and in particular in a terrorist air attack, the aircraft may be destroyed in accordance with the regulations laid out in the Act of October 12, 1990 on state border protection”.

course of subsequent events (e.g., rescue operations, including hostage rescue after landing).

Cooperative Airspace Initiative

In order to prevent terrorist attacks using civil aircrafts, i.e., of the same kind as used in the 9/11 attacks, the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) project was established. It was initiated in 2002 as one of the first projects of the NATO - Russia Council,\(^{15}\) which was a response to the new challenges posed to international security. The Council’s task is to enhance cooperation in the military sphere and the fight against terrorism. The Cooperative Airspace Initiative is an American project aimed at building and maintaining a system for exchanging information on any air situation in the region of NATO and Russian airspace. After the 9/11 attacks, it is one of the most important elements of the NATO - Russia Council’s plan for action in combating terrorism.

The new airspace security system is based on NATO and Russia having access to radar data on air traffic. It uses commonly agreed procedures to trigger an early warning of suspicious movements in airspace. If an aircraft behaves in a way that violates aviation rules, the air traffic coordination system offers numerous options for exchanging information and communications in order to ensure a rapid joint reaction to a terrorist threat.\(^{16}\)

The system consists of four units in Russia and four in NATO member states. They are located in the northern part of Europe: from Bodø (Norway) to Murmansk (Russia), and Ankara (Turkey) to Rostov-on-Don (Russia) in the south. The NATO Coordination Centre is located in Warsaw, and the Russian - in Moscow.\(^{17}\) The Polish Local Coordination Unit (LCU) in Warsaw and NATO CAI Coordination Centre (currently in a test phase), both within CAI structures, are located in the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (Polska Agencja Żeglugi Powietrznnej, PAŻP) in Warsaw. PAŻP provides logistic and technical services.

Interdepartmental Cooperative Airspace Initiative Board

Poland’s participation in CAI is important for the security of Poland’s north-eastern airspace border and NATO’s south-eastern airspace border. In order to

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\(^{15}\) Its members are the 28 NATO member states and the Russian Federation, all as equal partners.

\(^{16}\) NATO i Rosja wspólnie ćwiczą walkę z terroryzmem powietrznym, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 08/06/2011, [www.wp.pl](http://www.wp.pl), access: 10/09/2012.

develop organizational solutions and regulations for CAI operations in Poland, the Prime Minister appointed the Interdepartmental Cooperative Airspace Initiative Board (Międzyresortowy Zespół ds. Cooperative Airspace Initiative)\(^{18}\) in his Ordinance no. 140 of December 15, 2008. The Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of National Defence (which is the meeting place of the Board) was appointed the head of the Board. The Board also consists of:\(^{19}\)

2) Board Deputy Heads appointed by:
   a) The Minister of National Defence,
   b) The Minister of Transport,
   c) The Minister of Internal Affairs.

3) Members appointed by:
   a) The Minister of National Defence,
   b) The Minister of Transport,
   c) The Minister of Internal Affairs,
   d) The Minister of Health,
   e) The President of the Civil Aviation Authority (Urząd Lotnictwa Cywilnego),
   f) The President of the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency,
   g) The Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister,
   h) The Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces,
   i) The Air Force Commander.

4) Secretary appointed by the Minister of National Defence.

In order to implement the tasks properly, a number of specialized workgroups have been established: for legal matters, for the drawing up of conceptual and planning documents in agreement with international CAI management institutions, for organizational, technical and financial resources, in charge of creating a NATO CAI Coordination Unit and a Local Coordination Unit, for the preparation of CAI testing exercises and training, and for CAI operations.\(^{20}\) The Initiative was developed in three phases:

- Phase I: feasibility study (2004 - 2005);
- Phase II: implementation of a technical Information Exchange System (2006 - 2009);

\(^{18}\) Ordinance of the Prime Minister No. 140 of December 15, 2008 on formation of Interdepartmental Board for *Cooperative Airspace Initiative* realised as a part of NATO - Russia Council for cooperation in the scope of airspace operations and air traffic management.

\(^{19}\) Ordinance of the Prime Minister No. 140, para 3.

Phase III: the test phase, carried out by conducting a series of exercises, including exercises with aircrafts (2009 - 2011).

During the experimental operation of the IT system, before the beginning of regular operations, an international CAI workshop took place in Poland and other member states. There were 80 participants from various countries (colonels, brigadier generals and their civilian counterparts) representing the institutions responsible for air traffic safety, air defence and combating terrorism. The workshop was aimed at promoting the Cooperative Airspace Initiative internationally by means of a practical demonstration of the CAI Information Exchange System in operation as well as discussions on selected topics related to combating air terrorism.

The active phase of the Vigilant Skies 2011 exercise took place on June 7 - 8, 2011. It was the first joint counter terrorist exercise by NATO members and Russia and the first Cooperative Airspace Initiative operation completed. According to NATO representatives, these were the first exercises of this kind, demonstrating the new cooperation between former enemies who, during the Cold War, were used to observing each other’s aircrafts as potential intruders.

The goal of the exercise was to test the procedures in place for dealing with the event of an aircraft being hijacked by terrorists and it heading towards the territory of another state. The exercise phase, featuring real aircraft, took two days. On June, 7, a Polish aircraft taking off from Kraków played the role of a hijacked aircraft. After it deviated from the flight route and contact was lost, Polish fighters intercepted it and passed it over to Russian fighters. After a struggle in the cockpit, the terrorists were overcome but the navigation system of the aircraft was damaged. It was necessary for the Russian fighters to escort the aircraft back to Poland. One day later a Turkish aircraft deviated from its route over the Black Sea, contact was lost. A coordinated interception by Turkish and then Russian fighters was carried out.

The Significance of CAI

The third phase - the experimental operation of the CAI information system was aimed at testing the compliance of its operational functions with the

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21 T. Rąba, op. cit.
23 W. Zubrzycki, Wybrane zagadnienia..., p. 96.
requirements, eliminating any discrepancies found, and preparing for the next phase.\footnote{Ordinance of the Prime Minister No. 140, para 2. 3).} The exercises with real aircraft, \textit{Vigilant Skies 2011}, constituted a demonstration of the readiness of the \textit{Cooperative Airspace Initiative} for the fourth phase - the operational use of the system. To implement the fourth phase, the Office of the National Defence Ministry Director for ASOC (\textit{Air Sovereignty Operation Centre}), developed the \textit{Concept of Implementation of CAI in Poland} (\textit{Koncepcja wdrożenia CAI w Polsce}). On 31 May, 2012 it was accepted by the Minister of National Defence and the leading role of the Ministry of National Defence in coordinating Poland’s actions concerning CAI was assumed. The project is currently being analysed by the Ministry.\footnote{Information provided by the secretary of the Interdepartmental Board for \textit{Cooperative Airspace Initiative} realised as a part of the NATO - Russia Council for cooperation in the scope of airspace operations and air traffic management, Col. S. Bartoszewski.}

The CAI Information Exchange System is the first system of its kind common for both Russia and NATO. It will provide greater transparency, early information on suspicious behaviour in airspace, and enable joint responses to incidents concerning the security of European airspace, such as terrorist threats, by facilitating, for the first time in history, the exchange of real-time information on radar flight paths between NATO and Russia, common access to air traffic radar data, dedicated, direct communication channels and jointly developed notification and coordination procedures in the event of a suspicious situation in the air.\footnote{T. Rąba, \textit{op. cit.}}

Once the system reaches operational status, Poland will gain access to the airspace of Kaliningrad Oblast, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and north-west Russia. The information from the CAI system may be used by civil air traffic authorities, such as Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (\textit{Polska Agencja Żeglugi Powietrznej}) and air defence command systems as a means of early detection and a surveillance tool for RENEGADE objects approaching from the north-east. It would constitute one of the tools for combating air terrorism by providing early threat detection capabilities.

The \textit{Cooperative Airspace Initiative} is in line with the directions of Poland’s foreign policy. It is perceived as a good example of practical and effective cooperation between NATO and Russia and Poland and Russia and as such it may be the beginning of new (friendly) political relations with Russia.\footnote{The opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, related by its representative during the second meeting of the Interdepartmental Board for \textit{Cooperative Airspace Initiative} realised as a part of NATO - Russia Council for cooperation in the scope of airspace operations and air traffic management on March, 17, 2009.} The political prestige of Poland may be expected to increase thanks to the presence of the NATO CAI Coordination Centre in its territory. Additionally, the CAI should be perceived as
a way to start introducing NATO standards in Russia and as a confidence-building measure in NATO - Russian relations. It is one of few NATO - Russian projects that Moscow is really involved in. It may also contribute to the strengthening of Poland’s leading position in the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, the construction of Allied infrastructure in Poland, and the enhancement of the capabilities of the Polish air defence system with regard to the security of Poland’s north-east air border and NATO’s south-east air border. For these reasons, Poland is deeply involved in the Cooperative Airspace Initiative. It was given very high priority as it is perceived by both sides not only as a tool for combating terrorism in the air, but as a mutual confidence building measure.

Also the amount invested so far is indicative of the importance of the Initiative. NATO - Russia Council members, including Canada, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Russia, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States have so far spent over 10 million euro on the CAI project. Other NATO members and partner states (in accordance with separate provisions) may also join the system. Talks with Finland and Ukraine are already under way.29

Conclusion

In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in the amount of air traffic throughout the world. It increased by over 100 percent in Poland in the last decade. In 2011, Polish airports, all combined, handled 21.9 million passengers and 89 thousand tons of cargo.30 According to a report on air operators in Poland, 20 companies were certified to carry cargo or passengers in 2011. The charter flights market is also thriving.31 There were 2,230 aircrafts in the Republic of Poland’s register of aircraft and 676 more were listed in records in January 2012. Airplanes, helicopters, gliders, motor gliders, airships and balloons are subject to registration and ultra-light aeroplanes and powered hang gliders should be listed in records.32

In the note written by the President of the Civil Aviation Authority,33 it is reported that there were 1,602 air traffic occurrences registered in general; including 110 accidents (42 in Poland), 22 serious incidents (one in Poland), 638 incidents (73 in Poland), and 832 other safety-related occurrences (three in Poland) in

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29 T. Rąba, op. cit.
31 Ibidem.
33 Note by the President of Civil Aviation Authority on the air security in 2011, 13/09/212, [www.ulc.gov.pl].
The number of cases of deliberate dazzling of aircraft crews using laser light has been gradually increasing in Poland. There were also a few cases of so-called unjustified intrusions of the controlled airspace of the Republic of Poland. Furthermore, control over many airports and landing strips, particularly private one, is not always effective, which make it easier for them to be used for the purposes of terrorism.

In order to provide a sufficient level of security, especially in the face of deliberate actions, numerous countermeasures must be taken that are appropriate for modern threats. The Cooperative Airspace Initiative, in which Poland is actively involved, is aimed at preventing terrorist attacks with civilian planes, such as the World Trade Centre attacks in 2001, by exchanging information concerning activity in NATO and Russian airspace and by organizing the coordinated interception of potentially threatening airplanes. It will improve the security of passengers travelling internationally in both the airspace of NATO members’ and Russia every day and ensure the safety of millions of citizens.
Cyber Security of NATO Air Operations

NATO has been undergoing a transformation designed to prepare it so it can face the challenges to security threats in the 21st century as effectively as it did in the previous century. Indeed, no challenge that NATO has had to face has been as unpredictable as cyber terrorism. There are many organizations that focus on using and attacking in cyberspace: from states and wealthy and sophisticated criminal organizations to loosely interconnected hacker groups with political and social agendas. This poses new challenges to organizations, states, and political and military alliances. NATO is particularly exposed to cyber attacks from criminal groups, terrorists, or hostile states due to its increasing involvement in crisis response operations (both within and beyond its territory).

In this context, the Air Force may become the main target as it is the core means of rapid response and the most technology-dependent branch of the armed forces. Air Force destabilization may be attempted during times of peace, crisis and war, and its scope may not only be limited to a given crisis response operation, but also the operation of the whole of NATO’s defence system. Thus, the cyber security of NATO’s key Air Force infrastructure needs to be considered the priority during all defence readiness conditions. It requires appropriate regulations and mechanisms allowing for cyber threats to be correctly recognized and assessed. These include: cyber war, cyber terrorism, cyber crime and other actions which may cause damage both to the information transmitted and processed in cyberspace and directly to physical components (hardware). Therefore, the goal of this paper is to determine the impact of cyber threats on the security of NATO’s Air Forces and to present the actions taken by the Alliance to eliminate them.

The starting point for achieving this aim is to answer the following questions:

- How is the notion of cyber security understood?
- In what kind of crisis management operations can the Air Force take part and what operations can it lead?
- What threats may destabilize the operations of the Air Force?
- What actions are taken by NATO to counter threats in cyberspace?

Cyber Security: Identifying the Problem

Any discussion concerning cyber security should begin with an attempt to define cyberspace and determine potential cyber threats. The term cyberspace was
coined in 1984 by William Gibson in *Neuromancer* and by the beginning of the 1990s it was already widely used. It was at that time that Philip Elmer DeWitt described cyberspace as similar to Plato’s plane of ideal forms, a metaphorical space, a virtual reality. Cyberspace is defined in the JP 1-02 document as “the notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks”.¹ According to another definition, cyberspace is “a domain characterised by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures”.²

An analysis of the above definitions supports the conclusion that the idea of cyberspace has evolved. The first one indicates only computer networks as the medium for exchanging digital information, whereas the second points to a larger number of electronic devices, networks and the supporting physical infrastructure (not limited to computer networks only). Hence, today, cyberspace is understood as a communication space created by a system of Internet connections via interconnected computers and computer memories encompassing all electronic communication systems.

Based on the above statement, not only the Internet, but also other technologies, such as radio, television, telephone, telephone lines, and Hertzian waves are communication systems. The ICT (Information and Communications Technology) network made up of these media has become a theatre of terrorist operations. Both terrorist organizations and individual terrorists or criminals, and states and alliances can affect business entities and countries via this network. The main threats connected with using cyberspace are: cyber crime, cyber terrorism and cyber war.

*Cyber crime* is any illegal behaviour perpetrated by means of electronic operations that targets the security of computer systems and the data stored on them. It also encompasses the sharing and distribution of information. The greatest threats are: piracy, magnetic card-related crimes, identity theft and child pornography. Other crimes are: obtaining licensed software without paying for it and obtaining codes used to bypass the security features of software in order to unlock full versions of commercial software. Hacking into other people’s accounts, such as e-mail or social network accounts or (virtual) identity theft are yet further examples of cybercrime. It is illegal to sell non-existent objects via the Internet in order to fraudulently obtain money or to create an exact copy of a website, e.g., of a bank, to gather sensitive data (*phishing*). It is worth remembering that installing and using spyware is also a crime.

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² Ibidem, p. 3.
Cyber terrorism means attacking network infrastructure, websites, network services, etc. in order to achieve specific terrorist goals. Such an attack may be a part of a larger operation or an individual action. According to T. Szubrycht, cyber terrorism is: “using computer networks as a tool to paralyse or seriously restrict the ability to use state structures (such as the power industry, transport, government institutions, etc.) effectively or a tool to intimidate the government or the population or force specific actions from them”.

The phenomenon of cyber terrorism may be analysed from the point of view of its destructive results (as in the case of a traditional terrorist attacks) or as a propaganda and (dis)information tool. Terrorists may use computers for sabotage, communication, propaganda, training, psychological warfare and to propagate hatred, recruit new members, gather information or earn money. The cyber terrorists’ tools are: cyber attacks, hacking systems vital for security (military units, power stations) and DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks on privately-owned or governmental institutions.

Cyber war may be defined as an external activity by a state, organized in the form of violence, in pursuit of defined political goals aimed at destroying or modifying an adversary’s ICT systems or the information processed by them and the protection of their own IT systems from similar actions taken by the adversary. Cyber war is also understood as the potential use of computers, the Internet and other means of storing or distributing information in order to attack their adversary’s IT systems. The difference between traditional war and cyber war (not to be mistaken with information warfare) is the battlefield: ICT systems and networks. In short, cyber war is meant to disrupt or destroy the adversary’s IT and communication systems. It may be done using bombs, an electromagnetic pulse, or a cyber attack. The attack may come from a terrorist organization or a neighbouring country, usually from the opposing military bloc. The results of such an attack may be similar to one carried out by terrorists, however, a country attempting a cyber attack usually has better tools and means of attacking and covering-up than terrorists.

Having determined the main threats in cyberspace, an answer should be found to the following question: how is the notion of cyber security understood? Cyber security comprises many ideas: from information security and operational security, to the security of computer systems. It means different things to different people. In the case of individuals, it means a sense of security and the protection of per-

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sonal data and privacy. For businesses, cyber security means protecting access to critical business functions and sensitive data by using operational security measures and information security management. For states, it means the protection of its citizens, businesses, critical infrastructure and the state’s computer systems from an attack or a violation of its integrity.

Although definitions differ, the crux of cyber security is the set of actions and resources enabling citizens, businesses and states to pursue information goals in a secure and reliable manner while maintaining their privacy. Based on the above statements, cyber security in the context of NATO (including the NATO Air Force) may be defined as: all actions designed to ensure the functionality, continuity of operations and integrity of NATO combat systems in order to prevent threats as well as any project to neutralize the effect of such threats and ensure the rapid recovery of combat capability.

**NATO Air Force Operations**

In order to define what is meant by NATO air operations, their operational scope in general needs to be determined. In terms of the time at which the operations may occur, the Alliance may be involved in operations during times of peace, crisis and war. In terms of the place of operation, NATO may act within its territory or outside of this area, and operations may take the form of collective defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (in the case of a direct threat to security) or a crisis response operation. According to Article 5, an armed attack on any NATO member state in Europe or North America is tantamount to an attack on all the member states and obliges them to support the state under attack. Such a *casus foederis* has been used only once so far, after the 9/11 attacks.

*Crisis Response Operations* outside the remit of Article 5 are defined as multifunctional operations encompassing political, military and civil actions in accordance with international law the aim of which is the prevention of conflicts and crisis management to achieve the declared goals of the Alliance.⁶ According to the AJP-3.4(A) doctrine document,⁷ there are two main types of crisis-response operation.

The first type consists of *Peace Support Operations* carried out in cooperation with international organizations, mainly the UN and the European Union. This encompasses military, as well as diplomatic, and humanitarian operations. Among the *Peace Support Operations*, there are: *Peace Keeping Operations*, *Peace Enforcement Operations*, *Conflict Prevention Operations*, *Peace Making Operations*, *Peace Building Operations*.

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and Humanitarian Operations. The second type of non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations are the other crisis response operations. They do not require the consent of all the member states and hence may be conducted in a coalition, bilateral or national framework. The following actions are considered as other crisis response operations: supporting humanitarian operations; support in dealing with the results of natural disasters, search and rescue operations, evacuations, the withdrawal of forces, enforcing sanctions and embargos, and supporting civil authorities.

Undoubtedly, the Air Force plays a significant role in the above-mentioned NATO operations. It has been and will continue to be one of the most attractive and effective instruments for solving crises regardless of whether they are of a military or other nature, or related to natural disasters. The wide range of abilities and the consistency in respecting the rules of using the Air Force mean it is effective at any time and any place, and capable of acting with varying degrees of force. The doctrine of using the NATO Air Force in operations is described in the Alliance air doctrine, AJP-3.3(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations and defines over a dozen key areas of air operations.

One of the main tasks undertaken by the Air Force is a Strategic Attack. Its purpose is to destroy or disable objects of key importance to the operations of the armed forces or even the whole military system of an adversary. Another type of operation described in the Doctrine is Counter Air Operations against an adversary’s air force. They encompass any air activity against the offensive and defensive measures of an adversary’s air force with the intention of gaining and maintaining the desired level of air supremacy. The main goal of these operations is to wrest control of all of or part of the airspace in order to allow the Air Force to use this environment to protect and support other forces without any limitations. Air operations may be of an offensive or defensive nature. Offensive Counter Air Operations (OCA) are carried out by fighter aircraft and strike units and initiated by NATO, whereas the Defensive Counter Air Operations (DCA) are generally initiated in reaction to an adversary’s actions. Space Operations are a new category of operations. Thanks to the ability to put reconnaissance sensors and arms in the air, both Offensive Space Operations (OSO) and Defensive Space Operations (DSO) are possible.

It is worth noting that the Air Force may operate in support of other armed forces. Air Force operations supporting ground forces (Air Power Contribution to Land Operations) are designed to decrease an adversary’s combat potential and create favourable conditions for their own forces to defend, gain the initiative and overcome the adversary. They support their own forces either directly

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8 AJP-3.4 – Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, NSA, Brussels 2005, p. 3-1-3-4.
9 Ibidem, p. 4-1-4-10.
or indirectly. They may become *Air Interdiction Operations* (AI) or direct *Close Air Support* (CAS). Support for the navy (*Air Power Contribution to Maritime Operations*) may be implemented in three general ways: as *Anti-surface Warfare* against surface vessels, designed to prevent an adversary from using their surface units and particularly their strike, amphibious and transport groups effectively. *Anti-submarine Warfare Operations* constitute yet another category. Their purpose is to prevent an adversary from using their submarine forces effectively against the NATO fleet. The last category is *Aerial Mining*, i.e., mining straits and small sea areas.

In addition to typical combat tasks related to air, ground and maritime targets, the Air Force performs a wide variety of support tasks aimed at increasing combat capabilities, including mobility, securing and protecting their own actions, and achieving information superiority in its widest sense. *Airlift* is the basic support action. The main goal of using *Airlift* is to ensure a high level of mobility and manoeuvrability for ground, air and maritime units. *Air Logistic Operations* are yet another category. They consist of transporting personnel, supplies and arms at the right time to the right place.

The AJP-3.3(A) also describes exploratory activities (*Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Operations*) involving gathering detailed information on a selected object that may become a threat or a potential target. Air reconnaissance is carried out by special manned or unmanned aircraft equipped with various sensors (optical, radar, photographic, video, infrared, etc.). *Electronic Warfare* is a separate category. It consists of all the projects and actions that use electromagnetic energy and are aimed at identifying and disrupting the operation of an adversary’s electronic systems while providing conditions for the stable operation of their own systems.

The *Doctrine* also describes the *Special Air Operations* carried out by specially organized, trained and equipped special forces supported by air forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological goals using unconventional military means. *Airborne Operations* are a different kind of action. The air delivery of paratroopers and equipment is the most difficult task carried out by transport aircraft during wartime. *Air-to-Air Refuelling* is yet another support task carried out by the Air Force. Refuelling serves the purpose of extending the spatial and temporal capabilities of the Air Force during military operations and in peacetime tasks by expanding the range and prolonging the operational time that can be allocated to many tasks.

*Air-to-Air Refuelling* increases the flexibility of the use and mobility of the Air Force, allowing for it to concentrate on where and when it is most needed. Aeromedical Evacuation is the next group of Air Force support tasks. It involves the movement of patients to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. Aeromedical Evacuation is one of the elements of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) organized as a part of a given operation. Other tasks, such as *Air*
Traffic Control and Navigation and Positioning can be carried out using AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) early warning aircrafts, or the JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System).

The AJP-3.3(A) also identifies Geographic Support operations which may include terrain-oriented reconnaissance, especially for ground forces, and Meteorological Support tasks which concern the weather conditions in the operational area. The last category of Air Force tasks is Combat Service Support. This includes support tasks aiding, e.g., drug agencies and immigration agencies in combating drug cartels, organized crime and illegal immigration.10

The Impact of Cyber Threats on NATO Air Force Operations

The increase in the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the Air Force has been possible due to the implementation of the latest electronic and IT technology. In addition to the implementation of new structures and precision-guided weapons, automated command and real-time information distribution systems have also contributed to the great success of the Air Force. Modern data transmission systems enable the exchanging of information between numerous command system elements and various combat platforms (aircrafts, tanks, and vessels). Thanks to the efficient exchange of information between dispersed reconnaissance sensors, command centres and combat units (e.g., aircraft), success in the new, chaotic theatre is possible. Also, a new concept, network centric warfare,11 has been developed. Information and the ability to distribute it rapidly and without limits are its core elements. At the same time, the fact that the Air Force command has been linked to cyberspace poses a number of threats:

- Disruption – an attack consisting of rendering an IT system, or part of it, inoperative by reducing its availability or making it completely unavailable. A reduction of availability may be achieved in two ways:
  - overloading the IT system by blocking its individual elements or services, or by sending a huge amount of data to be processed and thereby disabling the whole system. The attacker can send electronic mail, messages, network service requests, or modem connection requests in such large quantities that the

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10 Based on: AJP-3.3(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, Section V – Core Air and Space Power Activities, NSA 2009, item. 0119F0145.

11 Network centric warfare is to be understood as warfare with information supremacy gained by interconnecting sensors, information transmission means (communications and IT), and strike and disabling means. Source: S. Czeszejko, Konflikty ery informacyjnej (The Conflict of the Information Era), “Przegląd Sił Powietrznych” Issue 6/2011, p. 7.
system will not be able to process them all. It is very difficult to detect such a program because after receiving a specific signal or realizing that it is being traced, it uninstalls itself and erases any traces of its presence in the system;

- computer viruses operate by simply adding a piece of code (a virus) to an existing program and modifying it so that it can multiply. When certain conditions are met, the virus is activated and destroys data, slows the system down, or disables it completely. The basic types of viruses are: boot sector viruses and file viruses, companion viruses, macro viruses, and computer worms.

- Data interception consists of revealing data and analysing traffic which causes the data to lose its confidential nature. The revealed data may be used as a way of gathering other data or may be the target itself. Data such as action plans or command documents can be used directly. Files containing passwords which can be used to reveal other data in the future or otherwise breach security by, e.g., modifying or fabricating are examples of data being used indirectly. Data may be revealed using various methods, such as: sniffing, Trojan horses, remote session monitoring, or browsing. Traffic analysis means intercepting and decoding data. It makes message structure, length and frequency analysis possible. It also allows for the identification of the location and identity of the computers involved;

- Modification is an attack in which a person who is not authorized to modify data attempts to do so. It may be done by adding new content to an original document or by modifying its existing content, deleting the original data and intentionally delaying data transfer;

- Fabrication is an attack on authenticity, misleading the system as to the user’s authentication. It consists of introducing false objects into the IT system and impersonating another network machine in order to mislead other computers as to the source of the data, thus persuading them to send the desired data.

These methods may be used by the special services of hostile states and special military and research units, etc. It should be noted that no external aggressor is necessary for this threat to occur. Failures and malfunctions may result from human error, also unintentionally, or for objective technical reasons. Incorrectly designed or installed hardware or software may fail and cause disastrous repercussions for the whole system. The unskilled or incompetent operation of the system, a human error, may also lead to damage. The ICT infrastructure of the Air Force may also be paralysed or operationally limited when changes are made to the conditions and environment in which it operates, for which it was not designed. An attack on one element of the system may disrupt the operation of other ones (the domino effect) as they are closely interconnected.
The following ICT systems of the Air Force are particularly exposed to cyber attacks:

- Satellite and radio positioning systems;
- Combat management systems, opto-electronic combat systems;
- Air traffic control and aircraft guidance;
- Communication (digital, radio, and satellite), broadcasting and reconnaissance systems;
- IT systems, databases, and software;
- Stationary and mobile telecommunication systems (information exchange systems);
- Automated command systems;
- Logistic systems;
- Rescue and crisis services notification systems;
- Administration systems (inventory, finances, etc.).

How then can cyber attacks and other events disrupt the operation of the above-mentioned systems? There are many possible scenarios. The Air Force facilities and their IT systems may be:

- completely paralysed in their functioning in cyberspace;
- partially paralysed in their functioning in cyberspace;
- limited in their operations without being paralysed;
- threatened by paralysis or limitation without apparent negative consequences for their operation.

Threats may occur during the planning, organization, or implementation phase of an air operation. A shortage of information would represent an obstacle for the whole command system, limiting or completely disabling the exchange of information, the chain of command, or access to databases via ICT connections. A cyber attack during the planning phase could lead to incorrect planning in terms of place, time, forces and means, and the assessment of threats/risks. During the organizational phase, a cyber attack could cause organizational chaos with regards to deploying operational units to bases and providing logistical support in a given place and at a given time with sufficient material resources. During the implementation phase of air missions, incorrect data could lead to attacking incorrect targets which may result in collateral damage and spark protest among the international community. A change of position in the air resulting from incorrect data concerning direction and altitude could cause an air accident and a loss of the combat capability.
NATO Defence Measures

Actions taken to build up NATO cyber security capabilities that have an impact on the Air Force can be grouped into three main categories: formal and legal, organizational and technical. As a consequence of the military operations in cyberspace during the Balkan conflict, the Alliance has taken the first steps towards creating a programme for cyberspace security. In 2002, its efforts bore fruit in the form of the first cyber defence programme, the NATO Cyber Defence Programme. Also, a new entity responsible for the protection of NATO’s ICT infrastructure was created, the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC). After the massive cyber attacks on the Estonian ICT infrastructure in 2007, a team of experts was created to develop procedures for countering cyber threats.

Another team was put in charge of the technical aspects and the development of appropriate security measures to prevent similar situations in the future. The combination of both teams’ work resulted in the creation of the Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in 2008 after the Bucharest Summit. The CCD COE mission is to increase capabilities, develop cooperation and exchange information between NATO, NATO member states, and other partners in cyber defence through training, research, sharing experience, and consulting. The CCD COE is to become the main source of expert knowledge in joint cyber defence by gathering, creating and distributing knowledge.

During the Bucharest Summit in 2008 the foundations of NATO’s cyber defence were developed (NATO Policy on Cyber Defence). The creation of the NATO Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA) was the next step in organizational terms. The main mission of the CDMA is to initiate and coordinate immediate and effective cyber defence when it is needed. The CDMA is the central hub managing the technical and political actions, as well as the exchange of information, necessary to ensure cyber security. Additionally, it coordinates the actions of the NATO units involved in its cyber defence.

During the informal NATO summit in Kraków in February 2009, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, stressed the need to prepare a new Strategic Concept due to changes in the security landscape, including cyberspace. In his speech he highlighted that “the Strategic Concept needs to include a precise description of the implications of, among other things, cyber attacks, for the sake of security and it needs to define the procedures for a collective defence against such

13 The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), [www.ccdcoe.org, access: 15.08.2012].
attacks”.\textsuperscript{14} Cyber defence was officially included in NATO exercises during the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. Another measure taken by NATO to ensure cyber security was the creation of the Emerging Security Challenges Division\textsuperscript{15} of NATO’s International Military Staff in August 2010.

In 2010 NATO published the new Strategic Concept. The NATO Concept on Cyber Defence was adopted in 2011 and since then has been the basic statement of NATO’s plan for combating cyber threats. The main goal is to implement a method for coordinated cyber defence, including planning and prospective development. To achieve this, elements of cyber defence have been implemented in all NATO tasks. At the same time, the North Atlantic Council was obliged to develop an improved NATO cyber defence plan.\textsuperscript{16}

With the advent of the global economic crisis and a significant reduction in the funding for weapons, the Smart Defence initiative was launched. Smart Defence is the opportunity to form coalitions and initiate collaboration of a strategic nature in connection with operating in cyberspace. It is also a joint initiative with the aim of bringing about close cooperation with regards to exchanging information, sharing experience and, most importantly, developing technological solutions together. Today, the key areas of the Smart Defence initiative which were announced in May 2012 at the Chicago Summit are being developed. In the context of NATO cyber defence measures, it is worth mentioning the new security model: defence in depth. It pertains to the issues of ICT system security and research into the constant development of the tools (software and hardware) and procedures used for securing the IT environment.

\textit{Conclusion}

At the end of the 20th century, new threats to international security emerged. Their new dimension is related to the cybernetic space of ICT networks. Today, many states use a common infrastructure for both military and civilian purposes. This has resulted in the creation of uncontrolled communication channels which can be used by cyber criminals. The traditional image of terrorism has evolved away from direct physical violence into attacks via ICT networks. Cyber terrorism has become a new threat to the international community and military alliances. As J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt rightly noted: the new technology is also having a

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Nowe NATO rodz\k{e}j si\c{e} w Krakow\k{e} (New NATO Being Born in Krakow)}, “Gazeta.pl”, 30.09.2009 [www.gazeta.pl, access: 16.08.2012].
\textsuperscript{15} New NATO division to deal with Emerging Security Challenges, [www.nato.int, access: 12.08.2012].
\textsuperscript{16} NATO, Defending the networks. The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, [www.nato.int, access: 22.08.2012].
transformative effect\textsuperscript{17} which leads to the abandoning of old ways of thinking and acting in favour of new ones which facilitate the achievement of various, often previously inaccessible, goals.

What has always been a challenge for criminals and terrorists is the Alliance’s military infrastructure. This is particularly true today, when NATO is more and more involved in the sphere of international security, which may provoke a hostile reaction from various groups in societies or states. One of the possible ways of disrupting a crisis response operation is to interfere with the key infrastructure of the Air Force via cyberspace and consequently introduce chaos into the whole NATO defence system. The most serious threats to the ICT networks of the Air Force, apart from technical imperfections, are deliberate actions. They may take the form of:

- penetration of IT networks by gaining access to the information on computers and IT networks and by accessing and using the information stored there;
- attacks on IT networks by exploiting software, storage media and hardware shortcomings, allowing for attacks to be launched using malicious code, such as viruses, the manipulation of data or device settings, or copying data. Due to the increase in the use of illegal software in military systems, the above-mentioned attacks have better chances of success.

The Air Force ICT infrastructure may be interfered with in all states of defence readiness (peacetime, crisis, and war). It is also hard to tell who is and who is not a potential adversary. Cyber attacks may by conducted by terrorists, special services and individual states. Hence cyber defence requires multidimensional actions. Threats and technology evolve faster than legal processes. NATO members need to cooperate in developing appropriate procedures and organizational structures to allow cyber security to keep up with the rapidly changing threats and to allow for innovation.

In terms of technology, the actions taken should comprise protection against: disruptions, misinformation, degradation, or destruction of the data stored in computers or networks or the computers and networks themselves. These measures are necessary to maintain decision-making capabilities. They also contribute greatly to the defence measures designed to detect an attack and respond to it by stopping enemy action and taking appropriate corrective measures.

The Image of NATO in Serbian Collective Representations

It is needless to state that the Serbian collective conception of NATO is, for the dominant part, definitely negative, the reasons for and manifestations of which we will try to present in this text. To begin with, however, we will discuss categories of collective representations, although the scale of our focus will be the minimum required for our further discussion, within which we will try to demonstrate the attitude of the Serbian people towards the Alliance.

One of the classic sociologists, Maurice Halbwachs, discussed the social construction of the world, suggesting that it is society itself that determines the perception of reality through individuals, and his views form a starting point for the consideration of larger communities. Teun van Dijk, a Dutch linguist, expresses similar views, talking in terms of the discursive construction of the world. While acknowledging the strength’s of the arguments of the above-mentioned researchers, it should be kept in mind that individual opinions will always remain secondary to the outside world. Collective representations consist of great schematic simplifications, operating as dynamic images. It is common knowledge that understanding an increasingly complicated reality requires its continuous simplification. Consequently, the meanings which settle in the collective sphere must be adjusted to its requirements. It may be said that a specific interpretative network, or - using Halbwachs’s terminology – frameworks of memory become part of the collective sphere. People perceive reality according to the fixed scheme, which is handed down from generation to generation in the process of socialization. As Bronislaw Baczko observed, social imagination is the power that regulates collective life. Collective spheres are filled with images, which constitute a modified form of real events, with profiles adjusted to the group’s requirements. Even if it refers to the future, imagination turns towards the past. All stories are set in times that are well known and therefore can be recalled. Narrations involving the past display events

1 M. Halbwachs, Społeczne ramy pamięci (Social Frameworks of Memory), Warsaw 2008, p. 168.
3 T. Kuljić, Sećanje na titoizam. Između diktata i otpora, Beograd 2011, p. 25.
5 M. Jergović, Ojciec (Father), Wołowiec 2012, p. 198.
in the light of the present. The types of images which constitute imaginations are in a process of constant evolution, being extremely susceptible to any fluctuations in both external and internal environments.

The same counts for the image of NATO in Serbian society. That is why we should ask not only about its current form but also identify the direction of its evolution. As we mentioned at the beginning, the attitude of Serbians towards the Alliance may be deemed as being absolutely negative, which is reflected in the concrete actions undertaken by the political elite, forced to take into account the opinion of their citizens. As opposed to other states of the region, Serbia has never applied for membership of NATO. Vuk Jeremić, who has been the Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2007, has frequently emphasized to his Western colleagues that his state does not intend to accede to the Alliance and to develop cooperation within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. What is more, Tomislav Nikolić, the President, of the Serbian Progressive Party, during his visit to Moscow, promised Vladimir Putin that Serbia would not join NATO. It is interesting that none of the major political parties clearly opt for membership.

The negative attitude on the part of the population seems to have resulted primarily from the operation Allied Force conducted by the Alliance in 1999, which many Serbians have labelled as aggression and is important for Serbians’ collective consciousness, contributing to the victim culture, characteristic of this state. This was clearly demonstrated in the words of Boris Tadić who described the NATO operation as a crime during his speech at the celebration of the thirteenth anniversary of those events. However, it seems that the origin of the Serbs’ aversion towards NATO can even be traced further back in time, since as early as the beginning of the 1990s, when the propaganda produced by Milošević’s regime created a spectrum of both external and internal enemies, the primary place among which – aside from the United States, Europe, the Vatican, the West and Germany - was reserved for NATO. Besides, as we will show further on, the anti-Alliance campaign did not end after 1999, but has continued, although - on the

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7 Vučić: Srbija neće pristupiti NATO, [www.b92.net, dostęp 7.01.2013].
8 Nikolić obećao Putinu da Srbija neće u NATO, a on njemu kredit od 800 milijuna dolara, [www.poskok.info, dostęp 7.01.2013].
9 M. Lazanski, NATO ne može bez Srbije, „Politika”, 14.11.2009, [www.polityka.rs, dostęp 1.02.20013].
other hand - there is now also a small group of supporters for NATO membership.

Unquestionably, the bombing of the former Yugoslavia (1999) should be perceived as the climax of the negative campaign, demonizing and denigrating the enemies. Both parties were then fighting a fierce ideological war to convince the public of their own correctness. Of course, we are interested in the arguments of the Serbs, although we do not have sufficient space for an in-depth interpretation. Consequently, we will restrict ourselves to mentioning only several topics. This issue was analysed by Saša Nedeljković, a Serbian political anthropologist, who then served in the army, and thus had direct contact with the contents propagated among the soldiers. Particular attention should be paid to the texts included in the brochure titled *Vojska*, where the superiority of the Serbian nation, its religion, culture, history and achievements were stated. It described the fight against the American “Satan”, on behalf of Europe.¹³ Similar statements, building on the classic good/evil antithesis were also visible in the mass media, controlled by the government. Mikloš Biro, a psychiatrist connected with the democratic opposition, examined the influence of the above-mentioned indoctrination on the minds of the members of Serbian society. One of the most interesting examples came from a program hosted by Milja Regulus, a popular astrologist: “a light appeared over the airbase in northern Italy... These are Tesla lightnings, which prevent the efforts of Serbia’s enemies to defeat us. A sub-station exploded near the White House. It was the Tesla spirit that once gave electricity to Americans, and now it is turning against them. God is on our side, which is visible in the fact that Serbia, the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republika Srpska constitute a trinity, and if you merge this trinity with letter S (of course, in Cyrillic), then you get a heart, and the American phantoms cannot hurt us any more”¹⁴

Such slogans are quoted here to emphasize the strength of the anti-American and anti-West campaign promoted not only by politicians, intellectuals or Orthodox dignitaries, but also by non-professional “scientists”, such as the above-mentioned Milja Regulus. We must remember that Serbian society was at that time particularly susceptible to such authorities, one example of proof of this arguably being, for instance, the results of a field survey carried out by an outstanding ethnologist, Dušan Bandić, which revealed a terribly low knowledge of religious basics, and its blending with the national ideology and ancient beliefs.¹⁵ Reality was explained based on irrational elements, composed of a mixture of magic, astrology, folk superstitions with pagan roots and Orthodox religion, experiencing a revival,

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¹⁴ M. Biro, Homo postcommunistics, Beograd 2006, p. 56.
¹⁵ D. Bandić, Narodno pravoslavlje, Beograd 2010, p. 16-17.
since - as Vojislav Perica, a Croatian political scientist noted - an inflation of religious symbols was perceived as a distinctive feature of the post-Yugoslavian era.\textsuperscript{16}

The most essential thing is that these negative images were never subject to a clear criticism, in spite of the fact that after the so-called bulldozer revolution and a change in the ruling party in October 2000, there was a rapid and distinctive re-definition of the attitude towards Europe and the European Union, one of the many signs of which was an informative campaign concerning the UE.\textsuperscript{17} Similar actions have not been, however, undertaken with regards to NATO, not mentioning some petty initiatives, such as an internet portal \textit{Zašto NATO (Why NATO)}.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, the old content could not be deconstructed. Here we must recall that one of the most fundamental conditions for the duration of the communication of collective representations is their constantly being reminded, while the anti-NATO feelings in Serbia are revived from time to time. Actually, the society’s knowledge regarding the Alliance is very poor and inconsistent. People are mainly guided by stereotypes and prejudices, perceiving reality in a selective manner.\textsuperscript{19}

NATO is commonly associated with being a military organization, primarily for the purpose of war, which sometimes attacks weaker states - Serbia, Afghanistan and Libya. Affiliation to the Alliance mainly involves sending troops to remote regions of the world and engaging in armed conflicts, which have no popular mandate. Serbs use a specific logic, whereby it would be absurd to make an alliance with an aggressor who has recently bombed their state and join later in its subsequent interventions, hurting innocent people. The society tends to sympathize with the next victims of NATO’s interventions. Such attitudes can hardly be explained, if we recall the trivialization that the pre-condition of the \textit{sine qua non} process of reconciliation is forgiveness, while the Serbs have been still unfoundedly accusing NATO of carrying out air raids which showed no consideration for casualties and were only to achieve the relatively pragmatic political interests of the Western superpowers. There is a very popular belief that NATO is an Alliance among states obliged to support each other in case of an external attack on one of its members, but it is not entitled to intervene externally.\textsuperscript{20} It is also noted that possible accession to NATO would mean de facto an indirect acknowledgement of Kosovo independence, and an admission on the part of Belgrade that the intervention was legal, while Serbian discourse still includes slogans that this was “an aggression

\begin{footnotes}
\item[18] \textit{Zašto NATO}, [www.zastonato.org, dostęp 21.01.2013].
\item[19] D. Šutanovac, \textit{Ne bavimo se pitanjem članstva u NATO}, [www.nspm.rs, dostęp 5.02.2013].
\end{footnotes}
violating international law”. Questions appear as to why Serbia should accede to the very organization that made war against it in the past, causing casualties among its civilians. Moreover it was not able to prevent attacks on Serbs in Kosovo by their Albanian neighbours, the direct consequence of which was an exodus of the population.\textsuperscript{21}

The opinion is frequently voiced that nowadays an attack is very unlikely, thus is not necessary to join NATO. What is more, it would increase the threat of terrorist attacks. The opinions given above, expressed by pacifist circles paradoxically coincide with the stance taken by nationalists, for whom the biggest real danger is posed by the alleged bases of Islamic fundamentalism in Kosovo. According to such a view of reality, NATO cannot serve as a guarantor of territorial integrity if it supports Albanian separatists and gives its consent for the “Serbian Jerusalem” to be separated from the motherland.

There are also some economic factors involved. It is frequently stressed that this poor nation, facing a permanent crisis, cannot afford the expenditure related to accession. It is not surprising then that a population, struck by a record level of unemployment in 2012, exceeding 25\%,\textsuperscript{22} where - according to estimates - over one million people work illegally and many employees have not received their salaries for months,\textsuperscript{23} prefers that their state more actively support its economic development instead of investing in the military.

It is not then surprising that while the question of European integration divides the Serbian people (since alongside the numerous supporters a big group of opponents exist - it is believed that only slightly over half of the respondents supports the pro-EU policy),\textsuperscript{24} the opinions concerning possible NATO membership are quite explicit. In a survey conducted in April 2012, in their answer to the questions: How would you vote if a referendum were held concerning NATO membership, 70\% of Serbs said they would vote absolutely against, 10\% for, while 15\% would not go to vote at all.\textsuperscript{25}

Serbian politicians very often emphasize that even if Belgrade is not a NATO member, it has been developing its cooperation within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. They highlight such issues as the modernization of the army according to Alliance standards, or the abolishment of mandatory military service. However, in the opinion of many experts, Serbia does not fully benefit from the

\textsuperscript{21}V. Jeftić, NATO – iluzija i stvarnost, [www.nspm.rs, dostęp 5.02.2013].
\textsuperscript{22}Stopa nezaposlenosti u Srbiji rekordnih 25,5\%, [www.euractiv.rs, dostęp 11.01.2013].
\textsuperscript{23}Platu ne dobija čak 60 000 zaposlenih, „Vesti”, 7.10.2012, [www.vesti-online.com, dostęp 22.01.2013].
\textsuperscript{24}Evropa tu oko nas. Šta činimo da bismo bili u Evropskoj uniji. Održivi razvoj: problemi, planja, usmerenja, Beograd 2011, p. 8.
possibilities its participation in the initiative involves.\textsuperscript{26} In any case, the very fact of participating in the Partnership for Peace - a relatively non-exclusive club, since it has been joined by Azerbaijan, Belarus and Uzbekistan - is perceived in Serbia as such a significant step that some try to criticize it, describing it in terms of parleying with the enemy or betraying their traditional ally, i.e., Russia. Willing to justify their activities, the authorities invoke, first of all, the following key arguments: Serbia has no other choice, because all the other states from the region are either interested in cooperation with the Alliance or have already become members; actions undertaken within the Partnership for Peace do not interfere with the relationship with Moscow.\textsuperscript{27} Taking into account the fact that Russia itself participates in this initiative, the anxiety of a certain sector of the population seems bizarre and proves its relatively poor knowledge of Euroatlantic structures.

The aversion shown by Serbs towards NATO overlaps with the demands to stay neutral. It is widely believed that there is no point in joining an organization which was formerly at war with Belgrade, causing much sorrow to the civilian population. It must be remembered that the byword of neutrality seems to be strongly embedded in Serbian collective representations, its sources being more deeply rooted than the traumatic events of 1999. It is worth mentioning that communist Yugoslavia did not belong to the Warsaw Pact. It entered into cooperation with Third World states within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, one of the leaders and initiators of which was the Yugoslavian leader. Today, you can frequently hear in Serbia the view that NATO is a relic of the Cold War past, outside contemporary reality. If it was possible for Belgrade to stay neutral during communist times, it would be absurd to give up this neutrality now. Others add that Serbia, as a small country, does not need the singularization, but rather the pluralization of its society, i.e., clever manoeuvring between Russia and NATO.\textsuperscript{28} At the same time, supporters of European integration often argue that accession to the European Union will sufficiently guarantee its security since Brussels also maintains its own security policy.

In 2007, the parliament passed a declaration of neutrality, which is often construed as a legal impediment to a possible accession to NATO. Despite the fact that, in the opinion of many experts, the declaration is not binding, some politicians, such as the former president and prime minister, Vojislav Koštunica, very often use this argument as proof of why Serbia cannot join the Alliance. There are

\textsuperscript{27} M. Stojanović, Srbija i sotati lojalna članica Partnerstva za mir, „Danas“, 9.07.2012, [www.danas.rs, dostęp 11.01.2013].
\textsuperscript{28} S. Stojanović, Srbija i NATO, „Politika“, 14.01.2010, [www.politika.rs, dostęp 25.01.2013].
also those who try to make it seem as if participation in the Partnership for Peace were also contrary to the declared neutrality. A considerable part of the population has been led to believe such distorted messages, ritualized by the mass media. A strong anti-NATO campaign flared up in autumn 2007, inspired by anti-West forces and an intense debate was seen during the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008. Some observed that harsh criticism of defence and security policy served to draw the public attention away from the internal problems of the country, since discontent was growing under the difficult economic circumstances during the period in question; there were mass protests in which numerous strikes, including hunger strikes, broke out. Interestingly, four years later, the election campaign was completely different; there were hardly any remarks concerning foreign policy and candidates focused mainly on the possibilities for solving the economic crisis.

Supporters of NATO accession, constituting - depending on the opinion polls - between 5% and 10% of the population, were composed - first of all - of intellectuals, academic elites, and the pro-West oriented middle class. Their arguments rarely reached the wider masses, rather remaining enclosed within narrow discourse. It is emphasized that NATO membership could precipitate integration with the European Union, which would serve to convince observers that Belgrade clearly distances itself from the Miloševic past. It is worth mentioning that so far all post-communist EU membership states have followed an analogous path, first acceding to NATO, then the European Union. From this perspective, Serbs should use the already tried and tested patterns. However, it should be added that NATO does not need to be the one and only bridge leading to the EU, at all. The examples of Cyprus and Malta show that despite acceding to the European Union, these states preserved their neutrality. Actually, NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, emphatically underlined in his interview given for Večernje Novosti, that EU membership is not a natural consequence of NATO affiliation.

Others add that Serbian accession to the Euroatlantic structures would increase Serbia’s credibility in the eyes of foreign investors and thus could translate into economic growth and a decrease in unemployment. It could also help in the overcoming of negative stereotypes, so strongly entrenched in the West, blaming Serbs for the dramatic events of the 1990s. It is enough to recall Bassam Tibbi’s work

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31 See e.g. Z. Stojilković, Izborna obećanja i postizborna realnost: javne politike u izbornoj ponudi u Srbiji, „Političke perspektive”, No. 2/1012, p. 89-90.

32 Srbija ne mora u NATO da bi ušla u EU, [www.nspm.rs, dostęp 5.02.2013].
titled *Fundamentalizm religijny* (The Religious Fundamentalism), in which the author states that the reputed factor that shattered the peace in the Balkan region was the Great - Serbian fundamentalist policy.\(^{33}\) We can spot many similar interpretations explaining the underlying reasons for conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, both in scientific and public discourse. Meanwhile, more and more Serbs have become aware of the necessity of counteracting such stereotypical views, which cannot serve a state well when it is trying to attract external investors. Moreover, there have been calls recently to make tourist development one of the factors with which to revive the economy,\(^{34}\) permanently plunged into crisis. However, attracting foreign guests must go hand in hand with promoting Serbia as a modern country, not a parochial one, consumed with ethnic hatred. In 1988, Greeks - wanting to attract more American tourists, who like imitating Europeans - promoted the slogan “*Greece – European holidays for Europeans*”.\(^{35}\) It seems that similar steps could be undertaken by Serbs as well, which would show the world that the events of the end of the 20th century were just a short moment of forgetfulness. NATO membership could be helpful in this respect as well, according to supporters of integration within the Euroatlantic structures.

It is also emphasized that affiliation to NATO increases the level of security, that small states cannot stay neutral nowadays, that they must unite with considerably stronger ones. The neutrality of such states as Switzerland, Sweden or Austria was confirmed by means of international agreements, approved by the superpowers, which Serbia lacks.

Supporters of NATO accession also recall that the rest of the Balkan states have assumed completely different political strategies. Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia and Albania have already become Alliance members, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have applied for membership, while NATO forces are still stationed in Kosovo. In such a situation, Serbia cannot stay on its own, since it is too small. What is more, as a NATO member it would be easier to solve local problems, overcome divisions and prejudice, thus building permanent peace within the region.\(^{36}\) It is also stated that accession to the Alliance will not be tantamount to loss of neutrality, because Serbia, by participating in the *Partnership for Peace*, is already not neutral. As far as the economic aspects are concerned, the accession could also make for savings due to the reduced number of soldiers and professionalization of the army.

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\(^{34}\) *Veliki potencijal za razvoj turizma u Srbiji*, [www.akter.co.rs, dostup 1.02.2013].


\(^{36}\) *Nije dobro da BiH prije Srbije uđe u NATO*, Novinska Agencija Republike Srpske, 29.12.2012, [www.srna.rs, dostup 17.01.2013].
It is also worth noting that for Serbs the West is not a monolith. Some countries are more popular, while others are more profoundly disliked, such as, e.g., the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany. There is a very wide range of theories demonstrating the imperialistic intentions of Washington. Views suggesting that America is conducting political, economic and cultural expansion, while striving for its hegemony, and that NATO serves as a tool to control Europe, are frequently expressed. From this perspective, Serbia’s accession to NATO would mean surrendering to Washington's demands, renouncing the traditional Serbian attitude (that one researcher named Homo Serbicus), based on choosing difficult, costly but honourable solutions. It was also suggested that Washington could have chauvinistically provoked the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in order to prevent the intensification of the European integration process and – as a result - create a field of agreement with the Arabic world. Aversion towards the United States is very widespread in Serbia and the theory may even be suggested that the United States function in the Serbian collective consciousness as a synonym of NATO. What is more interesting is that contempt towards Washington is, primarily, political. Serbs have nothing against American investments. It is even said that their inflow will raise the prestige of Serbia in the international arena, which - in turn - will help to attract European and Asian entrepreneurs. As a matter of fact, the US presence in the Serbian market has had a very long history, dating back to communist Yugoslavia. The first McDonald’s behind the Iron Curtain was opened in Belgrade in 1988.

Vesna Goldsworthy, a Serbian specialist in literature, draws attention to the deep Francophilia among her co-citizens, an idealization of France. She writes: “During the air raids in 1999, many of my relatives cursed the Americans, the English, the Germans (especially the Germans!), while they could forgive the French for everything. ‘They didn't want to do it! The Americans forced them to do it!’ - one of them kept repeating. She could not accept that fact that the Monument of Gratitude to France in the Kalemegdan Park was covered with a black tarpaulin to cover the inscription calling on the Serbians to love France ‘as it loves us’, which sounded ironic at that moment”.

It must be added here that Serbs’ fascination with France has a long tradition, dating back to the 19th century, when the nation, struggling for liberation from

39 Očekujemo američke investicije, [www.b92.net, dostęp 1.02.2013].
40 Wywiad z Dragošem Pavlićevicem (Interview with Dragoš Pavlićevic), „Profit Magazin”, [www.profitmagazin.com, dostęp 1.02.2013].
41 V. Goldsworthy, Czarnobyleskie truskawki (The Strawberries of Chernobyl), Wołówiec 2007, p. 249.
Turkish rule, perceived Paris as its protector. Facing a scarcity of schools, teenagers were forced to learn abroad, and the romantic interpretation of this era favoured idealized France as the place to be taught. At the beginning of the 20th century, Serbia was in favour of the Triple Entente and French money helped Belgrade to emerge victorious from the customs war with Austria-Hungary. In the 1990s, when western public opinion - simplifying events in the former Yugoslavia - accused Serbs of the outbreak of fratricidal fights and blamed them exclusively for “ethnic cleansing”, France tried to support Belgrade. However, the attitude of Paris was evolving slowly, and the French diplomacy changed its mind during the war in Bosnia, to finally opt in 1999 for an intervention. This step was not accidental. The pro-Serbian policy of the authorities was increasingly being criticized, even by many intellectuals or ‘new philosophers’. Many of them became emotionally involved on the other side of the conflict, e.g., Alain Finkielkraut supported Franjo Tuđman and Bernard-Henri Levi supported Alija Izetbegovic.

In turn, the negative stereotype of Germans, dating back to the WWII period, and maybe even further: to the Habsburg monarchy and the Austria - Serbia conflict, since in collective representations it is easy to equate Germans with Austrians, was eagerly used during the Miloševic era in the searching-for-an-enemy process. Since we are limited here and do not have the space to analyse the problem more profoundly, we will only mention the wide spectrum of conspiracy theories, that seek to find an international plot against the Serbs. The Germans appear in the majority of these, most often as allies of the Croatians and the Vatican, particularly after the so-called discretionary crisis. Such theories have their supporters, even outside the Balkans, e.g., Russian Slavophiles spread stories about the forces seeking to destroy the renascent Orthodox Church in order to prevent Moscow from playing the role of the Third Rome.

However, the negative image of Germany in Serbian collective representations exists alongside some positive stereotypes glorifying the quality and solidity of

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45 R. Zenderowski, R. Wiśniewski, M. Zarzeczki, Religia (prawosławna) w konflikcie etnicznym w tzw. Dolinie Preszowa i Miedwiedzi: wyniki badań terenowych (The (Orthodox) Religion in the Ethnic Conflict in the So-Called Preševo and Medveda Valley) [in:] We Have Already Been Eaten ... The Role and Significance of the Orthodox Church in the Ethnic Conflict in the Preševo Valley), (ed.) R. Zenderowski, Warsaw 2012, p. 375.
German goods, primarily, cars. We must remember the numerous Yugoslavian Gastarbeiter emigrants in the FRG, following the Worker Recruitment Agreement signed in 1968. The emigrants must have had positive experiences, since in the 1990s the majority of fugitives dreamt, first and foremost, about getting a German passport. Today, Serbs constitute the second biggest (after the Turkish) diaspora within the German-speaking world, with about 700,000 of them living in Germany itself.48

The good reputation of German products resulted in Serbs accepting the German mark as their unofficial currency. Prices or salaries could be expressed in marks, with no fear of rapid fluctuations of the exchange rate, as was the case with the unstable dinar. Since 2002, the mark has been replaced by the Euro and the habit of expressing the values of property or levels of salaries translated into Western currencies is still visible there. It is no coincidence that the brother state, as Montenegro was called, chose German marks when deciding on its economy on becoming independent of Belgrade. This step, nota bene, led Serbia to accuse Berlin of more biased actions carried out against Serbia and of the colonization of the Montenegrins’ minds, i.e., by beguiling them with nonsensical ideas.49

Russia remains the traditional ally of the Serbian population, which is not surprising, taking into consideration the long history of their mutual relationship and long-term cooperation, also in cultural terms. It must be remembered that the 19th-century activists had high hopes in Russia in terms of Serbian independence.50 This hope was consolidated in collective representations. This negative attitude was not unrequited, because Russian Slavophiles were fascinated with their southern brothers. For example, Konstantin Leontyev, an outstanding historian, spoke of the originality of the Slavs living within the Ottoman Empire, resulting from the Turkish having frozen the unique spirit of the Slavs and separating them from liberal Europe.51

While not questioning the still close relationship between Belgrade and Moscow, it is worth noticing that Serbs felt betrayed by Moscow’s lack of active support for them after the proclamation of Kosovan independence. This may have been what led to Serbia consenting to have Turkish financial resources enter the state and - as it is known - Ankara has been trying to restore its influence in its former lands in recent years. For researchers focusing on the transformation of the

48 Srbi u Nemačkoj, [www.zentralrat-der-serben.de, dostęp 25.01.2013].
Serbian collective representations, the less negative attitude shown towards its former invader seems important. Holidays near the Bosphorus are very popular in Serbia, as are Turkish soap operas in other countries of the region. This issue was addressed by the Ambassador of Turkey in Belgrade as the basis of a friendly climate.\textsuperscript{52} From the perspective of this paper, it is worth noting that Turkey, a NATO member after all, is being perceived less negatively nowadays and that the aversion towards the Alliance itself does not need to be translated into the attitude towards its individual membership states.

As we have already observed, Serbs associate NATO mainly with the United States. Besides that, knowledge of the Alliance on the part of the majority of the population is insignificant. If we recall that a lack of knowledge favours the stereotyping of collective representations and the formulating of conspiracy theories, it is easy to understand the Serbs’ attitude towards NATO.

\textsuperscript{52} Turske investicije uskoro u Srbiji, [\texttt{www.rts.rs}, dostęp 25.01.2013].
Russia - NATO: Towards a Partnership or a New Cold War?

Brief History of the Mutual Relations

Relations between NATO and Russia since the Cold War have followed a path similar to a sine wave. There were times of improvement descending into crises only to improve again. It may be inferred that in most cases the deterioration or improvement of the relations did not result from actions taken, or not, by NATO but from the unilateral decisions of Russia. In other words, relations are of a positive nature when it suits the decision-makers in Moscow. Importantly, NATO - Russia relations reflect to a large extent United States - Russian relations.

The 1990s was a period of limited and half-hearted cooperation, during which both sides were searching for new identities. The Russian Federation had to choose its political direction while NATO had to find a justification for its existence as the Soviet threat was gone. The possibilities of dissolving or transforming it into a pan-European security system were even considered.\(^1\) The search ended when NATO became involved in the Balkan conflict (1995) which led to the practical execution of the idea of out of area operations. More such operations were undertaken in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2003),\(^2\) Iraq (2004 - 2011),\(^3\) off the Somali coast (2009), and in Libya (2011).\(^4\)

Formal cooperation began in 1991 when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which in turn was transformed in 1997 into the Euro - Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Its aim was to create a platform for political dialogue, cooperation, and the coordination of actions carried out together with new partners from Central and Eastern Europe. In 1994, Moscow joined the Partnership for Peace programme aimed at facilitating the bringing of the defence structures of the former Soviet Union satellite states and post-Soviet states closer

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2. The War in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001 but NATO took a leadership role in the ISAF (*International Security Assistance Force*), a UN-mandated force, on August 11, 2003.
3. The Iraq War itself was not a NATO operation but an operation by an *ad hoc* coalition led by the United States. It was thus a mission aimed at training and mentoring: NMT-I (*NATO Training Mission - Iraq*), initiated in September 2004. It was the largest mission of this type in the history of NATO. The NMT-I forces have trained over 5,000 soldiers and officers and more than 10,000 police officers since 2004.
4. In 1995, the Alliance began an unprecedented operation: it launched an armed strike on Bosnian Serbs as a part of the operation *Deliberate Force* and then deployed ground forces (IFOR/SFOR). During the Balkan war, for the first time in its history, NATO went operationally beyond Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
to NATO standards while letting them stay outside of NATO. At first, the possibility of Russia joining NATO was contemplated, which will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.

Since 1996, Russian military forces have been deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina where they cooperated closely with NATO’s IFOR and SFOR contingents. In May 1997, the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security* was signed and Permanent Joint Council established for 16 + 1 (later 19 + 1) talks to be held. A year later, Russia established a diplomatic mission to NATO and signed a letter of intent to commence scientific cooperation. Russian officers were allowed to join the SHAPE although it was well-known that “they [were] mostly occupied with gathering information for Moscow, concerning everything that [was] connected with the relations between the Alliance and former Soviet republics”. In 1999, the cooperation in the PJC ceased as a result of the war in Kosovo (it was suspended by Moscow), even though later Vladimir Putin sent Russian peacekeeping forces to support KFOR.

The second half of the 1990s saw the beginning of the enlargement of NATO; former Eastern bloc states, perceived by Russia as its sphere of influence, joined the Alliance. In 1999, states such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic also became members. The Russian reaction was rather chilly. According to Robert Kupiecki, it “has never accepted the direction the transformation of NATO was heading. It still perceives the Alliance as an organization whose aim is to strengthen American influence in Europe and which is set against its own strategic interests”. It was difficult to initiate partnership when a ring of NATO members was being built around Russia. While NATO was declaring its will to cooperate, Russia remained passive as it was the only feasible reaction to the enlargement. Nevertheless, in March 2000, three weeks before the presidential elections in Russia, the candidate Vladimir Putin indicated he was considering the possibility of Russia joining NATO by memorably saying “why not?” during an interview for the BBC.

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7 The preliminary decision was made in the second half of 1996. The idea was accepted during the NATO Summit in Madrid in July 1997.
The Kosovo crisis (1999), described by Yuri Davydov as a factor with “extremely destructive consequences for the further development of relations between Russia and NATO”, became history in September 2001 when the United States started its war with Al-Qaeda. It was possible, pursuant to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on collective defence, to involve NATO in the military operation. Yet, the United States preferred to act alone and did not make use of this possibility in the first phase of the conflict, as a consequence of its rather negative experience in Kosovo. Thus, the Russian Federation soon became a significant partner of Washington and later also of NATO, which became focused on such threats as terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs.

It was Putin who called the White House first after the attacks in Washington D.C. and New York on September 11, 2011. Some time earlier, in July 2001, Putin was honoured as a close friend with an invite to Bush’s ranch in Texas. After their meeting in Slovenia, Bush told journalists, “After I looked the man in the eye (...) I was able to get a sense of his soul”. A few days after the tragic events in Washington D.C. and New York, Russia increased crude oil output to stabilize global markets. When the United States announced DEFCON 3, Moscow remained calm. Bilateral dialogue was easier to achieve, since in November 2001 President George W. Bush announced the plan to reduce the number of thermonuclear warheads to between 1,700 – 2,200 by the end of 2012.

The drama in New York and Washington D.C., as well as the Afghan issue, made the Moscow - NATO relations sine wave rise up again. Both sides had much to gain: NATO received the green light for its military presence in post-Soviet Central Asia and Moscow was able to legalize another pacification of the Chechens using propaganda by portraying its operation as part of the international counter-terrorist front. The new deal was discussed during the Rome Summit in May 2002. The inefficiency of the PJC was acknowledged and a new body, the NATO - Russia Council (NRC) established. That same year, the Alliance established a new military liaison office in Moscow and contributed to the first NRC meeting. In May 2002, during the opening ceremony of the NATO liaison office in Moscow, the first Deputy Minister of Defence and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General Yuri Baluyevsky, explicitly stated, in the spirit of the partnership being formed, that Russia “does not fear NATO’s expansion if its new members do not threaten its national security and use their infra-

10 Y. Davydov, op. cit., p. 15.
structure to deploy strategic arms”. Accordingly, Russian authorities remained relatively calm when faced with the fifth enlargement in March 2004, which was in fact yet another stage of the political and military encircling of the Russian Federation. It was a clear token of kindness towards NATO made contrary to Russian public opinion. Surveys conducted after the 2004 enlargement showed that as many as 58% of respondents perceived NATO as an aggressive organization and according to 52% the enlargement had a negative impact on Russian security.

As the relations are like a sine wave, so another crisis was just a matter of time. It took a few years for this to occur. It was largely due to the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which allowed it to begin working on a strategic missile defence system. Some of its elements were to be located in the Czech Republic (radar) and Poland (interceptors). Vladimir Putin, in whose eyes George W. Bush “was able to get a sense of his soul” at the beginning of his presidency, used aggressive and firm rhetoric towards the end of his term. He compared the foreign policy of the United States to that of the Third Reich. In 2007, Russia suspended its participation in the CFE (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe). As a response to the planned deployment of missile defence facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia threatened to deploy the Iskander ballistic missiles in the Kaliningrad Oblast and in May 2007, just before George W. Bush’s visit to Europe, tested ballistic missiles. The relations sunk to a dangerously low level.

The symbolic end of hope and the carefully constructed “partnership” came in 2008. At the beginning of the year the independence of Kosovo was recognized contrary to the stance of Moscow (Kosovo was formally and finally separated from Russia’s ally, Serbia, and became a protectorate of NATO). In August, in turn, the war between Russia and Georgia broke out. Leaving aside the reasons

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14 The following states became members of NATO at that time: Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
16 J. Prus, A. Ciechanowicz, Putin szuka rusofobów, imperialistów i faszystów (Putin is looking for Russophobes, imperialists, and fascists), “Dziennik”, 01/06.2007.
17 Earlier, since 2004, Moscow had implemented a strategy of claiming the right to be consulted on matters involving military use of the territories of the Baltic states by NATO. It also began criticizing NATO military activity in that area. Air Policing mission was one of the actions affected by it. M. Kosienkowski, Strategia adaptacyjna Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec państw bałtyckich (The Adaptive Strategy of the Russian Federation towards the Baltic States), Toruń 2006, p. 58-60.
for the conflict, and the analysis of the responsibility, it is suffice to say, with regards to the subject of this paper, that on 12 August NATO “condemned and deplored [Russia’s] excessive, disproportionate use of force”. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer halted the NATO - Russia Council and some of the joint undertakings.

Tests of the RSM-56 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles were carried out in September, November, and December 2008; and in November 2008 of the RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile. Although some of the tests were failures, it was a clear sign that Moscow was not willing to give up and would continue to develop means to counter the ballistic missile defence system. At the same time, Poland was effectively warned that it was positioning itself as the target of a nuclear strike and Russia was ready to respond militarily should its national security be threatened. George W. Bush was so concerned that he invited Vladimir Putin to his family home in Kennebunkport as if this could save the bilateral relations. It was an extraordinary occasion: no political leader had been a guest of the Bush family since 1992. According to Stanford University’s Michael A. McFaul, relations between the states had “reached the lowest point in 20 years” at that time and what was worse “Nobody [had] a good idea of what [was] to be done.” As if to confirm this disturbing observation, in January 2009, as a result of a dispute with Ukraine, Moscow cut gas exports which left some European NATO member states without a supply of this resource and in February it influenced the government of Kyrgyzstan to close Manas air base to U.S. troops.

Although Moscow did not comply with NATO’s demands regarding Georgia, the Alliance was quick to temper its position. Linas Linkevičius described such a “seeking of friendlier relations” as demonstrating “inconsistency and disrespect for (...) [its] own values and principles”. In 2009, decision-makers hoped that the thaw (“reset”) policy declared by Barack Obama would bear fruit. The new head of state, being from the opposition party, could indeed raise hopes for a break-


22 L. Linkevičius, Building Trust in the NATO - Russia relationship: what NATO can offer, “European Leadership Network”, 08/05/2012, [www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org].
through. The scandal of 2009 when NATO expelled from its headquarters two Russian diplomats suspected of espionage could have become a potentially significant obstacle to the process. The crisis, however, was averted. President Obama visited Moscow in July 2009 to talk about strategic arms reduction.

In the same year the decision to resume official meetings was made. The first formal meeting of the NRC at the ministerial level was held in December 2009. Both sides expressed the will to improve relations and draft a list of common areas of cooperation and challenges. An informal working meeting concerned with increasing the efficiency of the NRC took place in Rome in 2010. The discussion was continued in Moscow in July during a meeting between Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.

The Lisbon NATO Summit in November 2010 was an illustration of the high hopes. An NRC meeting was held during that Summit. The historical significance of that meeting is substantiated by the fact that it was the third meeting of the Council and virtually the first that yielded any decisions. 28 NATO member states, including Poland, signed a joint resolution with Russia. Its aim was to strengthen mutual relations. The document expresses the will to build “a true strategic and modernized partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency, and predictability.”

The declaration involved a number of issues. First, a commitment was made to undertake in the years to come a joint review of the most important threats to security (such as: Afghanistan, terrorism, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as natural and man-made disasters). Second, Russia confirmed its participation in the missile defence effort undertaken by NATO. This declaration was readily used by the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen who said it was a proof that both sides could “bury the ghosts of the past that have haunted us for too long. We exorcise them. Today, we make a fresh start.”

Closer cooperation concerning Afghanistan was announced and discussions were held on combating terrorism, the drug trade, and piracy.

Here, the sine wave reached the top and headed downwards once again. The bone of contention was the Arab Spring, in particular the situation in Libya – an important trade and military partner of Moscow. NATO launched a military intervention which resulted in Libya being taken out of the Russian sphere of influence. It contributed to the above-mentioned crisis in the bilateral relations. Vladimir Putin was “dumbfounded” as he criticized NATO’s actions. Eventually, Russia

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lost its political and economic influence in Libya, which turned towards the West. Even greater opposition has arisen during the Syria crisis. Moscow gave (and still gives) its official (political and military) support to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the last Russian ally in the Middle East. The NATO - Russia sine wave reached its nadir.

NATO’s Policy towards Russia

There have been many attempts by NATO member states to win the favour of Moscow in the two decades after the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, the idea of expansion was frowned upon as it might threaten the position of democrats and reformists in post-Soviet Russia and hamper talks on the reduction of strategic weapons. Expansion could only slow or even halt the execution of the plan. There was also not enough will to take on new political and military commitments on the part of states such as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Moscow was rather kept at bay in terms of politics and, to an even larger extent, military matters. “As American capabilities surged and Russian capabilities waned” – the political scientists Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry have observed – “Washington policymakers increasingly acted as though Russia no longer mattered and the United States could do whatever it wanted”. It was not until the new decade that Russia became strong and important enough for its position to be taken into consideration in NATO’s own political planning. A number of gestures towards Kremlin followed.

The many instances of the opinion being voiced that Russia is no longer treated as an adversary was one example of such a gesture. Friendly gestures made by NATO towards Moscow, which is not perceived anymore as a threat by most states and people in the transatlantic area, may be found in official documents. For example, a desire to see “a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia” and a determination to “build a lasting and inclusive peace, together with Russia, in the Euro-Atlantic Area” were declared during the Lisbon Summit in 2010.

The most extreme manifestation of a friendly attitude being declared towards Russia is the discussions concerning its full membership. This idea first occurred

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in March 1954; although the reasons and atmosphere were completely different.\textsuperscript{29} It is enough to note the importance of the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council of 20 December, 1991 when the Soviet ambassador read a letter from Boris Yeltsin. It declared that Russia’s membership in NATO was “a long-term political aim”.\textsuperscript{30} This idea was supported, in reality or just officially, by First Deputy Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis, Vice President Alexandr Rutskoy, and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.\textsuperscript{31}

After the above-mentioned, rather cool, 1990s and the collapse of relatively friendly relations between the United States and Russia during the second term of George W. Bush’s presidency, which directly affected NATO - Russian relations, the topic of Russia potentially joining NATO was on the table again. In theory, this may be explained by saying that there is no alternative to such rhetoric: it is just a diplomatic courtesy. When attempting to build a strategic partnership one cannot openly say that Russia is not welcome in NATO. Any other attitude would be at variance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty of 1949.\textsuperscript{32}

On the other hand, there are many advocates of this solution whose authority is widely recognized. Georgetown University’s Professor Charles A. Kupchan is one of the most influential supporters of Russian membership. In his own words: “Anchoring Russia in an enlarged Euro-Atlantic order, therefore, should be an urgent priority for NATO today.”\textsuperscript{33} President and Chief Executive Officer of the International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans called for an invitation to Russia to join NATO’s “inner ring”.\textsuperscript{34} A German group which includes, among others, Volker Rühe (former German Minister of Defence), Frank Elbe (experienced diplomat, former ambassador to Poland), Vice-Admiral Ulrich Weisser (former Director of Plans and Policy and former Military Advisor to the German Minister of Defence), and General Klaus Naumann (former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee) officially called for an invitation for

\textsuperscript{29} It was then that Russia applied for membership. This happened on 31 March, 1954 and the aim of this move was to stop the militarization of West Germany and its inclusion into NATO. The application was rejected on May 7.


\textsuperscript{31} Y. Davydow, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{32} “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” H. Horbaczewski, J. Reginia-Zacharski, \textit{Organizacje międzynarodowe. Wybór tekstów źródłowych (International Organisations. A Selection of Source Texts)}, Wyd. PWSZ: Włocławek 2008, p. 163.


\textsuperscript{34} V. Pop, \textit{Russia does not rule out future NATO membership}, “EU Observer”, 01/04/2009, [www.euobserver.com].
Russia to join NATO in the pages of the German weekly “Der Spiegel”. The authors argued that, without Russia, no European security system is possible.

Diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger and the already-mentioned Ulrich Weisser spoke in a similar tone in the “New York Times” newspaper (“it would be a grave mistake for NATO and its members to cling to the Cold War perception of Russia as a potential aggressor and not as a strategic partner with whom we share interests. Security and stability in Europe are only possible with Russia”). Even the Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, expressed an opinion that this solution “could introduce stability and security into the regions which are lacking both”. Many officials show a similar attitude, although for them it is clearly a distant future desire and most of all a courtesy and diplomatic rhetoric. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Philip Gordon declared that “if Russia meets the criteria and can contribute to common security, and there is a consensus in the alliance, it shouldn’t be excluded”. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton made it clear: “Well, I can imagine [Russia being a member of NATO] I’m not sure the Russians can imagine it”.

Verbal declarations should be taken with a pinch of salt, treated as political gestures with no practical implications. What is worrying, however, is the fact that NATO has been consciously and systematically weakening its defensive capabilities, which disrupts the balance of power in relations with Moscow. What Josef Stalin sought to achieve: to torpedo the defence of Western Europe, is now being implemented by European decision-makers. As an example, one can point not only to the decrease in defence spending and cuts in the armed forces of NATO member states, but also to various pressures, particularly from the left wing, to unilaterally withdraw U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, estimated as of today at 180 B61 gravity bombs in bases in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Italy, regardless of any decision by Russia as to the future of its own nuclear arsenal (probably a thousand missiles along its western border, including the Kaliningrad Oblast).

One more example of how NATO trusts Russia should be mentioned: the selling of modern military technology, including offensive systems. European states are more and more willing to conclude such transactions. France has begun train-

36 Sikorski: nie wykluczać Rosji z rozszerzenia NATO (Sikorski: do not exclude Russia from enlargement), „Wprost24”, 05/02/2010, [www.wprost.pl].
37 Russia dismisses NATO membership suggestions, „RIA Novosti”, 30/07/2009, [www.en.rian.ru].
39 J. Borger, New push to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, “The Guardian”, 03/0/2012, [www.guardian.co.uk].
ing Russian sailors and marines. The Italians want to sell Russians B1 Centauro wheeled tank destroyers and Freccia infantry fighting vehicles, and these have been sent to Moscow for tests. A contract for 60 light multirole Lynx vehicles was signed with Iveco. Boxer armoured fighting vehicles (German - Dutch) are considered as a possible subject of yet another transaction. In June 2011, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation signed a contract with the German company Rheinmetall to construct a training centre compliant with Bundeswehr standards in Mulino near Nizhny Novgorod. AgustaWestland, in cooperation with Russian Helicopters, assembles AW139 helicopters in Russia. Defence companies such as Beretta (Italy), Glock and Steyr Mannlicher (both Austria) have started discussions with Moscow about using their technologies in Russia. France sold the Russians two 200-metre Mistral-class assault helicopter carriers. The Head of the National Security Bureau (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego), General Stanislaw Koziej, openly admitted that “the introduction of Mistral into the Baltic Sea and Black Sea will undoubtedly change the balance of power there. NATO will have to even it out somehow". As of today, the transaction is being carried out but there are no NATO plans to balance numbers accordingly. These ships will be of relevance to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and also Poland.

The Russian Response

NATO’s gestures have not managed to elicit the expected reaction from Moscow, despite the courteous statements made from time to time by Vladimir Putin: “We have come a long way from opposition to dialogue, and from confrontation

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41 A. Wilk, P. Zochowski, Francja i Niemcy zacieśniają współpracę wojskową z Rosją (France and Germany in Close Cooperation with Russia), “Tydzień na Wschodzie” – Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Issue 22(182), 29.06.2011, p. 3-4. Rheinmetall Defence’s website stated that it will be “a major army training centre (…) Located in the Volga region, by 2014 this simulation-supported training centre – the most advanced system of its kind worldwide – will be able to train 30,000 troops a year. For Rheinmetall the order is worth well over €100 million including further options (…) Measuring over 500 square kilometres, the state-of-the-art Russian army training centre in Mulino is designed to train a reinforced mechanized infantry or armoured brigade”. Rheinmetall wins major order in Russia, 24/11/2011, [www.rheinmetall-defence.com].
42 Production of AW139 helicopters in Russia began in 2012. It is expected that up to 15 - 20 helicopters will be assembled annually.
43 According to press information from September 2013 the Russian state-owned company Rostec signed a deal with Steyr Mannlicher to produce Steyr weapons in Russia. Since 2012 Russia has been assembling Glock pistols from parts imported from Austria.
44 R. Czulda, Wywiad z prof. Koziejem, szefem BBN [Interview with Professor Koziej, Head of the National Security Bureau], “Stosunki Międzynarodowe”, 24/02/2011, [www.stosunki.pl].
The Russian Federation has completely ruled out joining NATO in the near future. The Russian ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, said in March 2009 that “Great powers don't join coalitions, they create coalitions. Russia considers itself a great power”. In July, Rogozin said that Secretary Gordon’s words were “not serious enough” and that the United States were trying to take advantage of Russia’s weakness to advance into a territory “that [they] once occupied or controlled or influenced”. What is more, during the time of the breakdown in relations in 2010/2011 Moscow did not even try to rebuild them. Vladimir Putin ostentatiously rejected the invitation to the Chicago Summit excusing himself with a busy schedule. A few days before, the invitation to the G8 Summit in Camp David was rejected and in March an NRC meeting cancelled.

NATO does not threaten Russia with military force as opposed to the latter which has employed an aggressive and provocative rhetoric many times. Many of their statements substantiate the theory that Russian decision-makers still think in the terms of the Cold War spheres of influence and, in contrast to European leaders, they perceive international reality through a military perspective and traditional balance of power. Thus, it is hard to agree with the German expert, Matthias Dembinski, who, in the pages of “Stosunki Międzynarodowe” explains the “setback in relations” with different interpretations of the recent past, mutual misunderstandings and a high level of mistrust.

His opinion is oblivious to the fact that, according to Russian strategic documents and official statements, “The Alliance is perceived (...) as the main challenge for Russian security and an organization which can substantially limit the possibility of building and strengthening its sphere of particular influence in the post-Soviet area, particularly the European part.” The most important bone of contention is the ballistic missile defence system. NATO’s project presupposes two systems: that of NATO and a Russian one. Both are planned to cooperate closely, especially as regards threat-information exchange. They would, however, be separate in terms of decision-making. In an attempt to ease the situation,

45 G.B. Hendrickson, op. cit., p. 2.
46 V. Pop, op. cit.
48 F.S. Larrabee, Putin’s NATO dis. Cold wind from Moscow, “Chicago Tribune”, 17/05/2012, [www.chicagotribune.com].
NATO decided to express once more its readiness to start talks by agreeing to invite Moscow to the discussions concerning the project, which has been always perceived by Russian decision-makers as a threat to their offensive capabilities, which is both interesting and symptomatic. Saying that the NATO ballistic missile defence system, designed to defend the Euro-Atlantic community, weakens Russian strategic capabilities means that Moscow is still considering a potential strike on Europe.

Moscow would like to create one defence system instead of two separate ones: NATO’s (mainly American) system and the Russian system, based primarily on the still experimental S-500 systems. The Russian concept, the so-called “sector defence”, assumes that Moscow and NATO would have separate missile defence zones.\(^{51}\) Thus, in practice, NATO would defend only the United States and Western Europe. NATO members from Central and Eastern Europe, most probably including Poland, would be covered by the Russian missile umbrella; a solution obviously unacceptable for them.

A conciliatory tone from NATO, as well as from the United States, who changed their missile defence concept when Barack Obama took over the White House, toward Russia had no effect. Despite NATO’s willingness to talk, Russia did not accept compromise and threatened war. In May 2012, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, Nikolay Makarov openly stated that the “use [of] destructive force pre-emptively” on the U.S. missile defence infrastructure in Poland and Romania was a possibility. He also confirmed that Russia wanted to deploy Iskander short-range missiles in the Kaliningrad Oblast.\(^{52}\) The threat made by Dmitry Rogozin in March that there was the possibility of a “blitzkrieg strike” to “disarm enemies” was thus repeated.\(^{53}\) In May, President Dmitry Medvedev made a similar statement, in which he warned that Russia needed to prepare a military response to the plans to construct a United States - NATO missile defence system in Europe.\(^{54}\) Russia threatened NATO that it could withdraw from the latest arrangements on strategic weapons reduction and forbid NATO from using air and ground transport routes to and from Afghanistan through Russian territory.\(^{55}\) It is difficult not to see these words as clearly hostile, at variance with the spirit of declared cooperation.

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\(^{51}\) Rosja znów grozi – ocieplenia nie ma (Russia threatens once more – no thaw), “ARMIA”, April 2012, p. 6.

\(^{52}\) B. Waterfield, Russia threatens NATO with military strikes over missile defence system, “The Telegraph”, 03/05/2012, [www.telegraph.co.uk].


\(^{54}\) Rosja znów grozi..., p. 6.

Not only words are hostile but also actions. John R. Schindler wrote: “NATO’s Baltic members are accustomed to regular harassment by Moscow, with aggressive espionage, subversion, and manipulation of local politics, business, and Russian minorities being part of daily life in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russian intelligence services are highly active in the Baltics and generally treat them as less than sovereign states, much less NATO member countries. But the return of a conventional military threat from Russia, coupled with press releases from Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin that seem nostalgic for the Soviet period, has led to a mounting sense of dread in the Baltics”.

A series of ostentatious military exercises conducted from time to time is an explicit example substantiating the theory that Moscow has been increasing tensions intentionally. For instance, the Kavkaz military exercises that took place from June to July 2009 ended exactly on the day President Barack Obama visited Moscow. The exercises, involving 8,500 soldiers, 450 armoured fighting vehicles and transporters, and 200 tanks were organized alarmingly close to Georgia, which was not a gesture meant to ease the situation. What is interesting, is that some time earlier, Moscow described the NATO exercises, Cooperative Longbow/Cooperative Lancer (mainly for staff personnel), in Georgia, involving as little as 700 soldiers, as provocative. It was also critical of the potential creation of contingency plans for the defence of the Baltic states.

The operational - strategic manoeuvres in 2009, Ladoga (10 August - 8 September) and Zapad (8 - 28 September), should also be mentioned. The basis of the exercises involved defeating an aggressor’s army with a counterstrike and establishing a line of defence at the border. The very idea of the exercises itself was provocative (how would Russia and Belarus react, if similar manoeuvres involving several thousand NATO soldiers, strategic bombers, fighter-bomber aircrafts, amphibious assault crafts and tank battalions were to take place on the eastern borders of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia?). Despite the declared defensive nature of the exercises, the forces and the means used, including Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers, and the lack of international observers bring into question Moscow’s true intentions.

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60 Tu-22M3s and Su-24Ms were also involved. J.T. Quinlivan, O. Olker, Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Russian Approaches to a New Environment and Implications for the United States, RAND 2011, pp. 56-57.
Additionally, soldiers practiced the suppression of an uprising of the Polish minority in Hrodna; even Minister Bogdan Klich, known for his placid character and balanced opinions, deemed it a “manifestation of force”.\(^6\) A landing on a “Polish” beach, an attack on power installations, and even a thermonuclear strike on Warsaw were simulated, which made some experts compare the manoeuvres, labelled as “intimidating”, to “the Red Army’s preparation for the invasion of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and an attack at Finland in 1939”.\(^2\) Taking into account the location, size, and scale of the exercises, as well as the forces and measures involved, the obvious conclusion is that it was a preparation for a war with NATO. The Alliance protested, pointing to the fact that as many as 30,000 soldiers took part in both exercises, collectively referred to as *Osen*, which was deemed a breach of the agreements on the use of force.\(^3\) No wonder that the renowned publication, The Economist, described the Russian behaviour as “sabre-rattling”.\(^4\)

The same could be said about *Zapad* in 2013. As John R. Schindler said, “despite their portrayal by the Kremlin as a counterterrorism practice run, were clearly more conventional in focus and, given their location—and name—plus the involvement of Belarusian forces in the exercise, proved troubling to frontline NATO states, above all Poland and the Baltic states”.\(^5\) According to *The Lithuanian Tribune*, “Moscow argued that the *Zapad* 2013 exercises represented a riposte to terrorists. But again, a little-publicized fact is that these simulated “terrorists” were apparently Balts intent on mounting operations in Belarus against that government and on behalf of their supposedly oppressed ethnic kinsmen. Beyond those points it is also clear that Russia regards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an enemy, despite concurrent cooperation with it. Indeed, just before these exercises, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu told the Valdai Club forum that NATO is an enemy because of its pursuit of a comprehensive ballistic missile defence system and the Alliance’s continuing expansion”.\(^6\)


\(^4\) *Rethink the reset. NATO should not give in to Russian aggression*, “The Economist”, 19/05/2012, [www.economist.com]. *Zapad* 2013 also raised questions. The Baltic states expressed their concerns about the scale of the exercises.

\(^5\) J.R. Schindler, *op. cit.*

When analysing Russian policy towards NATO, one should not focus on the negative aspects only; there are some areas where Moscow cooperates with the Alliance. For example, a counter-drugs cooperation in Afghanistan has been developed. Moscow agreed to NATO using its base in Ulyanovsk on the Volga (approximately 900 km from Moscow) as a transit point for further rail and air transport. There is also the so-called Northern Distribution Network (NDN), used to transport ISAF equipment to and from Afghanistan by air and land. Joint exercises have also taken place, e.g., *Vigilant Skies* and *Bold Monarch*.

Russia offered NATO the use of its radar in Azerbaijan near the Iranian border for missile defence purposes. President Vladimir Putin also offered the use of a radar installation within Russian territory and submitted a plan for constructing a joint missile defence system to strengthen European security. “We want positive cooperation, (...) we want to act together against common threats” – said President Dmitry Medvedev in November 2008 and added – “but they, unfortunately, don’t want to listen to us”.

It is hard not to question Russia’s intentions. According to Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, for Russia, the goal of the cooperation is not to make friendly gestures towards the West in order to build partner relations. In his opinion, it is in Moscow’s own interests. He gives Afghanistan as an example: “Were it not for NATO, it would be Russia who would have had to tackle the problem of Muslim radicalism in Central Asia”. Right on spot; as was mentioned before, Russia’s consent to the presence of United States and NATO forces in Central Asia was beneficial for Moscow. The statements made by President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (contrary to the opinion of Russian nationalists and communists), in which they state that NATO should not leave Afghanistan too early, as well as their consent to use the base in Ulyanovsk result from a cool calculation of the profits and losses and not from friendly relations. If the United States and NATO leave Afghanistan too early, it would plunge that state into chaos which would affect Russia and the states in Central Asia, more or less still influenced by Moscow, such as Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. The longer NATO

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67 By the end of June 2012 2000 officers have been trained, almost half of them in Moscow and Petersburg. *Rosja ostrzega – NATO nie może wyjechać* (Russia warns: NATO cannot leave), „ARMIA”, May 2012, p. 12.


70 R. Czulda, *Z Polską nie ma małych wojen – wywiad z doktorem Przemysławem Żurawskim vel Grajewskim* (There is no such thing as a small war with Poland. Interview with Dr. Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski), „ARMIA”, 6/2011, p. 7.


72 *Rosja ostrzega…*, p. 12.
stays in Afghanistan, the greater the chances are for stability there and the bigger the costs for the Alliance. Therefore, each year the war continues weakens the Americans and NATO. For Russia, the continuous presence of NATO’s contingents in Afghanistan is a win/win situation.

Similar conclusions can be drawn concerning missile defence. For Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, “the willingness to build a joint missile defence system with NATO [is motivated by the aim of giving] Russia the means to control it and to paralyse it should Kremlin deem it advantageous”.73 The Russian project involves one system “with common threat assessment centres, a system based on joint decisions”.74 This solution would be highly disadvantageous to NATO: Russia could control and even hinder the operation of such a system. Joint command would make any reaction to a Russian act of aggression on NATO extremely difficult. This would be at variance with the basic rule: indivisible and non-gradable security (the same guarantees for all member states) because East and Central European states would by protected by the Russian missile defence umbrella.

Furthermore, the statement by Dmitry Medvedev that Russia should have been admitted to NATO in the 1990s is not an articulation of regret but an accusation: in his opinion, had this happened, there would have been no conflicts in the post-Soviet area, e.g., in Georgia.75 The message is clear: it is NATO (which Putin called a “relic of the Cold War” in April 2012) that is responsible for the situation in the region, not Russia.76 Russian consent to the intervention in Libya, given by abstaining from voting at the UN Security Council meeting, was designed to weaken NATO by allowing it to wage a potentially long and costly war while simultaneously causing an increase in oil prices which would benefit their own interests.

Conclusions and Outlook

In 2002, former NATO Secretary General, George Robertson made the following comment on the likelihood of the success of the NRC: “the real difference between ’19 + 1’ and ‘20’ is not a question of mathematics, but one of chemistry”.77 This is true because it is intentions and good will that are the most important factors if bilateral relations are to be positive. Much depends on Moscow’s political and geo-strategic calculations, as NATO is interested in cooperation. The

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73 R. Czulda, Z Polską…, p. 7.
75 The Threat of Militarization …, p. 11.
76 Putin calls …
77 G.B. Hendrickson, op. cit., p. 33.
same pertains to the United States, which greatly affects the Alliance’s policy. Deterioration or improvement of the bilateral relations in general does not result from actions taken by NATO but from the unilateral decisions of Moscow. In other words, if Russian decision-makers want to cool relations, they use power or threats. When they want to improve them, they talk of their good will and offer cooperation. So, good relations are feasible only if Moscow deems them advantageous for them.

Undoubtedly, any predictions of Russia becoming a NATO member in the near future would be close to political fiction. According to Kenette Benedict, there are only two reasons why this could not come about: a lack of strategic agreements with Washington concerning missile defence and “a failure to reconcile with former Eastern European countries that once were Soviet client states”. The above analysis and belief that getting rid of the enumerated obstacles will yield Russia accession are highly superficial, naive, and wrong.

Russia will probably never become a NATO member; certainly not in the foreseeable future. Setting aside the Russian attitude towards the Alliance, it would be impossible for objective reasons: Russia does not comply with the membership conditions, including democracy and the rule of law. It is far from achieving any of the standards, including technical and operational ones, demanded by NATO. It would be a surprise, although not entirely impossible (e.g., if the United States applied pressure) if the former Eastern bloc states, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, agreed to Russian membership. It is, however, an unlikely scenario, as it assumes that Moscow would express a will to join the Alliance. What would have to happen for Russia to impose consciously and out of its own free will the limitations resulting from membership? Membership also entails duties.

So maybe a strategic partnership? First of all, this idea should be defined. According to the definition by Martin Smith these are “relations [that] are motivated by a broader agreement amongst the partners about the overall nature of international relations, the sources of potential and actual security threats and the most appropriate means of responding to these”. If one was to use this definition, the prognosis for a partnership between NATO and Russia would be pessimistic. It is true that both share some common interests. Both NATO and Moscow have to fight terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Both have been focused on the war in Afghanistan, although to varying degrees and in different forms. The growth of China is also a problem; not only a political one but most of all – economic. It is a

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78 K. Benedict, Russia should be rewarded with NATO membership, “The Christian Science Monitor”, 15/05/2012, [www.csmonitor.com].
threat both for NATO member states and (especially?) Russia. International piracy, stabilization in the Balkans, and reducing tactical and strategic WMD arsenals are further shared interests. Despite all this, there are too many issues dividing Moscow and NATO and too little uniting them; these are more tactical interests rather than a common vision and shared values.

The likelihood that Russian policy will change in the upcoming years is not high. Moscow will want to talk, but to quote F. Stephen Larrabee: “Putin would like better relations with Washington — on his terms”.

In the forthcoming years, we will only witness attempts by NATO to establish a partnership doomed to failure, more short-term (tactical) agreements, and more weapons and technology transfers. Meetings and summits will be held as both sides need to cooperate one way or another due to their importance in the international arena. However, no partnership is possible.

The prospect of further expansion should not cause any deterioration in the relations. The states closest to Russia are already NATO members: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria and Romania. The accession of states such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine may be problematic because historically they were in the Russian sphere of influence. It seems, however, that in the foreseeable future these states are unlikely to join NATO.

It is important that the Alliance not show weakness. This may occur both in the political and military domain. Politically, NATO needs to stress its steadfast will to defend the states at its eastern border (especially the Baltic states as they are at the highest risk but also Poland as the Poles do not consider that NATO’s guarantees are sufficient) by making clear that there are contingency plans prepared. The Steadfast Jazz multinational military exercises, held in Autumn 2013 in Poland and the Baltic states, were a good opportunity to demonstrate the second element. Although disappointingly small in their scale (just a brigade size) the exercises were probably the largest of their kind since the end of the Cold War and could be thought of as a response to the Ladoga and Zapad exercises. Such a demonstration of NATO’s solidarity, strength, will and readiness is very important even at the cost of a possible deterioration in relations with the Kremlin.

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80 F.S. Larrabee, Putin’s NATO dis. Cold wind from Moscow, “Chicago Tribune”, 17/05/2012, [www.chicagotribune.com].
The European Phased Adaptive Approach – The U.S. Contribution to NATO Missile Defence

During the Lisbon Summit (19 - 20 November, 2010) the heads of the NATO member states decided to build a joint missile defence system consisting of national components (interceptors) and a joint, integrated Command & Control Centre (C2). The system is to be compatible with the U.S. solutions deployed as a part of the EPAA (European Phased Adaptive Approach). The Washington three-stage\(^1\) initiative assumes that Aegis BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) ship and land-based next-generation SM-3 missile launchers will be deployed in Europe to ensure protection against short-range (up to 1,000 km), medium-range (up to 3,000 km) and intermediate-range (up to 5,500 km) missiles. Due to the time consuming decision-making process and financial issues that European NATO members face, it is probable that the EPAA will be the backbone of the European missile defence in the nearest future. Thanks to the tactical and technical parameters of the SM-3 missiles, it will provide, at least partially, area defence, not just point defence.

When on 17 September, 2009, President Barack Obama declared that the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) be defined anew, Poland focused on just one aspect of this decision: abandoning the idea to build the so called third base for Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) in Redzikowo. In doing so, Poland completely disregarded the fact that other projects, also deemed fruitless, had been abandoned: the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), Multiple Killing Vehicle (MKV) and the Airborne Laser (ABL) were also put on ice. The European Phased Adaptive Approach, proposed instead of the third base, has a good chance of becoming a real and valuable part of the NATO missile defence. This does not mean, however, that the implementation process is guaranteed. There are several factors that could delay implementation or even cause yet another reconfiguration of the project. In order to counteract these factors effectively, they need to be clearly defined.

For the purpose of this paper, defining the four main factors (or groups of factors) that could have an influence on the U.S. plans seems most helpful. The

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\(^1\) The initial plan involved four phases. The final one consisted of deploying SM-3 Block IIB interceptors capable of countering ICBMs. The spring 2013 Korean crisis, however, changed these plans. On 15 March, the United States Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, announced the decision to cease working on the missile and stream the financial resources thus saved to the subsequent purchase of fourteen GBIs, among other things.
possible change of approach to missile defence (and its NATO component) after the forthcoming presidential elections in the U.S. is deliberately disregarded. Two of the above-mentioned factors are of a political and strategic nature, one involves the military perspective and the current assessment of threats, and the last is connected to financial resources.

The Shift in the Centre of Gravity of U.S. Security Policy towards the Asia-Pacific Region

In January 2012, the Pentagon announced new strategic guidelines. The document *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* contains the following sentence: “Most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it (...) this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts towards a focus on future capabilities”. While in its essence this statement is correct, it has the potential to raise the concern that the “pivot” (rebalancing) to Asia may also involve missile defence. This would not mean abandoning the EPAA, but it might cause a slowdown in the implementation of the second and third phase.

The document employs the term “missile defence” twice when reviewing the basic operations of the United States Armed Forces. The need to improve and develop missile defence is substantiated by the necessity of ensuring its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments and to provide territorial defence. In the Department of Defence jargon, the A2/AD term is found virtually exclusively with regards to the modernization of the People’s Republic of China’s armed forces (PLA). It is also used to describe Iran’s operations, but to a lesser extent. North Korea, in turn, is perceived as the main missile threat to U.S. territory today. It is thus clear that Asia is deemed a priority. It is true that the number of the Atlantic Fleet’s Aegis BMD-capable vessels has risen substantially over the last two years, from three to 12 ships, which is partially a result and proof of the involvement of the United States in the EPAA, yet it is the developments in the Far East that decide the overall changes in the BMD concept. It was the Korean crisis at the beginning of 2013 that caused the United States to abandon the fourth phase of the EPAA and the development of the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor. Washington plans to use the financial resources thus

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3 At the same time, the number of Aegis BMD system ships in the Pacific Fleet fell from 16 to 15, cf.: R. O’Rourke, *Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, 17/10/2013.
saved to deploy an additional 14 GBI interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska and to improve their warheads (Exo-atmospheric Killing Vehicle, EKV). In his speech on 15 March, 2013, United States Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, also announced the deployment of a second, additional AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan and the launch of environmental impact studies concerning the construction of an additional GBI base on the East Coast, confirming that the will exists on the part of the U.S. government to implement the remaining three phases of the EPAA. Still, one can assume that North Korea's ballistic missile program could affect the implementation process. Judging by the reports: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, and the non-classified part of the Defense Intelligence Agency Annual Threat Assessment, the U.S. is increasingly taking the possibility of Pyongyang having ICBMs capable of reaching the American continent into consideration.

The Russian Stance

Russia has been consistently opposed to any U.S. attempts at developing a missile defence system for years as it perceives it as a threat to its own deterrent capabilities. Moscow showed no understanding for American reassurances that the developed system is (and will be) too limited in terms of its size and technology to be able to provide a defence against a full-scale Russian attack. After 2001/2002 and Washington's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia faced a fait accompli and to some extent was forced to tolerate the U.S. developing missile defence systems. Still, it voiced its objections to deploying them in Central Europe and threatened retaliation.

Nevertheless, a joint statement of the NATO - Russia Council was agreed during the Lisbon Summit: “We agreed to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation. We agreed on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment and to continue dialog in this area. The NRC will also resume Theater Missile Defence Cooperation. We have tasked the NRC to develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future

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4 Missile Defense Announcement As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, 15/03/2013, [www.defense.gov].
5 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem, p. 18.
framework for missile defence cooperation. The progress of this Analysis will be assessed at the June 2011 meeting of NRC Defence Ministers”.  

The sides understood the meaning of cooperation in a completely different way. Russia proposed constructing two sector missile defence systems, each covering a part of Europe, which was unacceptable for the Alliance as some member states would be in the Russian sector. NATO responded with the concept of two common centres; the NATO - Russia Data Fusion Centre, responsible for the exchange of intelligence and early warning systems data and the NATO - Russia Planning and Operation Centre responsible for the planning and coordination of missile defence. This solution did not satisfy Russia. It seems that Russia could accept the first two phases of the implementation of the EPAA, whereas the third phase would require further discussions. This results from both the political aspect: the installations being located in the direct vicinity of the Russian border, and the military aspect: Russia does not treat the SM-3 Block IA and IB interceptors as a direct threat to its own intercontinental missiles; it is wary of the SM-3 Block IIA missiles with supposedly greater speed and range (it should be noted, though, that the range is still not sufficient to counter ICBM warheads) that are to be located in Poland. Representatives of the Russian government question also the nature of the United States - NATO missile defence system and argue that it will be continuously further developed and consequently would pose a threat to Russian missile forces. Russia is trying to employ the missile defence argument to support the withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, an idea welcomed by some politicians from the western part of the continent which may lead to the disintegration of the Alliance.

Russia also demanded from NATO legal guarantees that the developed missile defence system will not pose a threat to its missile forces. NATO's stance on this matter was best stated by Deputy Secretary General, Alexander Vershbow: NATO “has given political guarantees at the highest level. These were not given lightly and demonstrate NATO’s sincerity. Legal guarantees and new treaties are not on the cards; moreover, I would argue that they would not solve the real problem, which is a fundamental lack of trust”.

11 S. Pifer, Missile Defense in Europe: Cooperation or Contention?, Brookings Institute, 08/05/2012, [www.brookings.edu].
12 NATO and Missile Defence, Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the 2013 RUSI Missile Defence Conference, London, 12/06/2013, [www.nato.int].
13 S. Pifer, op. cit.
14 This is particularly apparent in Germany.
15 NATO and Missile Defence, Speech by NATO Deputy...
The need for cooperation with Russia on missile defence is unquestionable. Its nature, however, has to take into consideration the existing necessity of the construction of a missile defence system encompassing all member states and, at the same time, create the conditions and space in which to build trust and, in the future, maybe even a kind of common interest in the area.

The Possible Construction of ICBMs by Iran

The involvement of the United States in the NATO and EPAA missile defence stems mainly from the Iranian threat. In this context it seems absurd to say that the acquisition of ICBMs by this state might hinder the implementation of the project. This fear is, however, not entirely unfounded.

President Barack Obama said, among other things, while justifying shelving his predecessor’s idea to establish a GBI base in Poland: “The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower to develop than previously estimated. In the near-term, the greatest threats from Iran will be to U.S. Allies and partners, as well as to U.S. deployed personnel—military and civilian—and their accompanying families in the Middle East and in Europe”.16

SM-3 missiles of the Block IA, IB, and IIA variants were a response to the Iranian SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM respectively. It was the SM-3 Block IIB variant that was supposed to be designed to counter intercontinental missiles.17 In the Pentagon’s opinion, however, the prospective date of implementation of the interceptor (2022) was too far off given the emerging threats. The technology used may not be effective in the future and the financial means would be better spent on GBI missiles. With the Block IIB work halted, it is the task of the GBI missiles in the Alaska (Fort Greely) and California (Vandenberg Air Force Base) bases to counter potential Iranian intercontinental missiles. At the same time, the possibility of building a third base on the East Coast is on the table in the United States.18 This is the result of yet another change in the perception of the Iranian threat. The Department of Defense’s April 2012 Annual Report on Military Power of Iran reads:

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17 The anticipated speed of SM-3 Block IIA is approximately 4.5 km/s, and Block IIB was 5 - 5.5 km/s, cf.: S. Pifer, op. cit.
“Iran may be technically capable of flight testing an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015”.\footnote{Annual Report on Military Power of Iran, Department of Defense, April 2012, p. 1, [www.fas.org].} A similar statement was made by the authors of \textit{Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat} (i.e. NASIC, DIA, and ONI): “Since 2008, Iran has conducted multiple successful launches of the two-stage \textit{Safir} SLV. In early 2010, Iran unveiled the larger \textit{Simorgh} SLV. Iran will likely continue to pursue longer range ballistic missiles and more capable SLVs, which could lead to the development of an ICBM system. Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015”.\footnote{Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat..., p. 3.}

The potential threat of Iranian intercontinental missiles to the territory of the United States could lead to an increase in the number of GBI missiles in the existing bases and/or construction of a new base on the East Coast. This would require additional spending from the sequestered budget of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). According to the testimony of the MDA Director, Vice Admiral James Syring, given before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, an additional 14 interceptors located in Alaska will cost approximately USD 1 billion (75 million per interceptor).\footnote{P. McLeary, \textit{US Missile Defense Chief Backs East Coast Radars, More Interceptor Sites}, “DefenseNews”, 17/07/2013, [www.defensenews.com].} It is then possible that the Pentagon will be forced to look for the additional means for the implementation of the GBI in other elements of the MD programme.

\textit{Budget Issues}

Both United States and European NATO members have to face the issue of cutbacks. As was mentioned before, the evolving assessment of threats can and probably will induce changes in the U.S. BMD concept, including the relocation of finances. The sequestration may also affect the rate of the implementation of the EPAA. Finally, the United States may prove unwilling (also politically) to incur the high costs of a European missile defence unless the actions taken by the European states demonstrate serious involvement, especially so with the potentially increasing financial costs of the project. Even today, some voice the opinion that it is necessary to locate the next AN/TPY-2 radar in Europe (the first has been located in Turkey since autumn 2011).\footnote{S.I. Erwin, \textit{European Missile Shield: Can U.S. Taxpayers Afford It?}, “Missile Threat”, 05/07/2013, [www.missilethreat.com].} The United States has deployed these radar installations in Israel, Qatar, Japan (two units) and Turkey (another six are used by THAAD batteries) and do not plan to locate any more in Europe.\footnote{Ibidem.} The situa-
tion is not improved by the fact that the United States spends more than twice as much in percentage terms as most European states on defence and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit set the European contribution to the project at only EUR 200 million over ten years. In order to maintain their credibility as equal partners and providers, not just consumers, of security, the European NATO member states should first of all become involved in the development of their own missile defence capabilities. Good examples of such states are: the Netherlands who announced their plans to modernize the radar systems of their four frigates so as to prepare them for the fight against ballistic targets and are considering purchasing SM-3 interceptors in the future; France, developing the SAMP/T system; Germany, Spain, and finally Poland which is planning to acquire middle-range missile defence systems as a part of an overhaul of the air defence system.

Conclusions

Approximately 30 states have ballistic missiles in their arsenals. The United States estimates that there are 6,000 missiles beyond the control of NATO, Russia and China. This weapon is the perfect tool for political blackmail were it to be in the hands of the leaders of North Korea or Iran. What is more, it should not be forgotten that it is not the exclusive privilege of just states to own ballistic missiles: Iranian ballistic missiles are now in the arsenal of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the prospect of rebels taking control of the Syrian SCUDs instils fear not only in Israel but among NATO member states, including the United States. On the other hand, missile and counter-rockets defence systems have proven their worth as a real game changer both in times of crisis (from January 2013 in Turkey and in March/April in the Korean Peninsula) and actual conflict (the Israeli operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip in November 2012).

The American EPAA initiative is a real and substantial contribution to the development of NATO missile defence capabilities. Its value is defined not only by political factors pertaining to the involvement of the United States in European security but also (or even most of all) by military aspects. The Lisbon Summit declaration reads: “The aim of a NATO missile defence capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles”. Today, only the American systems are capable of providing this type of protection. The missile systems in the arsenals of European states or being developed by them (PAC-3, MEADS, SAMP/T) are in fact tactical systems capable of defending ar-

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24 Ibidem.
mies in the theatre of operations or singular agglomerations not of providing protection to the whole territory of a state (not to mention a number of states as only some Allies have them): their range varies from a few dozen to a little over a hundred kilometres, whereas the range of the SM-3 in the current version is estimated at approximately five hundred kilometres (classified data). That is why the implementation of the EPAA needs to be NATO's top priority and the opinion of third parties should not influence the decisions made in this regard. There is a need for a political dialogue with Russia regarding the issue but the results of such a dialogue cannot affect the operational limitations of the system. Individual NATO member states should not associate the development of collective missile defence capabilities with the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The deterrence potential cannot be equated with defence capabilities lest both lose credibility.

Although the implementation of the EPAA is not in danger, it cannot be said for sure that its future form and time frame of implementation are final. During the Chicago Summit the so called *Interim BMD Capability*\(^{25}\) was declared. In the next few years, the *Initial Operating Capability* should be implemented and at the beginning of the next decade – *Full Operational Capability*. Achieving these ambitious goals may require financial efforts and political determination greater than initially anticipated.

\(^{25}\) *Chicago Summit Declaration*, 20/05/2012, [www.nato.int].
CHAPTER IV

NATO Towards the Contemporary Challenges, Opportunities and Threats
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The Formation of NATO’s Approach to the Arctic in the First Decade of the 21st Century

In order to identify and clarify the key challenges of the modern world that NATO is currently facing, it should be noted that they are, to a large extent, conditioned by the specificity of the current international environment. As M. Pietraś points out, the Alliance was established in the traditional (Westphalian) system of international relations, the subjective and functional dimensions of which were primarily determined by the bipolar confrontation underlying the Cold War. At present, NATO is trying to function in the post-Westphalian system, which is an unstable, uncertain and unpredictable system, wherein, moreover, entities have a heterogeneous structure. This gap, which is in its essence part of the current transformation of the international system, should therefore be regarded as the main, but not the only, source of the significantly increasing needs, or even demands, for NATO to adapt in a multilevel and multidimensional manner to the realities of the modern world, and the identification of its share in the future development.

The experience of the last two decades suggests that, despite many setbacks in the effective execution of its tasks, the Alliance still has a relatively high potential in this area and can play many roles in the international arena.

At the same time, however, there are also challenges which NATO faces to which it does not respond as quickly and strongly as might be expected, and sometimes without being able to develop and adopt a unanimous and specific approach. Such situations are related both to the political will of the member states on specific issues and their participation in the joint coverage of the Alliance’s costs, as well as issues of strategy. This problem is highlighted by D. S. Yost, among

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1 This research was supported by National Centre for Science (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) post-doctoral fellowship under the grant: DEC-2011/04/S/HS5/00172.
others, who points to a number of conditions that exist in this context, both on
the part of NATO and the member states.\(^5\)

However, it should also be kept in mind that NATO is now additionally con-
fronted with changes that, for all of the other participants in international
relations, are not only brand new but also phenomena and processes that are diffi-
cult to clearly assess and rapidly respond to. These include, among others, the mul-
tidimensional implications of climate change on international security,\(^6\) the conse-
quences of which occupy a unique place, bringing about the current change in the
geopolitical importance of the Arctic in international relations.\(^7\) This issue is
the subject of the research undertaken in this study; the main objective is to ana-
lyse the process involved in the development of NATO’s position regarding the
Arctic\(^8\) in the first decade of the 21st century.

The starting point of this study is to present the causes and consequences of
the evolution of the significance of the Far North for contemporary international
relations. In the next part, the steps taken by NATO regarding the Arctic geopolit-
ical implications of climate change in recent years will be analysed. Then, the posi-
tions of the selected, mainly arctic, members of the Alliance will be identified
regarding their role in the Arctic. The study will finish with conclusions and an
attempt to assess the possibility of changing NATO’s reconstructed approach
towards the Far North.

Outline of the Evolution of the Arctic Position in the International Arena

The arctic regions, due to their natural geographical conditions, especially their
climate\(^9\), up to the end of the first half of the twentieth century, were located at the
distant periphery of the international system. This situation was conducive to

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\(^8\) The study adopts the definition of the Arctic, according to which it is an area north of the boundary formed
above the Arctic Circle: 66° 30' 39'' of the north latitude). This means that it covers land and sea territories of
the Arctic Ocean coastal states: Norway, the Russian Federation, the United States, Canada, Denmark
(representing Greenland) and Iceland, as well as the land territory of Sweden and Finland. Sometimes, an
extension is used with respect to North America, Iceland and eastern Russia to 60° of the north latitude, see:
C. Keskitalo, *International Region-Building: Development of the Arctic as an International Region*, “Cooperation and
the consolidation of the international acceptance of the common stereotype of the Arctic, whereby these places were seen merely as inaccessible and sparsely uninhabited, snowy and cold deserts, located far away in the eternally frozen northern seas; areas not belonging to anyone and being of interest only to those seeking new lands and sea routes, and from the second half of the nineteenth century, gradually of increasing interest to researchers.\(^{10}\)

This approach began to undergo a slow change during and after World War II, when, due to the perceived geo-strategic position of the Arctic,\(^ {11}\) its gradual militarization began and because since the end of the 1950s it has become the arena for the mutual “hunting” of submarines by the United States and the Soviet Union.\(^ {12}\) It is worth noting that the effect of this change, particularly the Cold War rivalry in the Far North, has been the identification of the Arctic not only with the group of the Arctic Ocean coastal states (the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, Denmark/Greenland and Norway), but also with Iceland, Sweden and Finland.\(^ {13}\) This new perspective did not change even in the seventies when, due to the thawing of relations between the East and West, official international scientific cooperation within the Arctic Circle first became possible. Its success helped the development of local contacts between the organizations representing the Arctic’s indigenous peoples.

A significant moment in the positive trend of Arctic cooperation, and in fact, its acceleration, was Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech delivered in Murmansk in 1987, when the last leader of the Soviet Union announced the Arctic to be a zone of peaceful cooperation. This new, open approach on the part of Moscow actually resulted in the establishment of a series of initiatives over the following years, mainly by Finland and Canada, with the cooperation of the Arctic states, for environmental safety, the importance of which was widely understood. Thus, at the end of the Cold War, the process of the “soft” institutionalization of the cooperation between the Arctic states began, mainly through the Arctic Council, established in 1996.\(^ {14}\) Its role as a forum for the international cooperation of the Arctic states, especially in the fields of ecology and scientific cooperation, for

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\(^{13}\) C. Keskitalo, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

a long period of time has not enjoyed special international attention, and even some of its member states have not always shown much interest in this matter.\textsuperscript{15} The implications of the climate change that has now been observed to have occurred in the Arctic in recent years and the trends projected in this area\textsuperscript{16} have again changed the image of the Arctic and its position in the international arena. Currently, the maps showing the declining ice cover in the Arctic Ocean, due to excessive melting and the increasingly marked boundaries of the jurisdiction of coastal states, especially the locations of the very few disputes in this respect, most fully illustrate this image.\textsuperscript{17} The issue most often invoked in this context is that of the exploitation of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas from the bottom of the Arctic Ocean.\textsuperscript{18} It is estimated that approximately 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves are located there, along with about 30 percent of the undiscovered gas resources.\textsuperscript{19} In addition to hydrocarbon resources, deposits of such metals as zinc, lead, copper, gold, iron, molybdenum, nickel and platinum have been discovered in the Arctic, as well as such non-metals as apatite, zircon, olivine, barite, graphite and, finally, diamonds. The increasing melting of the Arctic ice could potentially contribute to the development of fisheries, but it is quite difficult to carry out any estimates in this respect. The issue of the access to all of the resources, however, is only, from the point of view of international relations, an aspect of a much more important debate. This debate concerns territorial sovereignty in the Arctic, the regime of the \textit{United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982}, the multi-dimensional security issues in the region, the foreign policies of the Arctic and non-Arctic states, and the activities of the transnational entities interested in the areas and mechanisms for managing the region.

The second most frequently reported challenge to international policy in the northern polar regions is the potential development of trans-Arctic shipping due

\textsuperscript{17} M. Łuszczuk, \textit{Rozwój sytuacji międzynarodowej w Arktyce a delimitacja obszarów morskich na Oceanie Arktycznym (The Development of the International Situation in the Arctic and the Delimitation of Maritime Areas in the Arctic Ocean), “Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations” 2010, Vol. 42, No. 3-4, p. 139-153.}
\textsuperscript{19} D.L. Gautier, et al., \textit{Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic, “Science” 2009, Vol. 324. p. 1175-1179.}
to the fact that the sea lanes are becoming more and more exposed by the melting ice cap. The calculation of the potential for reduced distances between the major ports of the world convinces many of the urgency in this matter, because of a need for highly cost-effective and open shipping lanes to the north of Eurasia and North America and, in the future, across the Arctic Ocean. However, the reality is more complex, because the shipping industry is not only about distances, but also timeliness and security, and in the ensuring of which, the waters of the Arctic will be crucial for the implementation of this vision.

Therefore, these factors, in combination with others, contribute to both the multi-dimensional transformation of the northern polar regions, as well as to the change in their role in international politics. The observed intensification of international activity in the Arctic and towards the Arctic is clearly reflected in the rise (politically, economically and with relation to multi-dimensional security) of the northern polar regions for a number of national and transnational participants in international relations, including those who are not, or do not directly operate, in the Arctic. Moreover, due to the phenomenon of rapidly growing and multi-faceted dependences, e.g., climatic, ecological or geopolitical, the transfor-
formation potentially entails greater, even global consequences.\textsuperscript{25} In this way, the feedback mechanism may lead to the further growth in the importance and the increasing complexity of the Arctic’s impact on the future evolution of the international order, both in terms of structure and functionality.

Considering the above facts and their interpretations it can be assumed that those issues should enter NATO’s agenda\textsuperscript{26}, especially as four of the five Arctic Ocean coastal states and Iceland, located in the immediate vicinity, are, after all, member states.\textsuperscript{27} The extent to which this has happened will be presented in the next section of this chapter.

\textit{The Development of NATO’s Approach to the Changing Arctic}

As has already been mentioned, during the Cold War, the Arctic was a major area of competition between the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. NATO was also involved in the competition, because for it, the Far North was one of the main areas of activity, not only political, but military as well, which, however, ended in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{28} The end of the Cold War rivalry, especially the far-reaching restrictions on the collapsing Soviet Union’s, and then Russia’s, ability to use and project power, meant that the military potential of the Allies in the Arctic began to be gradually reduced, and the attention of the decision-making centres, both political and military, was directed towards other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{29}

The renewal of NATO’s interest in the Arctic areas took place in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century\textsuperscript{30}, particularly in 2008. It should be noted that this time it happened in a new context, namely in relation to the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical consequences of the now more clearly observed climate changes. The number of political and expert meetings with the participation of representatives of the Alliance at that time


\textsuperscript{26} Similarly: H. Gnaś, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 89 and on.

\textsuperscript{27} L. Coffey, \textit{NATO in the Arctic Challenges and Opportunities}, Heritage Foundation Issues Brief No. 3646, 22/06/2012, \texttt{www.heritage.org}, access: 25/10/2012.


\textsuperscript{30} It is worth recalling one of the reports adopted at the session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2005, by the Canadian P. Nolin. Titled: \textit{Climate Changes in the Arctic: Challenges for the North Atlantic Community}, \texttt{www.nato-pa.int}, access: 22/09/2012.
indicated that this issue was very popular. A clear demonstration of this was the expert seminar devoted to the Far North and the role of NATO in the area organized in Reykjavik by NATO and Iceland in January 2009. In his speech addressed to the participants, NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that “although the long-term implications of climate change and the retreating ice cap in the Arctic are still unclear, what is very clear is that the High North is going to require even more of the Alliance’s attention in the coming years”. In the opinion of the Secretary, NATO’s role should therefore be to create space for debate on the situation in the Far North in the following areas:

- The conservation of transport corridors, safety of navigation, rescue missions related to the risk of accidents (protection of people and the ecosystem): NATO countries should have the necessary capabilities and equipment to carry out such actions, and within the Alliance these tasks might be coordinated by the Euro - Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre;
- Energy security: if activity in this sector grows, NATO is one of the organizations that will need to take into account the consequences of this process (including the collection of information, the strengthening of regional cooperation, and the protection of critical infrastructure);
- Territorial claims concerning the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf;
- The military establishment and the development of the military capabilities of the countries with a direct interest in the sub region.

It should be noted that one of the results of the presented speeches and the discussions held at the seminar in Reykjavik was a publication entitled: Security

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32 See: [NATO discusses security prospects in the High North](http://www.nato.int), [access: 22/09/2012]. As assessed by H. Haftendorn this conference was a late reaction to the setting of the Russian flag on the pole at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean (so much publicized in the media) and the war in Georgia in the autumn 2008. See: H. Haftendorn, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

33 The speech by the NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on security prospects in the High North, 29 January 2009, Reykjavik, Iceland, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), access: 28/08/2012].

34 By: O. Osica, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
Prospects in the High North: Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze? It emphasizes, *inter alia*, that although NATO has an important role to play in the Arctic with regards to disaster prevention and crisis management, it must not be forgotten that military means are also a factor ensuring sustainable development and stability in the region. Their presence should not be a source of danger, which can be achieved by an appropriate, that is, open and balanced dialogue with all stakeholders. The study also included a note that the development of the situation in the Far North concerns all of the members of the Alliance, and the interest in this region is not only an expression of the particular interests of the group’s members but is directly related to the threat posed by the Arctic with regards to the infringement of the principle of indivisibility of security. The presentation of the issues concerning the Arctic in *NATO Review* on its website in March 2009 was similar in tone. The seminar in Reykjavik quite specifically marked the further development of NATO’s approach to the Arctic, as evidenced by one of the points of the declaration adopted at the NATO summit held in Strasbourg and Kehl in early April 2009. Paragraph 60 reads as follows: “Developments in the High North have generated increased international attention. We welcome the initiative of Iceland in hosting a NATO seminar and raising the interest of Allies in safety- and security-related developments in the High North, including climate change”. According to H. Haftendorn, it had been planned that the reference in the declaration to the Arctic issue would be more concrete and comprehensive, but, due to Canada protesting, it had to be abandoned, which resulted in the remaining, insignificant paragraph 60, which included, in principle, no significant findings.

Canada’s position can be explained by Ottawa’s reluctance for NATO to become by chance a forum, wherein it would have to respond to pressure from its Allies on issues relating to its Arctic policy, particularly on the change of its position concerning the status of the Northwest Passage and its relationship with Russia. The importance of that for the Canadians is demonstrated by their continued intransigence expressed by the absence of any reference to the issue of the

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38 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl, 04/04/2009, [www.nato.int, access: 29/08/2012].
Arctic in the new *Strategic Concept* (Lisbon 2010)\(^{42}\), as well the declaration of the Summit in Chicago in 2012.\(^{43}\) It should also be noted that the issues concerning the situation in the northern polar regions have for the last few years become the subject of debates by the members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly\(^{44}\) and analysts working for the Alliance.\(^{45}\) At the same time, NATO is supporting initiatives at the operational level, the most well-known examples being the *Cold Response* exercises, held since 2006 by Norway. Initially, only the member states were invited, but in 2012, participation was also offered to the participants of the *Partnership for Peace*.\(^{46}\)

To sum up the above section, it should be noted that, despite several years of ongoing analytical work, policy dialogue at the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO, as well as NATO’s reduced operational initiatives, although it declares its interests in the climactic and geopolitical change in the Arctic, it is not able to decide on its official approach to those issues. Most of the Alliance’s officials’ speeches dedicated to areas of the Arctic are of a general nature and are devoid of any specific declarations or plans. Quite a good example of this attitude is the results of the working visit held by the ambassadors of the North Atlantic Council along with the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in Norway in May 2013. On the one hand, the Norwegian government’s acceptance of the invitation to visit the northern regions of the country could be interpreted as an expression of NATO’s interest in the issues of the Far North. On the other hand, during the

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\(^{42}\) It should be noted that the expert study is the foundation for the Concept, i.e., the so-called Elders report prepared in the spring of 2010 under the direction of M. Albright: the Arctic issue appears in one place. A mention of the Far North is made in the context of the recommendation for NATO to have an increased situational awareness with regard to the maritime areas in the peripheral regions of the Alliance. See: A.D. Rotfeld (ed.), *NATO 2020: Zapewnione bezpieczeństwo. Dynamiczne zaangażowanie* (NATO 2020: Provided Safety. Dynamic Engagement), Warsaw 2010, p. 81.


\(^{44}\) At the Assembly, almost every year, there are reports in whole or even in part devoted to the Arctic, for example in 2010, the report titled “*Security at the top of the world: is there a NATO role in the high north?*” [www.nato-pa.int], and in 2012 the report titled: “*Arctic economic opportunities, environmental obligations and security stakes*” [www.nato-pa.int]. A further report will be presented in autumn 2013, and the Vice-President of the Assembly will be its Rapporteur, who is at the moment the President of the Polish delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, member Jadwiga Zakrzewska; the draft of this document is titled: “*Security in the High North: NATO’s role*” [www.nato-pa.int]. In June 2010 in Helsinki the Rose-Roth Seminary was held where the arctic issues regarding the security context of the Nordic and Baltic countries were presented. It was during this meeting that Ch. Shapardanov, a Canadian Ambassador to Finland strongly protested against NATO’s involvement in the affairs of the Far North. It is worth reminding ourselves of the parliamentarians’ study visit to Greenland and Iceland in September 2010.

\(^{45}\) NATO’s new division: A serious look at ‘emerging security challenges’ or an attempt at shoring up relevance and credibility?, ISIS Europe Briefing Note, No. 51, September 2010, [www.natowatch.org, access: 13/11/2012].

press conference in Oslo, the NATO Secretary General was to state that the Alliance was not planning to increase its presence in the Arctic.\(^{47}\)

As has already been indicated, the responsibility for this ambiguous attitude demonstrated by NATO lies with the Arctic states and, therefore, the last part of this paper will be devoted to the presentation of the positions of these countries regarding NATO’s involvement in the Arctic.

\textit{NATO’s Involvement in the Far North based on an Assessment of the Arctic Allies}

As H. Haftendorn rightly points out, Arctic NATO members highly appreciate NATO’s potential ability to support the sustainable development of the Arctic region, as it serves their political and economic interests. The challenge, however, is that there is no agreement as to how exactly this ability would be expressed and how NATO would actually be present within the Arctic Circle.\(^{48}\) Interestingly, it seems that the difference in the presented positions is correlated with two other issues relating to relations with Russia and the military capabilities of the members.

A good example of the close relationship between these issues is the attitude of Norway which, having the most experience in relations with Russia in the Far North, as well as having the most experience enforcing its sovereignty by intensively developing their military capabilities in this area, very clearly support initiatives that would serve to strengthen NATO’s presence in the Arctic. A clear example of this was the inviting of senior NATO representatives to visit not only Oslo in May 2013, but also to hold several meetings within the Arctic Circle, for example in Tromsø or at the Norwegian Air Force base in Bodø.\(^{49}\) As M. Madej points out, “Norwegian authorities depend primarily on NATO’s recognition of the current and future importance of the Arctic region for the security of all of the Allies”, which should be manifested by the “visible presence” of NATO in the region.\(^{50}\) This presence could, in the opinion of Oslo, strive to guarantee or prepare the allies’ readiness for action in the subpolar region through regular military practices (such as the \textit{Cold Response}), to prepare action plans for any worrying development in the situation in the Far North, as well as perhaps for NATO’s future taking on of part of the responsibility for the safety of the northern mari-

\(^{47}\) Norway News, [access: 12/05/2013].

\(^{48}\) H. Haftendorn, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 345.

\(^{49}\) NATO Newsroom, [www.nato.int, access: 12/05/2013].

time routes and the development of its capability to respond to environmental
disasters and accidents (the so-called SAR, or Search and Rescue).\footnote{Ibidem, p. 77-78.}

The position of Copenhagen concerning the involvement of NATO in the
Arctic, in turn, is conditioned largely by the fact that since 2009, the former Prime
Minister of Denmark, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has been Secretary General of
NATO, hence the authorities of that country are quite cautious in their statements
on this subject in order to avoid awkward associations. Denmark, being an Arctic
member of NATO, due to its territorial sovereignty over Greenland, as well as its
special relationship with the U.S. military on the island, treats the Far North as an
area of major multilateral peace cooperation, so it does not believe that NATO
should be particularly heavily involved in the region. It fears that this could lead to
the unnecessary militarization of the Arctic and an escalation of the situation\footnote{Idem, Dania (Denmark) [in:] Państwa ..., p. 32.}
(which does not mean that Denmark is not alone in trying to be present in the
Arctic also militarily\footnote{See H. Haftendorn, op. cit., p. 347.}).

A unique situation, both because of its geopolitical position in the Arctic, as
well as its specific role within the Alliance, is that of Iceland. Since 2006, when the
United States left the base at Keflavik, the authorities in Reykjavik have had high
hopes for the Alliance, both in terms of general security guarantees, as well as its
role in the security of the Arctic region. Iceland, therefore, seeks to encourage the
Alliance to take a specific position regarding the geopolitical change in
the importance of the Arctic and its potential for being used for the safety of the
northern seas, and especially calls for increased NATO readiness to conduct
rescue missions in the Arctic and prevent environmental disasters or reduce their
effects, which would be helped by, among others aspects, adequate practice and
the constant presence of specialized equipment and crews in the region.\footnote{M. Madej, Islandia (Island) [in:] Państwa..., p. 56.}

The Canadian position has already been mentioned and, as has been noted, it is
basically simply a major barrier to the development of the Alliance’s official
approach to the Arctic. As B. Wiśniewski claims, “Ottawa does not seek (...) to ex-
pose the issue of security in this region at the NATO forum, which confirms the
secondary, in his point of view, importance of the Alliance for the provision of
the treaty area’s defence”.\footnote{B. Wiśniewski, Kanada (Canada) [in:] Państwa..., p. 61.} This opinion is not entirely exhaustive, since it should
be remembered that, in general, Canada is reluctant to internationalize Arctic
issues and any decisions about them coming from outside the group of the Arctic
Ocean coastal states. Certainly, Canada’s declarations on strengthening its
presence, even militarily, in the Arctic, particularly the Canadian section may even be disturbing, but it is worth keeping in mind that there are a lot of problems with implementing them. This, in turn, may lead at least to an alleviation of the position of the scope of NATO’s interest in Arctic affairs. It seems that, in this case, an important role is not only played by the differences between Canada and the other members of the Alliance (which are for example compensated by such joint practices as Operation Nook), but also the bilateral relations between Canada and Russia.

Regarding the position of the United States, it is worth focusing at the outset on the fact that the latter generally has a relatively modest Arctic policy, which is associated with a relatively low assessment of the political importance of the region by the administration in Washington. The assessment of the geostrategic dimension of the evaluation of the situation in the Arctic is somewhat different and, in this case, however, the United States are open to the arguments of the countries which support NATO’s activity in the Far North, they simply do not have high expectations with regard to this activity. As H. Haftendorn puts it, NATO is Washington’s primary tool for achieving their interests and to guarantee security in the Arctic region.\textsuperscript{56}

Summing up the previous statements, as indicated by the above development of the position of the Arctic NATO states on the scope of the Alliance’s involvement in the Arctic, it should be noted that NATO’s active stance is mainly favoured by Iceland and Norway, due to geo-strategic considerations. Denmark is cautious in formulating their position, and under certain conditions, would be prepared to support the development of the Alliance’s approach towards a new position on the Arctic in international relations. The United States do not seem to attach too much importance to this matter, however, as a result of their dominant position militarily, in terms of the northern circumpolar areas. A definite “brake”, in this case, is Canada. Taking into account that the vast majority of non-Arctic members of the Alliance will be, at best, indifferent to the design and implementation of NATO’s approach to the Arctic, it seems that, unless some far-reaching changes take place in the situation in the North Pole, its formulation should not be expected too soon.

Summary

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that, so far, the Alliance, only taking into consideration its role in the northern polar regions, is engaged mainly in the

\textsuperscript{56} H. Haftendorn, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 351.
context of climate change, seen not so much through the prism of the disparate interests of its member states but from the perspective of the whole region, and even the world. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that NATO seeks, above all, to prepare quite an overall assessment of how it could help to support the future of Arctic maritime safety and the protection of routes, and the protection of critical infrastructure, as well as taking care that the exploitation of raw materials and climate change does not lead to phenomena which would destabilize the international order.  

The challenges to Arctic security may mean that the main role of the Alliance in those areas will be maritime crisis management missions. The Alliance will also continue its traditional tasks, which include the control of airspace and the gathering of information, which is implemented by the NATINADS (*NATO Integrated Air Defence System*) and through regular AWACS aircraft flights. For the time being, the solution adopted by the Council of the Arctic does not preclude such scenarios, but the question of the assessment of NATO’s involvement in the Arctic from the perspective of the other participants interested in that region is a separate area for research.

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57 See: the *Speech by the NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on emerging security risks*, 01/10/2009, [www.nato.int, access: 12/09/2012].
NATO and Energy Security

The problem of energy security has become one of the major contemporary challenges facing NATO for one basic reason - apart from Canada and Denmark, no member of NATO is self-sufficient in natural gas and crude oil - the most strategic natural resources. NATO states possess about six percent of the world’s known gas reserves and about seven percent of the known oil reserves. On the other hand, members of the Alliance are responsible for about 34 percent of global gas consumption and 37 percent of global oil consumption.¹

Most of the strategic regions from which the Allies import these materials are not in their close vicinity. Moreover, the largest gas and oil reserves are controlled directly by the exporting countries, where energy policy is sometimes a reflection of their own particular purposes. To sum up, the ratio of production to demand, the geographical factor and the ownership of key oil and gas resources are not in any case favourable from NATO’s perspective. Despite this disadvantage, the issue of energy security was not fully recognized by the NATO hierarchy until the beginning of the 21st century.

The Evolution of NATO’s Energy Policy

At the beginning of the twentieth century, petroleum became the primary fuel in the global economy. Security of supply became an ongoing challenge for the importing countries and the role of the increased security of supply grew, not only with the industrialization of the developing economies and international communication, but also with the use of oil for military purposes. The problem arising from the lack of fuel for warships, tanks or aircraft was for the first time noticeable during World War II, when the lack of raw materials was one of the reasons for the defeat of the German army by the Allies. Technological progress and modern methods of warfare have meant that today’s armed forces need a lot more fuel than during the last World War. For example, WWII gasoline consumption per one U.S. soldier was about three litres a day. In 2007, during the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the consumption per one U.S. soldier reached an average of 48 litres of petrol per day (mostly due to air operations).² During the operation Iraqi

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Freedom in 2003, the Americans used probably more crude oil than the Allies did in 1941 - 1945 during the entirety of the action in the European theatre.\(^3\) As shown in the above examples, the security of fuel supply is a key logistical challenge for the execution of any military action.

Since oil prices are going up, both the civilian sector and the military are looking for an alternative fuel that would allow for savings. Many experts have estimated that the fuel that can, to some extent, replace oil and eventually lead to the switch to renewable energy, is natural gas. Commercial gas production began in the 1970s, and today the resource already has a significant share in the global energy mix.\(^4\) The U.S. military is studying the use of gas as fuel (for jet engines for now), and has set itself the goal of moving away from oil by 2040.\(^5\)

After the close relationship between the security of oil and gas supplies and the defence of NATO members became more noticeable, the Alliance could no longer avoid holding serious discussions on energy security, especially in the face of disturbing events in the international arena. In January 2006, as a result of the escalating conflict between Moscow and Kiev, Russian gas supplies to Ukraine were completely halted. In 2006, European countries imported 35 percent of their requirements for gas from Russia, of which 85 percent passed in transit through Ukraine.\(^6\) This dispute meant that Moscow’s decision to suspend the flow of gas to Ukraine directly resulted in supplies to Europe being halted. This type of situation had occurred before as, exactly two years earlier, the Russians temporarily halted the export of oil to Belarus - another strategic transit country for Europe.

As increased and sharper tensions between Moscow and Kiev resulted in a temporary loss of gas supplies for the European members of NATO, and the situation in the Gulf region (especially in Iraq which is extremely unstable and constitutes an ongoing threat) directly or indirectly affected the security of oil and gas supplies, the administration of President George W. Bush, with the support of United Kingdom and Germany, for the first time, initiated a formal discussion on energy security at the NATO summit in Riga in 2006. A NATO Joint Declaration was adopted in Riga, stating that “Alliance security interests can also be affected by the disruption of the flow of vital resources” and that is why NATO will “support a coordinated, international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure security”.\(^7\) The most important part of

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\(^3\) J. Daly, *U.S. Military Gets Serious About Biofuels*, “Oilprice.com”, 26/03/2012 [www.energybulletin.com, access: 02/12/2012].

\(^4\) Energy mix is the share of given energy sources in the overall consumption.

\(^5\) Ibidem.


\(^7\) Riga Summit Declaration, NATO, [www.nato.int, access: 02/12/2012].
the discussion, however, concerned the assessment determining the area in which area NATO “can make a positive contribution”\(^8\) and the definition of a legal framework for possible actions. The findings of the summit in Riga were received very enthusiastically because it was a turning point which meant that the discussion no longer questioned whether energy security should play any role at all in NATO, but what role it should play.

After 2006, the issue of energy security was gradually further developed (at the summits in Bucharest, Strasbourg, Lisbon, and Chicago). The findings were more specific at the Bucharest Summit, its declaration stipulating that “NATO will engage in the following fields: information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure”.\(^9\) The declaration of the Summit in Strasbourg emphasized the strategic role of the Strait of Hormuz and because of the gas crisis in 2009 highlighted, among other things: “The issues of a stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy sources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance”.\(^10\) The problem of diversification was a special challenge for the Central European and Baltic NATO countries and that is why in 2012, at the NATO summit in Chicago, the Alliance agreed that the Lithuanian Energy Security Centre should be transformed and integrated into the NATO Centre of Excellence project (Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania).

The evolution in the perception of the risks associated with energy security shown above, demonstrates that NATO’s decision-makers are aware of the critical influence of the security of the oil and gas supply on the Alliance’s military capabilities - a sine qua non for the existence of NATO. The discussion, started in 2006, has enabled further formal consultations and the conclusions contained in official statements published by NATO after each summit. Recognizing the problem of energy security as one of the greatest challenges facing NATO, however, has not resolved the question as to the role that NATO should play.

Most importantly, the legal framework for possible NATO actions strictly in the interest of the energy security of its members could be based only on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, which provides, moreover, in very general terms that “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is

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\(^8\) Ibidem.

\(^9\) Bucharest Summit Declaration, NATO, [www.nato.int, access: 02/12/2012].

\(^10\) Strasbourg-Kehl Declaration, NATO, [www.nato.int, access: 02/12/2012].
threatened”. However, Article 4 exhausts all of the legal mechanisms available to NATO, which is why the development of the issue of the Alliance’s energy security depends on the ability of its members to cooperate and their goodwill.

Differences in the Availability of Energy Resources of the NATO Member States

With regard to the overall picture of the dependence on imports of oil and gas, the NATO member states obtain from the exporting countries more than a third of the amount of oil and gas that they consume. In Europe, the European Union’s Eurostat data show that, in 2010, apart from Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Latvia and, less historically rich in natural resources, Romania, most of Europe was dependent on gas imports, ranging from 80 to even 100 percent of consumption. The situation is the same with regard to the import of petroleum products. In 2010, most European countries were dependent on imports for over 80 percent, with the exception of oil producers - Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Romania, and Estonia. Looking at the whole of Europe, the degree of dependence on imported oil and gas, with some exceptions, is quite similar. An analysis of the dependence of individual exporters shows that dramatic changes in situation vary with geographical location. The Balkan and Central European countries purchase most of their oil and gas from the Russian Federation, and farther west, more countries are dependent on supplies from North Africa, Norway and the Persian Gulf.

Canada and the United States are in a much better situation, and more importantly, in a better prospective situation than the European countries. In 2011, both countries produced 3,552 and 7,841 million barrels of oil per day, respectively, and 160,5 and 651,3 billion m$^3$ of natural gas. As the demand for oil is much less than in the United States, Canada has been, so far, from Washington’s perspective, a safe and predictable resource base. This relationship is steadily changing in favour of the United States even more because, inter alia, thanks to significant savings in fuel and the introduction of new mining technologies, the United States, within a decade, may even become an exporting country. This would mean that

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11 The North Atlantic Treaty, NATO, [www.nato.int access: 02/12/2012].
12 Of course, the source of raw material imports in each country depends on their geographical location.
13 Lithuania, for example, was dependent on gas imports in 99.71 percent, Latvia in 61.87 percent, Bulgaria in 95.08 percent, Poland in 69.3 percent, Germany at 81.89 per cent, France in 92.98 percent, Spain in 99.24 percent and Portugal in 100 per cent.
14 Production in the United States and Canada accounted for 13.1 percent of 2011 global production, while the share of European countries was 4.1 percent.
the U.S. will reduce its direct dependency, not so much on oil imported from Canada but from politically unstable regions (indirectly, however, it will continue to depend on them because of the specific pricing of crude oil). This scenario is quite likely if you take into account the fact that in the last decade, the United States has increased gas production so that, instead of importing, exporting it is being considered. In the future, the differences between the members of NATO in North America and Europe will continue to widen as the forecasts, not including shale gas, for European countries provide for increasingly smaller levels of oil and gas.

The differences in the level of the energy security of individual NATO members affect not only the level of production and import of strategic natural resources, but also the level of the development of the infrastructure for the transportation and storage of oil and gas. This is particularly important for NATO’s military dimension. As in the case of oil and gas, the geographical location also affects the level of security of supply and storage of these materials. Pipeline systems in the NATO countries are very diverse and it can be clearly stated that only some sections of the systems are tailored to meet their role as a suitably protected fuel power base for potential military operations. The United States and Canada have a highly developed network for the internal supply, and in this respect, the situation is also very different from that in Europe. The Alliance’s flagship scheme for transportation and storage infrastructure is the NATO Pipeline System (NPS) consisting of 12 thousand kilometres of pipelines and fuel depots with a capacity of 5.5 billion cubic metres, located in thirteen European NATO countries.\(^\text{16}\)

The NPS system, created during the Cold War, combines gas stations, warehouses, military air bases, loading and unloading stations, and refineries. The NPS is made up of several parts across different countries, with the exception of the international North European Pipeline System (NEPS - Denmark and Germany) and the Central European Pipeline System (CEPS - Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The NPS has been designed in such a way that its peacetime capacity is used up to about 90 percent for public needs (including servicing civilian airports), and during times of conflict, this ratio can quickly be switched and most of the fuel can be allocated to military needs.\(^\text{17}\) The NPS structure does not include the allies in Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Baltic states and Romania) because this is not allowed by the present existing network of internal and cross-border connections. Furthermore, the storage capacity for oil and gas is not developed to the same degree as in Western Europe or Canada and the United States.

\(^\text{16}\) Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

\(^\text{17}\) NATO Pipeline System, NATO, [www.nato.int, access: 02/12/2012].
The different levels of security risks for oil and natural gas, and differing NATO geographical locations make the establishment of common guidelines for an effective response to energy crises of all kinds very difficult to achieve. It seems that at present the only area where NATO can take a common position and implement joint solutions is the Middle East, where the world trade in gas and oil is concentrated. The unrestricted export of natural resources from the region is in the direct (supplies) or indirect (prices) interest of each member of the Alliance. The expression of these relationships, among others, is NATO’s readiness to respond to a possible blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and the agreement to provide the AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance), with a system that will facilitate the monitoring of the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean in order to minimize the risks caused by piracy.

At the following NATO summit, the Alliance leadership came to the conclusion that the most important issue in the debate on energy security is the protection of the infrastructure and cooperation within the organization. Some, however, argue that NATO could play an even larger role in building international consensus and strengthening political dialogue between the exporters, the transit countries and those importing energy resources. The multifaceted nature of the international economic policies of natural gas and crude oil, however, prevents the adoption of clear and large-scale operations by NATO. Taking advantage of its military potential and the interest of some exporting countries in the Middle East, the Alliance is able to work with some exporting countries to ensure free navigation in the Persian Gulf region.

On the other hand, however, NATO does not have any possibility of beginning mediation between exporters and importers on the issues of the pricing of oil and gas, especially in the bilateral trade of natural resources (see Poland and Russia) or to have an impact on the pricing and production policies of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries. NATO is also not able to protect the infrastructure, production and transportation in what it considers the key countries, that is, for example, in Iraq or Venezuela. For these reasons, it is vital to continue to work on determining the role of NATO in energy security in a context where the international economic policy of oil and gas is formed by the producers and various types of organizations (associations of either exporters or importers) that have the relevant legal tools to take effective action.

The *Smart Defence* Initiative – a Chance to Increase NATO’s Defence Capabilities?

**General Aspects of the Initiative - Limitations, Problems in Implementation, Key Projects**

It is very hard to find a formal interpretation of the activities of the *Smart Defence* initiative. No official records in the regulatory documents make mention of *Smart Defence* in the way described by the Secretary General, who in an article for *Foreign Affairs* wrote that *Smart Defence* “is about building security for less money by working together and being more flexible. This requires identifying those areas in which NATO allies need to keep investing (...) *Smart defense* also means encouraging multinational cooperation. As the price of military equipment continues to rise, European states acting alone may struggle to afford high-tech weapons systems such as the ones used in Libya. European nations should work in small clusters to combine their resources and build capabilities that can benefit the Alliance as a whole. Here, NATO can act as a matchmaker, bringing nations together to identify what they can do jointly at a lower cost, more efficiently, and with less risk”.

The key idea behind the *Smart Defence* initiative is contained in three words: prioritization, specialization, cooperation. The setting of priorities should be understood as the Alliance being able to define its key areas in terms of military capabilities, thereby aligning national capabilities in accordance with NATO’s plans. Specialization is a response to restrictions on defence spending which has contributed to the cancellation of many projects designed to improve defence capabilities. The essential aspect of the concept of *Smart Defence* is, however, cooperation between countries. Acting together, member states will have access to facilities which they would otherwise not be able to afford themselves, thereby achieving economies of scale. Cooperation may take various forms, from regional and cultural to strategic, involving all member states. Hence, the route to success may be found in the following recommendations. First, cooperation between member states requires strong political will on the part of all of the countries, a clear vision for the allocation of tasks between them and the financial and industrial enclosures. Secondly, regional cooperation (between groups of countries) seems to be more

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appropriate (bringing tangible benefits) than multinational projects initiated by NATO, involving a large number of countries. Thirdly, the joint building of capabilities in the military sphere is very difficult. It is definitely easier to share technical and training skills than to develop capabilities which affect all of NATO’s actions, especially if they are linked to political constraints.³

Without a doubt, the above-defined areas will require the execution of a wide range of tasks that are sure to encounter political obstacles. So what prompted the Allies to develop the Smart Defence initiative? First of all, the main reason is the global economic crisis, which has effectively reduced defence spending. Not without significance are the experiences of NATO operations in Libya, which revealed significant weaknesses in the Alliance, as well as transatlantic relations, which are currently undergoing a transformation.

The economic crisis, which is significantly affecting the global economy, has had an influence on the reduction in defence spending. This applies to virtually all of the NATO countries, including the United States. Funding cuts for defence budgets, implemented by individual states in an uncoordinated manner and based on domestic priorities, have led to the emergence of a significant risk to the building of the operational capabilities of the Alliance. Further cuts in defence spending without harmonization with other countries could lead to a collapse of operational capabilities. The Smart Defence initiative addresses this limitation by increasing (improving) the capabilities within the framework of prioritization, specialization and cooperation.

An important event in the initiation of the concept of Smart Defence was the NATO operation Unified Protector in Libya, which revealed a number of shortcomings in the operational capabilities of the countries participating in the missions related to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. In the past, these deficiencies were masked by the United States making the necessary resources available and taking on the role of the leading state. During the operation in Libya, shortcomings in important areas were keenly felt. The key ones included: a lack of electronic warfare resources, a lack of suppression of enemy air defence assets, no surveillance and reconnaissance systems, including unmanned, no refuelling aircrafts and small amounts of precision guided munitions for aircrafts. The lack of trained personnel who could interpret reconnaissance data and operate joint terminal attack controllers was also important. It should be emphasized that, in the future, European

³ D. Scheschkewitz, A. Pawlak, NATO zamierza inteligentnie oszczędzać pieniądze (NATO intends to intelligently save money), “Deutsche Welle”, 07/02/2012, [www.dw.de, access: 05/11/2012].
NATO countries will have to make up for the missing resources, as the U.S.’s evolving foreign policy prioritizes its engagement in the Pacific Rim.\(^4\)

It is expected that there will be problems with the technical implementation of the *Smart Defence* initiative. Definitely one of the greatest of these will be overcoming political obstacles to the implementation of the initiative, which could include in particular: a lack of political trust between member states, the level of ambition being defined differently by each state, the strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union member states and specialization in terms of building operational capabilities.

Political trust between NATO members is very important for the implementation of the *Smart Defence* initiative and a sense of common identity within security issues will be key to the full implementation of the objectives of *Smart Defence*. Sovereignty concerning decisions related to national security may be an obstacle to achieving full consensus among the states. The dependence of any given state on the defence capabilities of other members and the need to rely on the capabilities of others may raise legitimate concerns. An example of these fears is the operation in Libya, where, during the conflict, some countries strongly advised against intervention in Libya, and some of them, during the operation, withdrew their resources (mainly due to the high cost of operations). The level of national ambition represented by individual states, especially those that also belong to the European Union, is directly related to the problems of political trust. It is demonstrated by the defence policy of a country which also determines the level of the state’s defence capabilities and will significantly affect the implementation of the *Smart Defence* initiative on a global basis.\(^5\) At the NATO level, it has been decided that the Alliance will continue to have the ability to conduct two major joint operations and six smaller crisis response operations. It seems that, at the moment, this is a great over-estimation and needs to be verified. It should be emphasized that the *Smart Defence* initiative, based on cooperation between countries, can be helpful in maintaining a certain level of commonality in the military ambitions of individual states.\(^6\)

The choice by individual states to specialize may prove to be another politically sensitive problem in the *Smart Defence* initiative. The attempt to impose on a country the selection of a particular set of military capabilities might be treated as an attack on the sovereignty of the country. On the other hand, it is a great responsi-

\(^{4}\) T. Zieliński, *Inicjatywa Smart Defence w kilku pytaniach i odpowiedziach* (*Smart Defence Initiative in a Few Questions and Answers*), “ARMIA” No. 10/2012, p. 31.

\(^{5}\) M. Terlikowski, *Not As Smart As It Could Be: the NATO Smart Defence Initiative - Chicago and Beyond*, “PISM Strategic Files”, No. 22, May 2012.

\(^{6}\) T. Zieliński, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
bility for the state, as it is the only one (or one of a few) which will provide specific capabilities for other NATO countries. Without a doubt, specialization seems to be one of the key challenges, as it requires that there be cohesion within the Alliance and that NATO play an advisory role for individual countries in their choice of capabilities while ensuring synergy and consistency within the Alliance.\(^7\)

Multinational projects involving cooperation between NATO member states are a good example of the concept of *Smart Defence*. During the NATO summit in Chicago, an initial package of more than twenty projects targeted at improving the operational capabilities of the Alliance and achieving economies of scale in order to reduce the cost of their development and implementation was adopted.

The main projects which come under the umbrella of *Smart Defence* include::\(^8\)

- A universal armaments interface for combat aircrafts, including the ability to use munitions from different countries on different types of combat aircrafts;
- Remotely controlled vehicles to remove improvised explosive devices. Based on the experiences from Afghanistan, remote controlled robots will be created (using the latest technology), whose task will be to clear roads (surfaces) of explosives;
- Pooling maritime patrol aircrafts - a project aimed at the mutual use of aircrafts from a number of member states for the coordinated patrolling of sea areas;
- Multinational cooperation in the development of ammunition - the project involves, in particular, the development and sharing of the same precision weapons. This is due, *inter alia*, to the fact that precision equipment is very expensive, so co-operation in this area can significantly reduce costs and increase access to precision weapons;
- A multinational aviation training centre - the project involves the creation of a training centre for helicopter pilots and ground staff focused on the support of NATO operations and the creation of an advisory team for the training of Afghan National Security Forces;
- Pooling and sharing multinational medical treatment facilities - a project aimed at creating a modular system of medical security supporting the activities of NATO forces, using existing resources;
- A multinational logistics partnership for fuel handling - being the best way of securing NATO forces’ access to fuel;
- Joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance - this is to ensure the integration of the different systems (national and NATO ones) for acquiring and

\(^7\) *Ibidem.*

\(^8\) L. Berthiaume, *About those concrete NATO “smart defence” projects*, “Canada.com”, 20/05/2012, [www.o.canada.com, access: 12/06/2013].
disseminating data from reconnaissance, joint training and education for professionals involved in the analysis of data and for improving the procedures for the exchange of information to support political and military decision-making processes;

- A multinational logistics partnership project to reduce the cost of maintaining equipment and armoured vehicles which are more resistant to mines and ambush attacks;
- A deployable contract specialists group – a project designed for the creation of a mobile group of experts with a knowledge of NATO procedures related to the contracting of resources in the theatre of operations.

The above projects are the best illustration of the idea of Smart Defence, although it should be noted that NATO’s flagship projects in this area continue to be: capabilities building in the field of ballistic missile defence, the formation of an allied ground surveillance system and NATO’s Air Policing.

It should be noted that a similar initiative is also in operation within the European Union. In order to reduce costs and avoid duplication, a list of potential joint projects was developed, which, under the banner of a Common Security and Defence Policy, is managed by the EDA (European Defence Agency). After about 300 initiatives had been identified, EDA presented 11 proposals relating to the improvement of military capabilities. To avoid sensitive issues of sovereignty and autonomy, these proposals focused primarily on defensive capabilities, such as the coordination of observation of sea areas, the development of new technologies to increase the ability to detect and neutralize chemical, biological and nuclear weapons (CBRN). Projects also include such areas as training, modernization of ammunition, logistics and combat service support, and cooperation in the defence industry in the context of research.

Progress on these initiatives has been gradual. In November 2011, 26 EDA member states agreed to invest USD 40 million in a pilot program, European Satellite Communications. Next, in March 2012, the EU-14 reiterated the importance of investment in the coordination of the surveillance of maritime areas and reconnaissance, and another 12 countries did the same for the development of new technologies related to CBRN. An agreement was reached on the establishment of a joint helicopter training scheme. The EDA is developing further proposals related to the acquisition of joint capabilities for in-flight refuelling. The EDA has also announced the appointment of a working group whose task is to

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9 J. Benitez, National contributions to NATO’s Smart Defense Initiative, “Atlantic Council”, 23/05/2012, [www.acus.org, access: 05/11/2012].

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consider the possibility of cooperation in the design, testing and planning of future requirements for ammunition. Despite the European Union taking extensive steps towards the development of its operational capabilities, the lack of progress made in implementing the objectives of the Common Security and Defence Policy is noticeable. Many military missions undertaken by the European Union remain static and, despite major efforts to create rapid reaction forces (EU battle groups), they have so far not yet been used.\(^{10}\)

It can be assumed that the Smart Defence initiative, as well as Pooling and Sharing, are more likely to achieve positive results, since budget constraints will force governments to cooperate more closely. Without such cooperation, the construction and development of the Alliance’s military capabilities may be limited because of the member states not providing in their budgets for the provision of the necessary projects in coordination with the decisions of other member states. Hence, there is a need to convince member states to specialize in certain capabilities and move away from attempts to build defence capabilities to ensure the completion of tasks in a wide range of allied missions. It is clear that states will do so reluctantly, because this is related to a limitation of sovereignty or it being transferred to another state providing a specific set of military capabilities.\(^{11}\) This leads to some further questions: will the governments of countries that do not have the right set of military capabilities wish to support a given mission? Furthermore, if they have to rely on the assistance of another state’s capabilities, will they be able to trust those capabilities? There could be many questions of this kind, but there is insufficient knowledge to give the correct answers.

Without a doubt, one of the roles of NATO decision-makers should be to provide the appropriate mechanisms to guarantee all NATO members access to a given set of military capabilities. NATO should also act as an intermediary to help individual countries in their decision as to whether to choose a specific set of military capabilities. It should also provide impetus for cooperation and specialization by arguing that massive cuts in spending undermine the credibility of the Alliance’s members and NATO’s own security. Thus, cooperation between the allies will strengthen, not weaken, the Alliance. Cooperation in the framework of Smart Defence also includes cooperation with non-NATO countries. Both NATO and the European Union face a similar challenge - the reconciliation of sharp cuts in defence spending with the desire to possess modern defence capabilities.

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NATO and the European Union, in particular the European Defence Agency, should work together in order to avoid the unnecessary duplication of projects which will provide specific defence capabilities.

The Proposed Mechanisms for the Development of the Smart Defence Initiative

It seems that the common denominator of all the activities undertaken by the NATO Smart Defence initiative is the desire to encourage cooperation between the member states in the pooling and sharing of key military capabilities. There is also a need for intensive efforts to spread engagement in the initiative. This should include a variety of mechanisms to ensure its effective implementation. It is worth noting that cooperation between the NATO member states has developed primarily on the basis of the economic crisis, hence the proposed solutions also focus on financial savings. The concept of the reinvestment of funds is an interesting prospect in this area. \(^{12}\) NATO member states’ Ministers of Finance and Defence can make arrangements so that the savings made thanks to projects based on multilateral cooperation will be placed in a common reinvestment pool in NATO. This money could be transferred to grants for the future acquisition of military equipment and weapon systems. The states would compete with each other for this grant and priority would be given to projects that are crucial for the Alliance as a whole. The states bidding for the opportunity to be granted these funds would also contribute their own funds to the project. The possibility of using the means of reinvestment would involve their own funding dependent on the size of the country and its economic condition — according to the principle that the larger contributes more. Priority for obtaining funds would be given to the projects importance for the development of the Alliance’s defence capabilities, based on cooperation between the countries, which in turn will contribute to reduced spending.

Another proposed solution involves the resumption of the investment fund for security. Should the concept of reinvestment gain no acceptance among NATO members, there is an alternative involving the renewal of an existing fund in the NATO program for security, supporting multi-national projects. The Alliance has long been committed to the principle that if member states want to build joint armed forces based on multinational structures, they need help covering the costs directly associated with the project. Therefore a central fund into which all members pay their money, depending on the level of their gross domestic product,

was set up. In turn, money from the fund is paid out to the governments for the costs associated with NATO membership. In the past, oil pipelines connecting NATO airports were financed by these funds, so they could be used to support projects related to the construction and development of defence capabilities in the framework of Smart Defence.\textsuperscript{13}

Equally important is supporting multinational cooperation. National governments should be aware that international cooperation (the pooling and sharing of capabilities) brings tangible benefits in terms of savings. NATO authorities should provide arguments in this regard. Examples include publications presenting savings made from logistical cooperation between countries in ongoing operations under the NATO flag. Experts from NATO could go a step further and present an evaluation of the equipment, supplies and services most commonly used by the member states in various operations. This would allow for a realistic assessment of the costs and the possibility of replacing them with new, cheaper ones, arising through international cooperation.\textsuperscript{14}

Developing the market for surplus military equipment seems to be one of the most interesting proposals. Many countries in Central and Eastern Europe are struggling to modernize their equipment which is a remnant of the Warsaw Pact, and in the meantime, Western states are making acquisitions far beyond their financial capabilities. Too many NH-90 helicopters, A400M transport aircrafts and Eurofighter Typhoons have been ordered. These countries are hoping to sell off their surplus equipment to Asia or the Middle East, but the global financial crisis is not only affecting European countries, so either there are no buyers, or potential buyers offer prices too low to dispose of such equipment. One idea could be transferring the surplus equipment to member states with reduced capabilities in exchange for training, maintenance and upgrading. The relevant NATO structures have the necessary information about the surplus military equipment and thus can create a virtual bulletin board to facilitate transfers. The larger the quantity of equipment that is the same across the armed forces of the Alliance, the better the level of interoperability of their actions. Having similar or the same equipment would facilitate the development of units, facilitating the process of training and reducing costs. Therefore, modernizing by providing surplus military equipment is a starting point for the standardization of equipment and military equipment within NATO.\textsuperscript{15}

The need to improve NATO’s defence planning, of NATO understood as which would involve providing access to the data from all the NATO member

\textsuperscript{13} Ibidem, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibidem, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibidem, p. 6.
states, is not without significance for the development of the Smart Defence initiative. This would require frequent visits by representatives of the NATO member states’ capitals, as well as the exchange of experience and expertise in various fields. This may not necessarily apply to those countries that play a major role in the Alliance, but all - especially when they cooperate with each other in the framework of concluded agreements. For example, consultations concerning planning carried out in Slovakia should automatically include the countries of the Visegrád Group (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia) as they closely cooperate on defence issues. In addition, NATO planners should collect data on regional cooperation between countries and make an assessment, seeking the right model of cooperation.

The main essence of the Smart Defence initiative is the development of military capabilities, especially at the regional level. Currently, each of the NATO member states undertakes to maintain a certain quantity of military detachments and equipment, thus, fulfilling treaty obligations. Those commitments, which can connect the states in clusters of similar capabilities and thus contribute to the strengthening of regional cooperation and facilitate specialization, should be evaluated. For example, the Benelux countries, which recently strengthened cooperation in the field of defence, would like to specialize in maintaining combat aircraft capable of performing high-precision air strikes. Regional cooperation seems to be a much better alternative than implementing multinational projects by random states. NATO’s help in choosing member states’ specialization should be directly linked to the development of regional cooperation. Some NATO countries decided to focus on the professionalization of specific capabilities, thereby overlooking the others, which could be provided by other Allies. For example, the air space of the Baltic states is monitored by NATO aircrafts, but on the other hand, they are committed to the development of land forces and their participation in the operations in Afghanistan in much larger quantities than would be consistent with the size of their armed forces. Such specialization must be based on mutual trust and mutual guarantees to provide the necessary capabilities, whenever they are needed. One of the main roles of NATO should be to help individual countries identify their specialization by exchanging information on the capabilities, opportunities and needs of individual countries.¹⁶

The advent of the global economic crisis directly helped bring about the reduction of budget expenditure allocated to defence. Therefore, numerous attempts to counteract this trend were made, of which, international regional cooperation should be considered as one of the most promising. Through the use of shared infrastructure, performing maintenance and repairs to equipment, armaments and military equipment, the operating costs of military units can be reduced and new operational capabilities necessary to the Alliance can be built and developed. There are several examples of such cooperation. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries have been cooperating with each other for many years. The crisis has also forced France and United Kingdom to cooperate, but unfortunately these are just isolated cases. It seems that countries’ concern for their sovereignty and access (if necessary) to key resources that are shared are hampering progress.

There is no doubt that the Visegrád Group (VG) including Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, should become an example of a regional cluster cooperating within the sphere of defence, and thus significantly promote the Smart Defence initiative in the context of the construction and development necessary for NATO and European Union defence capabilities. The armed forces of the Visegrád Group countries work closely together, participate in missions outside their countries and follow a common policy in many aspects of what is widely-understood as security. Their geographical location and similar equipment and philosophy of thinking make them a model for regional cooperation in building defence capabilities in times of economic crisis. The cooperation among the Visegrád Group states will not only improve their operational capabilities, but also strengthen their position in NATO and the European Union politically. So what areas of cooperation should be crucial for the Visegrád Group countries in the context of Smart Defence?

Some general conditions should be spelled out which must be met in order for the Visegrád Group countries’ cooperation in the field of defence to be properly developed. First, it should be based on mutual trust, and the development should start with joint training and training that will strengthen it. The next step should be to take on joint projects, first smaller, then more and more serious ones concerning defence capabilities, appropriately spaced in time. Cooperation should be characterized by pragmatism; already existing capabilities in the Visegrád Group should be used and those that cannot be obtained individually should be developed. Secondly, two organizations are key in defence planning - NATO and the European Union, and the Visegrád Group cannot be a regional alternative for
them, but should support them by improving their capabilities within the Visegrád Group countries. Therefore, the selection of projects should be carried out in consultation with both NATO and the European Union, and directly complement their capabilities in the context of NATO’s *Smart Defence* and the European Union’s *Pooling and Sharing*. Thirdly, cooperation should be sustainable. Due to the differences in economic potential and equipment, cooperation does not have to take place between countries at the same level and not all of the Visegrád Group members have to show the same commitment. Of course, the projects are open to all of the members, but the decision to proceed with the project must be sovereign. In addition, the state acceding to the initiative can initiate cooperation with non-VG countries under the existing bilateral agreements.

Fourthly, there is a need for a reliable assessment of the Visegrád Group countries’ defence capabilities to precisely identify opportunities and key combat weaknesses, which in turn, will help to clearly clarify joint projects to support the *Pooling and Sharing* and *Smart Defence* initiatives. An important aspect of both initiatives are links to the defence industry. The defence industries of the Visegrád Group countries are as diversified as the political attitudes to the defence industrial sector. Undoubtedly, this is a challenge, as it is natural to want to protect national interests in the production of armaments. There are examples of the formation of international arms industry clusters, which preferably support the economy of the countries concerned. In this context, a principle should be adopted that any given contract will be carried out by the state which has the most appropriate potential in the given area, but the benefits of the project (in proper proportions) will also be enjoyed by the other states. The essence of real, deep cooperation between the Visegrád Group countries should be appropriate political and technical arrangements based on long-term declarations signed at the highest level of power, thus having formal political empowerment. Without a doubt, it would make it possible to gain appropriate measures for the implementation of specific projects and to strengthen political interest in cooperation.17

Experts from the Visegrád Group countries have identified a list of priority projects that will support the *Smart Defence* and *Pooling and Sharing* initiatives. Over the next three years, the creation of the multinational defence battalion against weapons of mass destruction and the building of defence capabilities for cyberspace are seen to be most important. The first initiative is based on the capabilities available to all of the Visegrád Group members, hence there is a high chance of the project being successful. It is worth noting that the battalion should be highly

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mobile and capable of transferring. Its future possible uses should be considered in the context of its involvement in crisis response operations and in case of industrial accidents. The second project involves the introduction of long-term mechanisms for regional protection against cyber attacks: regular exchanges of information, joint training and joint procedures in case of emergencies. The aim is to build a system able to counter cyber attacks on the critical infrastructure of the Visegrád Group. It seems sensible, in this area, to benefit from the experience of the Centre of Excellence (COE) in Tallinn, and other NATO institutions dealing with cyber security. On the other hand, in the long term, joint cooperation projects should focus on the construction of an EU battle group (along with Ukraine) and the construction of a common capabilities for the NATO Air Policing mission.

The Visegrád EU battle group will consist of three thousand soldiers and will be subordinate to the authorities of the European Union. The Polish contingent will consist of 1,200 soldiers. In addition to operational tasks, the unit will help in the fight against natural disasters. In the second half of 2015, exercises preparing the EU battle group, with the participation of the military, will be held. They will also be open to third countries, including countries from outside NATO and the European Union. The operational readiness of the battle group is expected by 2016.

The second project (Air Policing) may come into force when Slovakia is forced to get rid of its MiG-29 aircrafts, due to their operational life ending, with no possibility of them being replaced. Then, aircrafts from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary could guard the Slovak sky. It is obvious that this requires analysis and a number of arrangements, both economic and operational. Taking that eventuality into account, action should be taken to prepare an in-depth analysis of the situation and an assessment of the available alternatives. It is worth taking advantage of the experiences of the Air Policing mission, which took place in the Baltic states.\(^{18}\)

One of the key projects related to training is a multinational helicopter training centre for pilots and ground staff with the Czech Republic as the leading country. It should be stressed that this project was on the list of priority projects in the framework of NATO’s Smart Defence initiative. It should be noted that all of the Visegrád Group countries have similar equipment, which is a remnant of the Warsaw Pact, including the Mil class helicopters, which could be a starting point for the implementation of joint training and training in various areas. Another of the possible, joint projects between the Visegrád Group members within the Smart Defence initiative could be the construction of a training centre in for dealing with

\(^{18}\) Ibidem, p. 9.
improvised explosive devices. The Visegrád Group countries have extensive experience gained from participating in the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which could be exchanged and which can be used to develop new technologies to counter improvised explosive devices.\(^{19}\)

Closer cooperation between the military academies of the Visegrád Group countries in military education should be an important aspect related to training. The coordination of efforts should focus on joint military training, appropriate to the needs of NATO and the European Union. In the longer term, it would perhaps be a good solution to create a joint military academy educating senior commanding staff in English. The Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia is an example of a military academy of this kind. The establishment of such an academy would eliminate the duplication of courses in different countries, while maintaining a common model of education.

The above projects are only suggestions. Some of them are firmly rooted in the realities of the economic crisis and have a chance of success. Without a doubt, cooperation, which is the essence of both the Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing initiatives, allows for the construction and development of capabilities, even with cuts in defence spending. In addition, it allows for the building of utilitarian capabilities applicable to all the dimensions of the Alliance and the European Union.

**Summary**

By following the history of NATO closely, it can easily be seen that the idea of cooperation and building common defence capabilities, currently expressed in the form of the Smart Defence initiative, is nothing new. The idea of a strong NATO, which has the necessary operational resources of all of the NATO countries, has been the motivation since the inception of the Alliance. Paradoxically, however, the ongoing economic crisis and weakening of the transatlantic relationships may contribute to a situation in which the overall aim of the initiative will be implemented and will help to achieve interoperability within NATO.

Without a doubt, the main obstacles to be overcome are political constraints, in particular the lack of trust around the national security of the member states. Hence, it is necessary for the authorities of the Alliance to engage in affirming the need of individual countries to understand cooperation, in particular regional cooperation, as constituting the essence of the Smart Defence initiative, as well as supporting the states in their choice of specialization. This will help to increase savings and to select those projects that will develop the Alliance’s capabilities as

\(^{19}\) Ibidem, p. 10.
a whole. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the *Smart Defence* initiative cannot be an excuse to reduce the defence budgets of the NATO states, but to substantially influence the development of the necessary competences in times of economic crisis.
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The Idea of “Smart Power” in the Concept of NATO Security

NATO is one of the most effective institutions incorporating transatlantic states. It has been operating uninterruptedly for 64 years, despite many crises, such as, the Republic of France’s withdrawal from the military structure of NATO in 1966.\(^1\) However, the greatest challenge to the Alliance’s cohesion was the events surrounding the turn of the 21st century.\(^2\) The internal unity of NATO has been impaired by the ideological and geopolitical differences between the main pillars of the Western European countries and the United States, further deepened by the global financial crisis.\(^3\) The key question, which is essential for a proper analysis of the structures and principles of NATO’s activities and to predict its future functioning, is the question of its sustainability, especially in the context of qualitative changes in the international environment.\(^4\) The essence of the Alliance is to achieve synergy, especially in matters relating to the collection and application of force in the international environment. The preservation or not of those capabilities will shape the future of this international organization.

The main objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of the idea of *smart power* on the shape of NATO’s security doctrine. The assumption of the existence of such an effect is due to the nature of the international environment, which induces the evolution of structures and concepts, periodically generating internal tensions in international relations. The article will be primarily limited to identifying trends in the evolution of power in the international environment, based primarily on the evolution of the strategic doctrine of NATO itself.

In order to better organize any further discussion, the article will be divided into three parts. First, it will look at the basic principles of *smart power*. This concept, which is having an ever more profound effect on the activities of internation-

\(^1\) The decision was made in 1966 by President Charles de Gaulle. France was back in NATO’s military structure in 2009.

\(^2\) One of the most important factors in this process was the evolution of the US strategic doctrine. This was brought about by the terrorist attack on Washington D.C. and New York on 11 September 2001.

\(^3\) The financial crisis was started by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank on 15 September 2008.

\(^4\) Part of the academic community tends to define the contemporary international environment as “late Westphalian”, pointing to the combination of elements, structures and trends found in the previous generation and those which are attributed to the next generation of international environments. M. Pietraś, *Hybrydowość późnowestfalskiego ładu międzynarodowego* (Hybridity of the late Westphalian international order) [in:] *Późnowestfalski ład międzynarodowy* (Late Westphalian international order), M. Pietraś, K. Marzęda (ed.), Lublin 2008, p. 57-74.
al decision-makers, in particular on the key NATO member, the United States, is essentially an attempt to adapt traditional strategic thinking to the challenges of the modern world. Secondly, it will examine, chronologically, the evolution of the total power of the Alliance understood as value added to simple sum of capabilities which participating countries represent. This passage will be devoted to an analysis of the challenges faced by NATO, meaning the power amplifier that the participating countries represent. Thirdly, an analysis of the basic documents will be conducted, which are designed to adjust the structure and functioning of NATO to allow for the presence of elements of thinking in terms of *smart power*. The introduction of this logic can be primarily seen in two packages of documents. The first package of documents is the summary documents of the *Multiple Futures Project* carried out by the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT). Secondly, there are the documents adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon (2010), designed to allow NATO to adapt to the challenges of the modern world.

*The Concept of “Smart Power”*

The idea of *smart power* was articulated for the first time in a publication by Joseph S. Nye Jr. entitled *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* which appeared in 2004. This publication could be read as a criticism of the doctrine of preventive strikes presented by the administration of President George W. Bush developed in reaction to the shock caused by the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York in 2001, the consequences of which were the military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). The problem, as analysed by Nye, was the apparent inefficiency of the implementation of the set of political objectives along with the rising costs of both military and economic involvement, and the loss of general international acceptance for the actions of the United States. At the level of international law, this process became particularly evident in the significant decrease in the acceptance of the global leadership of the United States, and thus in the field traditionally associated with *soft power*. In the conclusion of his paper,
he points to the need for a better balance of the two components of power, both
in the hard and soft dimensions.9

Joseph Nye, in his seminal work on the evolution of power, introduced the
distinction between the two categories. First, there is the category of hard power
including, notably, the material dimension of power, which is the means to coerce
or bribe a partner, and the methods for accomplishing this. Second, there is the
category of soft power, including the means and ways to persuade your partner to
accept your desired actions through methods such as negotiations, cultural attract-
iveness and international legitimacy, and the methods for accomplishing these.
Both methods of using power are complementary, more importantly, relying on
only one dimension is usually counterproductive.10

For this reason, the American scientific community was drawn to the Smart
Power Initiative, one of the programmes run by the CSIS (Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies), which developed a concept which tries to combine both approach-
es into a single, holistic attitude. Its final form is referred to as smart power.11 This
formation, which has gained in importance, especially during the Obama admin-
istration, has proved to be an innovative and creative response to the unilateral
document of “pre-emptive strikes” of the George W. Bush administration. It should
be noted that this concept is a creative development on traditional strategic
studies.

The basic principles on which Joseph S. Nye12 based his thinking were derived
from Walter Mead’s research.13 In his monograph, he developed the characteristics
of American foreign policy based on the profiles of the various American leaders
implementing it. These studies have revealed the existence of four main axes that
fixed the direction for U.S. foreign policy, which are named after the three Found-
ing Fathers and a subsequent President. They are: the Hamiltonians, the Jacksonians,
the Jeffersonians and the Wilsonians. Due to the volume of this paper, reference will
be made to each field of power and how it is used in an international environment.

First of all, the Hamiltonians, from Alexander Hamilton, represent an approach
based on a milder version of hard power. On the one hand, these approaches are
based on the rational use of the unique mix of so-called high politics and the
stimulation of international trade. This position is characterized by a high degree
of conservatism and passivity. Any disorder in the international system limits the

9 Ibidem, p. 188.
10 This is best evidenced by the case of Iraq, where both strategies limited to only hard power and soft power have
11 Ibidem, p. 188.
13 The development of this concept can be found in the monograph by W. R. Mead, Special Providence: American
Foreign Policy and How It Changed the Word, New York 2001.
usefulness of the most valuable tools. This approach has several advantages, the greatest of which is its extraordinary rationality. A major drawback is its lack of commitment to moral values, resulting in the fragility of the relationships and alliances established.

Secondly, there are the Jacksonians, from President Andrew Jackson (1829 - 1837). Leaders using this approach are described as “populists” by Joseph S. Nye\textsuperscript{14}, their actions being based on the aggressive use of hard power, especially militarily. It is an approach which has quite a high degree of activity in the international environment. This position is characterized by a high level of assertiveness, but in practice, relies solely on military means which are very expensive and, in the long run, generate strong resistance from the international environment.

Thirdly, there are the Jeffersonians, whose precursor was President Thomas Jefferson (1801 - 1809). On the one hand, their international activities put special emphasis on the manipulation of tools belonging to the domain of soft power. On the other hand, however, they are characterized by extreme conservatism, even isolationism. This approach is based primarily on the refining of their political model and its promotion abroad. The basic drawback of this approach is the lack of precision of the measures used and the greater instability of the results achieved in the international environment.

Fourthly, there are the Wilsonians, whose name was given by President Woodrow Wilson (1913 - 1921). This tradition is also based on the use of resources and strategies based on soft power. However, this approach is also characterized by a high degree of international assertiveness. Its main determinant is a focus on the conscious promotion of democratic governance in the international environment by primarily using the elements of soft power. This approach has one serious disadvantage. It is burdened with a high probability of failure. This is due to two factors. Firstly, this approach tends to pursue ambitious projects aimed at comprehensively transforming the international environment. Secondly, measures based on soft power are characterized by a high degree of generality and further reduce the level of precision of international actions.\textsuperscript{15}

As can be seen, the above trends in U.S. foreign policy are included in the area specified by the aforementioned approaches. An additional element that determines the formation of the concept of smart power is the assumption that there is a need to adapt a selected approach on the basis of the evolution of the international environment. This results in a transformation of the entire system, especially at the level of the means employed. The most important factor in this evolution

\textsuperscript{14} J. S. Nye Jr., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{15} This is due to the very nature of soft power, for which the key element is precisely perception, which may, only to a small extent, be shaped by external influence.
may be the use of new technologies by the followers of the different philosophies of American foreign policy. One of the main theses that Joseph S. Nye emphasizes is the necessity of finding an equilibrium between the two dimensions of power, which is precisely defined by the term *smart power*.

Since Barack Obama’s electoral victory, *smart power* has become a crucial category of operations in the international environment, propagated particularly by Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, acting counter to the neoconservative doctrine of unilateral preventive actions based mainly on the military dimension of *hard power*. This has, in fact, formed the basis of the criticism of this approach by accusing it of intellectual shallowness and being based only on a denial of the views of the previous administration.

The *smart power* concept has been refined in a recent work by Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, published in 2011. At its core, it is a work which summarizes the work of the CSIS, which includes a comprehensive study of the idea. Joseph S. Nye emphasizes in his publication, first of all, that the original concept of “strategy” is the best way to organize the available resources to achieve stated policy goals. This concept is also enriched by the internal dynamics of power that focus on trying to make traditional thought more flexible in order to adapt it to the requirements of today’s international environment, and the challenges that it generates. It also refers to the structural dispersion of power in the subjectively diversified structure of the international environment, as well as its geopolitical span. The main clue is the orientation of the use of power with respect to the five basic dimensions.

The first is to determine the desired results of acting in the post-Westphalian international environment. The preparation of a closed, hierarchical and limited list

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16 For example, the policy of President George W. Bush, can be located at the intersection of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian traditions. On the one hand, it operates aggressively in an international environment, using the doctrine of preventive actions. On the other hand, it uses the advantages of the American model and its cultural development, automatically compensating for losses caused by the unrestrained use of *hard power*. However, the international environment factors, with particular emphasis on the so-called “CNN effect” caused by the development of telecommunications networks, have led to a much lower efficiency of the strategy than predicted.

17 *Nomination Hearing To Be Secretary of State. Testimony Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State, Secretary of State Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 13/01/2009*, [www.state.gov, access: 10/12/2012].


of goals is of particular relevance to this task. However, it is important, first of all, to determine the significance of the relationship between specific tasks and prioritize them accordingly, so as to achieve specific objectives without reducing the probability of achieving others.\footnote{Empirical confirmation of this principle can be found in a development by Mary Kaldor. According to her model, the implementation of the goal of eliminating Saddam Hussein’s regime and its remnants, including the government and other state institutions, prevented the achievement of the long-term goal, the democratization of Iraq. M. Kaldor, \textit{New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in Global Era}, Cambridge-Molden 2006, chapter \textit{The New War in Iraq}, p. 150-177.}

Secondly, the key to the use of \textit{smart power} is the skilful use of available resources. This involves not only an extensive inventory, but also determining the likelihood of the availability of resources in an assumed timeframe, and changes to their availability according to the dynamic development of a given situation. The dynamics of access to individual resources can be not only a matter of military superiority and economic rhythm, they can also be certain conditions, such as legal or media.\footnote{A perfect example is the hypothetical possibility of the internationalization of the investigation into the Smolensk disaster of 10 April 2010. In the contemporary international conjuncture, the media narrative would enable the taking of the initiative at a relatively low cost and with a high probability of success. The farther from the date, the more expensive the taking of a similar initiative becomes and the likelihood of success is reduced. We are talking primarily about the so-called CNN effect described by Piers Robinson in the monograph by P. Robinson, \textit{The CNN Effect}, London-New York 2002.}

Thirdly, an important element is to determine the exact capabilities and the hierarchy of preferences of the object of influence, elements which are responsible for directing the response to the impact of other participants in international relations. Power, especially seen as a social category, the control of other entities and the international environment, causes resistance that increases as it deforms the main planes of its activity. The deeper the impact of the power, the stronger the reaction, reaching a level which is referred to as irrational. This reduces the effectiveness of the measures employed and the strategies, especially in a situation where the power deforms the level of identity.\footnote{The principle identified by John M. Rothgeb. An example of its practical application, was the US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. An entity subject to such influence was perceived as a threat to religious and cultural identity, which, in turn, induced resistance disproportional to their real ability to act. The consequence of this engagement was the additional cost of the use of power at a significantly reduced effectiveness. J. M. Rothgeb, \textit{Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System}, New York 1993, p. 27-37.}

Fourthly, to ensure mutual support, the most effective combination of the use of power should be determined. The key to the effective use is also to determine the direction and pace of change and the frequency of interactions between the
elements of power in order to obtain the optimum configuration\textsuperscript{24} to achieve all of its objectives.

Fifthly, it is important to clarify the likelihood of success and to determine the effectiveness of the actions in relation to the objectives and costs.\textsuperscript{25}

To sum up, \textit{smart power} is in fact an attempt to refresh the older (before the invention of nuclear weapons) strategic approaches to make them work in a post-Westphalian international environment, taking into account the challenges of the new qualities generated by this environment. However, to fully understand the evolution of power, two additional elements that add dynamism to the whole matter to a degree previously unheard of, must be taken into account in the concept of \textit{smart power}. These are transnational social connections and the processes of globalization.

First of all, as Philip G. Cerny points out\textsuperscript{26}, the international community is increasingly gaining the structure of a network. Metaphorically, we may compare states to billiard balls. In this case, these balls will be entangled in a thickening web, which largely limits their freedom of movement, harmonizing their vectors with each other. The key to success in such a world will be, first of all, to identify the most optimal transnational links, and secondly, to use these relationships to achieve the set objectives.

Secondly, as many note, with Mark Pietraś\textsuperscript{27} foremost among them, one of the basic mechanisms of globalization is one based on time-space compression, or in other words, reducing the importance of physical space through the use of cutting-edge information and communication technologies. Not only does this allow for an almost direct response to the emerging challenges, but also shortens the reaction time in the traditional geopolitical game. On one hand, it causes an accumulation of topics, challenges and phenomena, which must be managed to a quantity exceeding the processing capabilities of the most modern decision-making centres. On the other hand, it allows for the almost instantaneous, when compared to previous historical periods, transition from one logic of activity to another, in the absence of results during the given period of time.

In conclusion, the essence of \textit{smart power} should be seen in the creative combination of the traditional strategic approach taking into account both the latest

\textsuperscript{24} The adoption of an inefficient configuration of the components of power is one of the most serious allegations raised by Joseph S. Nye against the administration of President George W. Bush.

\textsuperscript{25} J. S. Nye Jr., \textit{Future} (…), p. 207-235.

\textsuperscript{26} Reconfiguration of power in today’s international environment is described in the monograph P.G. Cerny, \textit{Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism}, Oxford 2010, p. 64-82.

trends of the international environment involving, on the one hand, another reorganization of its structure, again based on the structure of the network, and, on the other, the unprecedented liquidity solutions provided by technological development. Power is no longer a constant and stable tool with its use clearly defined. It has become more of a process, flexible, ephemeral and dynamic in nature, which must be subject to continuous monitoring and modification to achieve optimal results.

The Changing Role of NATO in the Modern World

Since its inception, NATO has been constantly evolving, trying to fulfill its intended purpose in the best way possible, to provide the highest possible efficiency at a low cost. NATO’s history has primarily involved continuous attempts to achieve a balance between the states on both sides of the North Atlantic, so close that the similarities could be noticed, yet distant enough for frictions and disputes to appear between them. The key to capturing the essence of NATO is to be found in the response to the question of its effectiveness, or more generally, the key to its longevity. Throughout the Cold War, the directive guiding the continuing cohesion of Alliance was Lord Acton’s famous catch-phrase that it is necessary “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.

The community of interests and resources ensured that it was not a monolith. A good example of the differences and the evolution is the approach to the doctrine of containment, valid for the entire duration of the Cold War. Despite its existence throughout this time, it was not only perceived differently on either side of the Atlantic, but also in the long-term perspective. This was due to many reasons, particularly the evaluation and revaluation of the actions taken. For this reason, during the Cold War, the Alliance itself gradually evolved. However, the boundaries of this evolution were determined by the primary aim which was to produce the power necessary to ensure victory in the event of a confrontation with the bloc centred on the Soviet Union.

The most interesting question is, however, that of explaining NATO’s success against the failure of similar initiatives in other parts of the world, such as SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization), CENTO (Central Eastern Treaty Organization) and ANZUS (alliances between, Australia, New Zealand and the United States). The following conditions seem to be the key to the answer to this question.

Firstly, NATO was a unique combination of elements of soft and hard power. On the one hand, armed forces, with U.S. military as the clear foundation, with their enormous potential of nuclear deterrence, were a guarantee of security for the European allies. On the other hand, the consultation procedures, described in Article 4 of the Treaty, in part reflected the smaller allies’ potential to influence the
war machine and they gained the opportunity to participate in the supervision of
the activities of nominal hegemons.

Secondly, NATO was constructed on the basis of political entities founded on
a homogenous cultural heritage, which were, to a lesser extent, linguistically and
historically interrelated. This legacy, though not directly translating into the effec-
tiveness of the structures, created a platform of mutual trust and understanding
unattainable in any other region of the world.

Thirdly, the North Atlantic basin was considered the geopolitical and
geo-economic centre of the world. Protection against the interruption of the lines
of communication running through it was implicitly considered to be a require-
ment for the prosperity and security of both parties.

Fourthly, a fundamental factor affecting the efficiency and sustainability of the
alliance was the structure of the international environment and its relationship with
space. The Cold War was fought on the basis of a bipolar system, which divided
the world into three parts: the United States and its allies, roughly equivalent to the
term “first world” or the “capitalist camp”; the Soviet Union and its allies, known
as the “second world” or the “socialist camp”; and the post-colonial and non-
aligned countries, called the “third world”.

The fifth condition is yet another derivative of the structure of the world,
which was the ideological conflict between the two blocs. Sixthly, Europe’s experi-
ence of the consequences of total war, still fresh in the collective memory of
European nations, was equally important.

The end of the Cold War, and the subsequent collapse of the Eastern bloc and
the Soviet Union itself led to the removal of most of the above-mentioned condi-
tions. However, NATO, as one of the most successful institutions of the Cold
War period, did not end its existence along with its opponent. After 1991,
NATO’s history can be divided into three major phases, corresponding to the evo-
lution of the international environment. First was a period of optimism, lasting up
to the Central European extension and the Kosovo intervention in 1999. The
basic paradigm of the Alliance was to ensure the collective security of the allies by
incorporating as many of the former socialist countries as possible. Second was
a period of re-evaluation, especially for the major determinants of NATO. This
period came as the result of the bombing of Serbia by the Alliance in 1999, and the
international response to the event. 28 Not for the first time was the NATO com-
mand structure called into question, but it was for the first time after the disman-
tling of the USSR. During this phase, the issue of major reforms in NATO was

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28 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was met with widespread criticism from the international community. One
of the greatest critics was Noam Chomsky. N. Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo,
dealt with, especially with regard to its role on a global level. The culmination of this phase was the events of 11 September and the shift in U.S. foreign policy taken by the administration of President George W. Bush.

The third phase began with a deep division within the Alliance, caused by the independent intervention by the United States in Iraq in 2003. The groundwork for such a gap emerged in the 90s and was crystallized in the early 21st century, but has now escalated to a dangerous extent. There are two main axes to the dispute. The first is related to differing geo-political priorities and the resulting difference in the perception of the world. Maintaining global hegemony has become the basic motivation for the actions of the United States. To this end, their policy increasingly reflects the shifting geopolitical centre of gravity of the structure of the international environment in the Pacific, paying less attention to their unique bonds with Europe, affording European countries an increasing amount of indifference and even hostility. In contrast to the United States, the European NATO partners are focusing on the immediate environment of the continent. Therefore, they may treat the actions of the global hegemon, taken to maintain leadership, as a source of danger. The second axis in this dispute is related to the perception of the world and the possibilities for creative transformation. This division is derived from cultural differences and psychosocial aspects, identified in *Of Paradise and Power* by R. Kagan.

On the one hand, Americans see themselves as the world’s police force, and therefore prefer a proactive and aggressive approach underpinned by a sense of moral superiority over their opponents, and to a lesser extent, their allies; on the other hand the approach of the Europeans is much softer, more focused on highlighting common features and what unites partners, and is also underpinned by some kind of a sense of moral superiority. R. Kagan described the Europeans as the bartenders of the world, as compared to the American cowboys.

Using the approach presented by Walter Mead, current U.S. foreign policy is a mixture of the *Jacksonian* and *Hamiltonian* approaches, with a significant dose of

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31 Ibidem, p. 45.
Wilsonianism\(^{32}\), while the European approach is closer to the closely connected Hamiltonian and Wilsonian concepts with a deviation in the Jeffersonian direction. The combination of these two trends, reinforced through the prism of the Iraqi war, along with the weakening of the cohesion of NATO through its enlargement, also underpinned by a proactive policy by the Russian Federation, conscious of the situation, and evolutionary trends in the international environment, created a situation which threatened the continued existence of the Alliance.

To sum up, the current crisis in NATO, which the Lisbon summit attempted to overcome in 2010, has a deep root. The main problem is a crack running along the Atlantic and the divergent interests of both its banks. At the moment, it does not seem that the crack will be able to divide the Alliance permanently, especially if it is still a useful tool. For it to remain useful, NATO must still be able to fulfil its essential function which is to enhance the strength of its members. This requires a redefinition of the strategic foundations in the direction of smart power.

Currently, actions and initiatives are being taken to adapt the structure, responsibilities and tasks of the Alliance to face the challenges of the contemporary world, despite the actions of both former presidents of the United States aimed at NATO’s induced evolution and making it a more stable, flexible and adequate structure.

*Elements of Smart Power in NATO’s Defence Doctrine*

One set of reforms, which aims to restore the effectiveness of the Alliance is the attempt to modify the approach to power as a category including its influence on the international environment and other actors. These actions are undertaken in parallel with other remedial actions, such as reducing bureaucracy or ensuring more efficient financing mechanisms.

Chronologically, the first attempt to reconfigure the Alliance and modify its strategies of using power, was an international research project carried out by the ACT (Allied Command Transformation) entitled the *Multiple Futures Project*. The primary objective of this project was to conceptualize the challenges that the Alliance will face in the near future. The study was commissioned under a mandate set up by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO summit in Prague in 2002. Simulations were carried out with the participation of 60 government and non-governmental institutions, 500 military representatives and civilians.

\(^{32}\) The doctrine of pre-emptive strikes involved the progressive marginalization of the Hamiltonian tradition and the shift from Wilsonianism to Jeffersonianism.
from 45 countries.\textsuperscript{33} The final conclusions and recommendations were published in April 2009 in the form of two reports: \textit{Multiple Futures Project. Navigating towards 2030. Final report} and \textit{Multiple Futures Project. Navigating towards 2030. Findings and Recommendations}.\textsuperscript{34}

These reports constituted a set of hints and guidelines, as well as scenarios, in part touching on fantasy literature, which consider the probable versions of the future shape of civilization and the possible international environment in the year 2030. The identification of these changes provides guidelines that would shape the structure, functioning and strategy of NATO in the medium term and the potential challenges in surroundings that the Alliance is going to face. The challenges also require a redefinition of the approach to power based on the concept of \textit{smart power}.

Scientists involved in this project looked at the evolutionary trends in the international environment in an effort to select those that could be useful for the further development of the Alliance. At the same time, they sought to identify the most important elements of the structure of the Alliance that, despite changes in the relative configuration of the international environment, would retain its essential nature and importance. In conclusion, the authors presented four possible scenarios for the development of the international environment.

The first scenario, \textit{The Dark Side of Exclusivity},\textsuperscript{35} refers primarily to the further development of the globalization processes which determine the development of transnational links between political and international entities. In this scenario, the key challenge is to create a new, not only geopolitical, division of the world into the globalized rich and the localized poor. In this context, the key challenges the Alliance will face will be conflicts over strategic resources, the rise of radical ideologies (ethnic and religious), the migration of people from poverty-stricken to highly-developed areas and the phenomenon of state failure which will further deepen international instability. The Alliance, to ensure the security of its members, should focus on stabilizing the international environment through supporting operations and humanitarian interventions, the development of the civil-military components of transnational cooperation and the control of movements of population. The Alliance’s primary task will be the coordination of intelligence cooperation, the exchange of information and the development of the abil-


\textsuperscript{34} Full texts of the reports \textit{Multiple Futures Project. Navigating towards 2030. Final report}, April 2009, [www.act.nato.int, access: 10/12/2012]; \textit{Multiple Futures Project. Navigating towards 2030. Findings and Recommendations}, April 2009, [www.act.nato.int, access: 10/12/2012].

ity to conduct expeditionary operations involving both the military and civil planes.36

The second scenario, *Deceptive Stability*,37 concerns the maintenance of the stable shape of contemporary development trends in the international environment, with particular emphasis on negative demographic tendencies. The risk associated with the implementation of this scenario involves NATO member states losing control over the external environment. The suggested response for the Alliance is to boost the capacities of member states and support them through internal reforms and substantive power transfers to strengthen member states. In this context, NATO power is directed primarily to the interior workings of the member states, mainly shifted towards political, cultural and information exchanges. The structure of the Alliance should be adapted primarily for use within the NATO area of responsibility.38

The third scenario, *Clash of Modernities*,39 is focused around accelerating the development of information technology. The development of the information society in the direction of post modernity, and thus the massive social dependence on the collection and processing of information and data networks, will expose new sectors of NATO countries to attack, such as a vulnerability to hacking and cyber attacks, and will inflame the issue of civil liberties, leading to the criminalization of the high technology market, and the weakening of the loyalty of large sections of society towards traditional institutions, such as the state. The Alliance’s response should consist of virtualizing their own power and adapting it to asymmetric threats, as well as securing the supply of critical resources, together with the necessary protection of the critical infrastructure. In order to accomplish these tasks, NATO power should be based on three levels. Firstly, the professionalization and virtualization of the armed forces. Secondly, an efficient expeditionary mechanism designed to protect critical infrastructure and to stabilize the international environment. Thirdly, the Alliance should serve as a platform for the exchange of good information and technical support for the activities of the member states.40

The fourth scenario, *New Power Politics*,41 was developed around assumptions concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this case, the challenge is the renaissance of an arms race similar to the Cold War, and, to a much

36 J. Gryz, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
37 *Multiple...*, p. 20.
39 *Multiple...*, p. 21.
40 J. Gryz, *op. cit.*, p. 46-47.
41 *Multiple...*, p. 22.
lesser extent, the stability of the international environment. In this case, NATO will retain most of its traditional capacities, supplemented by an element of expeditionary operations, dual-use technology flow control and the support of humanitarian operations. It is the most traditionalist scenario, based on maintaining the status quo. In this case, the primarily military elements of NATO power will be maintained supplemented by increased cooperation within the Alliance and the expeditionary element outside the statutory area.\footnote{J. Gryz, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 47-48.}

In addition, the authors modified the scenario with two random events with the aim of highlighting the non-linearity of future international challenges and to introduce an element of dynamism into the static scenarios. The final document, which calls these the \textit{Strategic Surprises}, articulates two basic events. Firstly, a pandemic of a disease of a size and virulence comparable to the pandemic of influenza in the years 1918 - 1919 (Spanish Flu).\footnote{Multiple..., p. 23-25.} Secondly, the active use of weapons of mass destruction against a large port city within the zone of Alliance responsibility, which is also an important hub for critical infrastructure.\footnote{\textit{Ibidem}, p. 25-27.}

These random events also tend to emphasize the trend for changes characterizing the post-Westphalian international environment, and which in turn prevents the use of homogenous strategies and solutions. This trend, in fact, makes it necessary to assess and adapt to the challenges of a changing world.

The whole project was based on the idea of predicting the future of NATO. It includes a number of challenges of a military, economic, cultural, and ideological nature, thus requiring a gradual expansion circumscribed only to the military dimension of the perception of power in the international environment. However, what is disappointing is the lack of a complete vision of the elements of the internal dynamics, sufficiently taken into account, allowing for a smooth transition from the implementation of one scenario to another. The lack of consideration of these elements means the possibility of the simultaneous presence in the international environment of these different tendencies is ignored, and so, at the same time, the use of particular forms of power. From this perspective, project guidelines, despite having adopted particular elements of \textit{smart power} thinking, are not sufficient. Firstly, documents and studies form a preliminary theoretical study of the problem, which is a contribution to a more comprehensive analysis and the development of specific action plans. Secondly, the report, in its essence, insufficiently takes into account the existing dynamizing trends in the contemporary international environment. Thirdly, there is no determination of the structure and
decision-making procedures concerning a smooth transition from the implementation of one scenario to another.

A package of documents at the Lisbon Summit (2010) became the second stage of the implementation of the elements of *smart power* in NATO’s defence doctrine. It was composed primarily of the new strategic doctrine entitled *The New Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, a decisive step towards the evolution of the structure and the functioning of the Alliance. Its adoption, after a period of turmoil and anxiety associated with a clearly delineated division of transatlantic leaders, represented a clear desire to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance. Although the issue has not been definitively overcome, it seems that the new strategy has brought the desired results, partially rebuilding mutual trust and the shared responsibility for taking action.

NATO’s new strategic doctrine includes not only the announcement of the further development of the Alliance’s military capabilities across all of the relevant disciplines, ranging from conventional forces, through the ability to conduct cyber warfare and the military use of outer space to nuclear deterrence and combating the effects of the use of chemical and biological weapons. In addition, the strategy has also emphasized the development of *soft power* potential through the support of humanitarian operations and the development of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes and crisis management, as well as through the introduction of elements of stability in a turbulent international environment. In addition, the primacy of the UN Security Council and cooperation with regional organizations have clearly been emphasized. Cultural values underpinning the Alliance and its desire to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world have also been stressed.

The *Strategic Concept* has identified a number of challenges for NATO and its members. Firstly, the classic threat of conventional armed forces (attack), including the proliferation of long-range missiles. Secondly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery among non-European powers. Thirdly, terrorism, or rather, entities using strategies and techniques of terrorizing the general population to fight. Fourthly, instability and conflict beyond the statutory Alliance area. Fifthly, cyber attacks on the Alliance’s critical infrastructure. Sixthly, the instability of transit routes on which international trade and energy security are based (including dependence

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46 Ibidem, chapter *Core Tasks and Principles*, point 2.

47 At the same time, stipulating that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long there are nuclear weapons in the world, which greatly reduced the importance of the declaration.

48 *Strategic…*, chapter *The Defense Environment*, points 8-15.
on foreign energy suppliers). Next, the loss of the primacy of technology (for example, the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies for use in space for military purposes). Finally, the challenges related to the environment and the availability of resources (including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs).

As can be seen, the catalogue of challenges in the face of which action should be taken by NATO is extremely broad. This indicates, on the one hand, the general belief that NATO is useful as an institution; on the other hand, however, it does not account for the criterion of there being a genetic connection between objectives. For instance the document avoids touching on certain other more and less important challenges. One solution may be to focus on the military level (all of the challenges, apart from number eight, refer to this matter), but the key issue that has not been resolved is the synchronization of the increasingly conflicting priorities of the United States and Europe. One solution may be to reduce cooperation to narrow the catalogue of goals common to both parties.

To effectively operate in an international environment, the concept highlights the three main objectives of the Alliance. Firstly, it upholds the classic objective of collective defence. Secondly, by emphasizing crisis management, the importance of operations outside the Alliance area has been highlighted. Thirdly, through cooperative security, the importance of international cooperation has been underlined, the key element of soft power. The overview of tasks shows the development of the Alliance’s missions. In this context, particular attention has been paid to incorporating a comprehensive understanding of security that goes beyond national borders, covering almost the entire world.

The system was made more flexible by introducing such dynamic elements as group consultations on issues for the countries most affected by said issues, including those outside the Alliance. For the first time, NATO also took responsibility for the realm of economic security, specifically, energy security against the background of the diversification of the sources of the supply of raw materials, transportation routes and sensitive infrastructure by means of joint civilian-military measures. Cooperation with partner countries has also been extended through the strengthening of the instruments of dialogue, with a particular focus on Russia, especially against the background of the tensions inherent in the plans of the Bush administration, concerning the attempts to build a missile defence system against ballistic missile attacks. The current version of the system, which is based on

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49 Ibidem, chapter Core Tasks and Principles, point 4.
50 Ibidem, chapter Defence and Deterrence, point 19.
NATO ALTBMD (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence), is perceived as a solution acceptable to all parties.

The doctrine of the Lisbon Strategy is to clarify and detail the proposals contained in the Multiple Futures reports. They have been subjected to a far-reaching treatment involving the extraction of the common elements of the scenarios and a comprehensive expansion of the capabilities and planning in order to equip the Alliance with the potential to work in every direction. In this context, the Alliance is an entity which coordinates actions taken by member states and enables effective joint operation. The problem contained in the concept is the partial blurring of responsibilities with increasingly complex structures involving non-NATO partners. This is particularly clear in the example of the Russian Federation. Trying to connect partly contradictory approaches to the international reality of the United States and Europe, may be risky for the Alliance. However, changes in the structure and tasks of NATO, gradually negotiated and approved by consensus, provide for a stable, albeit slow, evolution of the structure of the Alliance into a contemporary international entity.

Conclusions

Elements of smart power are increasingly present in NATO’s defence doctrine, acting as an adhesive filling the growing transatlantic divergence, however, the extent of its use still leaves much to be desired. This can be understood as a result of the following circumstances. Firstly, the turbulent international environment makes it difficult to determine the precise responsibilities of each institution. The radical redefinition of fundamental terms such as “power” or “security” mean that NATO strategists operate in areas in which the consensus which accompanied the development of NATO during the Cold War is absent. Secondly, NATO strategists’ attitude to the transnational network of complex relationships is inadequate because it is based on the identification of challenges without any indication of the ways of operating effectively from the inside. The changing nature of the international environment, specifically with regards to creating qualitatively different network connections, requires a change in approach from the classic, based on the search for the perfect recipe for success, to the modern, in each case, based on the use of well-defined relationships between entities. It is the proper identification and the use of these connections that lead to an effective use of

51 An example is the attitude of the old and new generation of allies towards cooperation with the Russian Federation, especially in the field of energy resources.
power in the contemporary international environment. This dimension is still not sufficiently emphasized in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance.

Thirdly, it is important for the efficiency of the organization to clearly define the goal of its operation, as well as identifying and organizing the relationship between the two concepts (“goal” and “operation”), so as not to simply create a “wish list”. Fourthly, in this context, it will also be important to determine the appropriate resources to achieve the identified goals and the dynamics of the availability of specific resources in the foreseeable future, continually affected by the course of the financial crisis of 2008.52 Fifthly, NATO still does not adequately take into account the dynamic nature of the strategic planning of contemporary international crises. An example of this is the intervention in Afghanistan.53 Using well-defined measures and rigid strategic designators, the Alliance was not able to accomplish the tasks set for it. Meanwhile, in the near future, the issue of managing complex international challenges will require a multi-sectoral approach and a smooth transition from inefficient tools to find the most effective way of achieving goals.

The basic elements of smart power used in documents constituting NATO’s defence doctrine are primarily an attempt to compose two approaches to the phenomenon of power, both hard and soft power. Firstly, NATO strategists emphasized the importance of both the military capability and the unique cultural ties linking the countries belonging to NATO. Secondly, it was important to correctly identify and discount their technological superiority on the ground, using primarily the advantage of access to space and cyberspace, to strengthen its position against potential opponents.

Thirdly, the lack of stability in international relations due to the absence of a clearly defined opponent against which the Alliance is organized, must be addressed. The absence of a common foe allowed for the assembly of the vast potential of soft power, which enabled co-operation or even creating ad hoc coalitions with non-NATO structures Furthermore, lack of fixed threats extorted development of capability of contingency planning which main aim is to provide timely and adequate response for possible challenges. Fourthly, the new doctrine involves “fitting” NATO into the skyline of international institutions and entities. On the one hand, the primacy of the UN and the UN Security Council has been recog-

52 The impact of the financial crisis, ongoing since 2008, has not yet been fully evaluated. Attempts at a complex development can be found in R. Kuźniar (ed.), Kryzys 2008 a pozycja międzynarodowa Zachodu (The crisis in 2008 and the international position of the West), Warsaw 2011.

53 The question is whether the intervention has achieved its goals, if yes, it should be finished, but if not, we should rapidly respond to the identified obstacles, shifting the burden of intervention, if necessary, from military to non-military, and vice versa, to achieve the desired parameters of the situation.
nized (following the tension accompanying the military intervention in Kosovo in 1999); on the other hand, cooperation with regional and other organizations has been announced, with particular emphasis on the European Union. This means complementing NATO’s military capabilities with agencies and international entities specialized in other fields, such as economics, finance, international law and humanitarian activities. The key to success in this case will be the precise division of power between the different entities in order to reduce the friction between them.

Fifthly, the use of smart power may serve to make the internal structure and the external cooperation policy more flexible, through the development of consultation mechanisms related to Article 4, concerning both members, and non-NATO partners. It is a risky move in that it might blur the obligations and hierarchies of the Alliance through the excessive delegation of competences. Sixthly, it is important to develop and refine the pattern of crisis management, the final form of which has been shown in NATO’s Assessment of a Crisis and Development of Response Strategies of 10 May 2011. The process of decision-making, classical in form, includes the ability to assess and correct the methods of managing the current crisis. The continuous evaluation and adaptation of the use of power is one of the most important elements of the smart power concept.

In conclusion, most of NATO’s recent documents, from the reports summarizing the Multiple Futures Project through to the latest Strategic Concept, although still not being smart, seem to be much smarter.
Ensuring energy security in Europe in a period of rapidly changing challenges and threats requires sustained action to be taken. Nowadays, energy security should be seen not as a state, but as a dynamically changing process that is a challenge not only for individual European governments, energy companies and their investors, but also international organizations. The purpose of this article is to attempt to answer the question of what role NATO should play in strengthening the security of the energy system, as well as what challenges in this area should be the focus of its involvement. It is also important to answer the question as to whether European governments have the political will to devolve energy security to the NATO level and whether it has the appropriate tools within its structure to undertake operational activities.

National Particularism or European Solidarity in the Field of EU Energy

The energy sector is characterized by frictions between various political and business interests, which are dominated by the vested thinking of European countries and their energy companies. The primacy of interests is so strong that it drowns out energy solidarity, which is promoted by the European Union. This organization aims to build a single market for electricity and natural gas, where competition rules will apply. Breaking the monopolistic nature of energy markets would create the basis for the creation of effective crisis response mechanisms, increasing the energy security of the member states. Particularly important are the assumptions of the European Union’s Third Energy Package, which will contribute to the creation of a flexible energy market. Its effectiveness depends on expanding the energy infrastructure and the creation of cross-border interconnections, which would permit rapid crisis response. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the European Union has limited authority over energy security as the most important decisions are taken by national governments. There is no doubt that the decisions taken in Berlin, Paris and London are particularly crucial, and are often reflected in the European Union’s decisions. At the same time, the governments of the member states and the European Union institutions are under constant lobbying from various European and other interest groups. The political will of European countries to increase the powers of the European Union’s energy security is weakened in this way.
This issue is also the subject of the activities of other international organizations, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and NATO. In particular, NATO’s involvement in the issues of energy security raises doubts on the part of one of the main suppliers of energy resources to Europe, the Russian Federation. Moscow realizes that the growing dependence of the NATO members on natural gas supplies from the former Soviet republics and Russia can be used, in the event of a dispute, to weaken the cohesion and solidarity within the Alliance. Opponents of NATO’s over-extensive activity in the area of energy raise the argument that it is illegitimate for an international organization to bear the costs of the security of energy supply routes, the benefits of which are accrued mainly by energy companies. Concerns in this regard are weakened when it is noted that energy is a public resource, and NATO should therefore take measures to increase the energy security of Europe, which directly affects the public safety of its citizens.

**Should NATO Become Involved in Ensuring Energy Security?**

NATO is primarily a military alliance, and the energy security challenge is not strictly a military matter. This does not mean, however, that the organization should not take this issue up. It should be noted that the security of power systems affects states’ defence capabilities. Countries that have a guaranteed supply of fossil fuels and electricity are much less vulnerable to economic instability and the risk of lower competitiveness in global markets. This means that actions to support the security of Europe’s energy system by NATO contribute to greater political stability in the region.

Secondly, NATO operations and missions carried out in different parts of the world require military units to be mobile. This is achieved by ensuring the continuity of energy supplies and of energy used by operating units. In turn, this requires adequate supply chains, which are protected in such a way as to ensure continuity in critical situations. This means that it is in the interest of NATO itself to have such logistical corridors of fuel and energy supply that, if there is a conflict, it will enable delivery to ensure the operational mobility of Alliance forces. Thirdly, in the event of aggression against any member of the Alliance, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty will apply, under which the Alliance will also protect the critical infrastructure of the country under attack.

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2 Andrej Nosko notes that Article V works as deterrence but it does not provide energy security. Moreover, he stresses that Article IV provides the legal basis for the necessary coordination and consultation in this area.
Fourthly, NATO members recognized the need to involve the organization in ensuring energy security, and this is reflected in the new NATO Strategic Concept, which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit. According to this concept, NATO will “develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning.”

Nevertheless, although the commitment to the security of Europe’s energy is praiseworthy, the Allies should still determine the level to which they want to commit. Considering the fact that NATO is a military and defence organization, caution should be exercised. Too high a level of involvement in the organization of energy security issues could trigger certain reactions from the major suppliers of energy resources to Europe, in particular the Russian Federation. This means that NATO should pursue a policy of gradual engagement that does not seek the over-militarization of energy security. It should be taken into consideration that too strong a commitment by NATO will force a counter-reaction from the Russian Federation. It should also not be forgotten that energy security is a kind of economic security largely created by market forces, including the activity of energy companies and other operators in the sector. This means that the activity of the North Atlantic Alliance is not essential, but should contribute to the energy security of Europe.

The Challenges NATO Faces in the Area of Energy Security

Contemporary and future challenges in the field of energy security constitute a potential area for the involvement of NATO. Without a doubt, the European Union is seeking to preserve the stability and continuity of the supply of fossil fuels and increase its energy self-sufficiency. This means that the first geopolitical challenge is to maintain an appropriate level of political stability in countries that are major exporters of crude oil and natural gas to Europe. A lack of stability in the exporting or transit countries poses a risk of disruption to energy supplies. Therefore, it is in the interest of NATO countries to support peace operations and then conduct preventive measures to reduce the risk of major geopolitical conflicts that could contribute to the disruption of the supply of energy carriers and an increase in prices in world markets.


Secondly, a particularly important challenge is to increase the operational energy supply during military operations carried out by NATO. The conflict in Afghanistan shows that the strategic weakness of the Alliance is its long chains of fuel supply, because convoys of fuel trucks are often the target of attacks. The ultimate cost of providing fuel at the conflict location has turned out to be very high. What is more, vehicles and diesel generators used during missions are energy intensive and have high fuel consumption. This means that an important challenge for NATO is the need to develop cooperation between member states, which will be focused on the production of alternative fuels and more efficient generators and motors, as well as shortening the supply chain of fuel and energy for NATO operations.

A potential threat to NATO is the risk of terrorist attacks against objects of critical infrastructure, including the energy sector. This risk should be viewed broadly, not just in terms of the potential to blow up energy infrastructure in explosive-based attacks, but also cyber attacks that, by virus infection, could destabilize or even paralyse the operation of facilities such as nuclear power plants, pipelines, gas pipelines and refineries. Ensuring cyber security is a huge challenge and the scale of threats increases every year, along with the increasing computerization of the management of energy infrastructure facilities. Moreover, in the long term, smart grid and smart metering will be implemented, which will also provide an opportunity for attackers to capture these electronically. The potential effects of permanent damage in power engineering could have disastrous consequences destabilizing basic social services. In addition to terrorist acts, the acts of terror that have increased in recent years with regard to vessels transporting crude oil and liquefied natural gas constitute a significant threat. Specific actions have been taken by Somali pirates who, armed by different entities, have abducted tanker-crews, demanding a ransom for their release.

Fourthly, there is a real danger associated with the use of energy as a weapon in political and economic international relations. Energy exporters exerting economic pressure on importing countries may cause particular hardship. Russia’s Gazprom

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4 “By November 2011, the NATO forces in Afghanistan were consuming 6.8 million litres of fuel per day, which was supplied in trucks from Pakistan. In November 2011, the route was interrupted after the NATO air attack on border posts, which resulted in the deaths of 24 Pakistanis. This forced NATO to change its transit route to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which was a rail connection of 5169 km from the Baltic port of Riga in Latvia, through the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Afghanistan (through the city of Termez).” This meant that the transit route for fuel supplies to NATO missions had become dependent on Moscow. J.C.K. Daly, Energy: “pięta achillesowa” NATO? (Energy: NATO’s “Achilles Heel”?), “Stosunki międzynarodowe”, 24/09/2012, [www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info, access: 09/12/2012].

often undertook such actions, by agreeing to reduce the price of natural gas sold on the condition that the importer sign a long-term contract or sell of its assets in the energy infrastructure. Sometimes, the Russian company has cut off energy supplies to force the receiver to make decisions in accordance with Russian interests. The effects of such a policy have been felt not only by Belarus, Ukraine, but also other countries such as the Czech Republic, which, while taking over the presidency of the European Union, struggled with the problem of Russian oil supply. Western European countries, during the time of the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, also suffered, in 2006 and 2009, the effects of the interruptions in the supply of natural gas which resulted in economic problems. According to the accepted *Falin doctrine*\(^6\), Russia is rebuilding its political position by using its role as a supplier of crude oil and natural gas to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It should be noted that the application of the *Falin doctrine* in the supply of natural gas was described by the current Russian President Vladimir Putin in his doctoral thesis.

*NATO’s Tasks in the Field of Energy*

It seems that NATO should, first of all, develop cooperation in the exchange of information and intelligence with the member states, partner countries and representatives of the private sector.\(^7\) Of particular importance will be information regarding the safety of the energy infrastructure in the countries exploiting energy resources and exporting them, and in the transit countries. It seems reasonable to systematically develop regional co-operation led by NATO to identify threats, the exchange of information, consultation and for the creation of appropriate analyses and reports. At the same time, the Alliance should maintain an ongoing analysis of energy demands and energy for NATO forces involved in operations.

Secondly, NATO should use **soft power** tactics to contribute to the promotion of political stability in different parts of the world, especially in regions rich in energy resources. The organization may contribute to the development of appropriate

\(^6\) The *Falin doctrine* was formulated in April 1991 and has been recognized as a political strategy of the Soviet Union (and after the collapse of the Soviet Union – a strategy of the Russian Federation) in its relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia wanted to maintain its influence in the region and prevent the development of military cooperation among the former satellite states of Western European organizations by making these countries dependent upon the supply of energy resources such as oil and natural gas. Despite the fact that Moscow has failed to prevent Central and Eastern European countries from becoming involved in Western alliances, raw power resources, to this day, are used as an effective instrument of political and economic power over those states. See: J. Strzelczyk, *Jaka była geneza doktryny Falina i jaki był jej sens?*, *Europa Bezpieczeństwo Energia*, 02/06/2011, [www.ebe.org.pl](http://www.ebe.org.pl), access: 18/01/2013.

\(^7\) M. Rühle, *NATO and energy security*, “NATO Review”, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), access: 06/12/2012.
procedures to reform and lead an appropriate political dialogue and military cooperation. These activities are designed to build confidence in the Alliance as an organization contributing to the strengthening of regional stability. At the same time NATO can thus strengthen ties with the partner countries with which it works and broaden the circle of partner countries with which it can cooperate by drawing in new ones. It seems that this kind of activity is in particular demand in Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Gulf region.

Thirdly, a particularly important measure is to protect the critical infrastructure of the member states, which should be carried out at the request of the countries concerned. At the same time, NATO is maintaining surveillance of sea lanes and territorial waters, the justification for which is the increasing activity of pirates who hijacks ships transporting oil or LNG liquefied gas. The Active Endeavour and Ocean Shield operations are of particular importance to European energy security.\(^8\) In addition to securing the main transit routes of energy resources to Europe, NATO operations act as a psychological deterrent for potential pirates from taking action. At the same time it is important for NATO to carry out appropriate training and offer advice to member states in the field of counter-terrorism policy planning and the use of appropriate procedures. The organization should support operations related to crisis response and the handling of emergencies. From the point of view of the North Atlantic Alliance, it is important for potential terrorist attacks on a country not to cause political instability within the affected country. Appropriate strategic action with anti-terrorism policy planning, pursued by the Alliance, represents an additional value for the individual member states, which should benefit from the best practices in this area. It is also reasonable for NATO to develop cooperation within the organization in the field of cyber security infrastructure. Best practices and knowledge in this field should be continuously dispersed among the members of NATO in order to continually raise its capabilities and skills in relation to cyberspace protection.

**NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence**

Apart from the main institutions, NATO has an Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) in its organizational structure, which was established in April

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\(^8\) NATO launched operation *Active Endeavor* in 2001 and its purpose was the protection of Mediterranean Sea shipping, which is a major pathway for crude oil supplies to Europe and an important transit route for natural gas. The aim of the operation *Ocean Shield* is to prevent piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. See: K. Rosner, *Smart energy is smart defense*, “Journal of Energy Security”, 19/04/2012, [www.ensec.org](http://www.ensec.org), access: 02/12/2012].
2010. The main tasks of the unit involve monitoring and analysing events relating to the energy security of Europe. Measures of a preventive nature enabling the identification of risks in their early stages are particularly important. The unit will deal with the issue of the use of modern renewable energy technologies for military operations, including, in particular, the use of solar energy to create batteries accumulating huge amounts of energy, which could significantly increase the mobility of NATO forces operating in harsh and extreme conditions. However, the issue of energy security is one of several areas of the activities of the unit.

The NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, established at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania (Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija) in Vilnius, is even more focused on energy security. In early October 2012, NATO’s Military Committee approved the inclusion of the structure in the NATO Centre of Excellence (COE). The main goal of the unit will be to support, advise and recommend actions to improve the effectiveness of solutions to increase the military potential and the development of doctrine along with the concept of energy security, the development of energy security standards, the exchange of information, the conducting of technical and scientific experiments in the field of energy security (emergency simulations), and creating recommendations for actions and proposals to solutions to the problems of energy security.

An important function of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence is to disseminate important information on the energy security of NATO among member states and conduct training and exercises. The United States pledged to support the development of institutions that, by carrying out analyses, are to provide recommendations for operational activities related to energy security and the development of alternative energy sources and fuel for military operations. From the point of view of NATO member states, it is important that the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence preventively identifies hazards that may affect the future energy security of Europe.

Conclusion

European energy security is of strategic importance to the Alliance, which should be involved in this area, according to the new Strategic Concept of NATO. The diversity of interests of European countries and their energy companies, the involvement of various international institutions in the field of energy and the economic dimensions of the issue lead us to the conclusion that NATO will not

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9 LESC actions are suggested in the conclusions of the Conference of October 2011 “Innovative Energy Solutions for Military Applications”.

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be dealing with energy security. Nevertheless, an energy-safe Europe needs a competitive market, greater energy self-sufficiency, the better use of energy resources and their sustainability and safe routes to distribute energy resources and effectively protect critical cyber infrastructure. It is appropriate that NATO member states hold ongoing internal consultations shaping strategic decisions in the area of energy security. It is important to sustain sufficient trust between the governments of the member states, which will facilitate the mutual exchange of information and increase the effectiveness of threat recognition.

The NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence may be of assistance; it is likely to increase the Alliance’s analytical potential and training in hazard recognition and the protection of energy infrastructure. It is important to constantly improve capabilities and skills in this area of both NATO members and partners, and the transit countries that the main oil and gas pipelines cross. Appropriate training and exercises, as well as the continued protection of the Alliance, will strengthen the effectiveness of the protection of the routes. NATO should engage in continuous dialogue and consultation with national governments and other international organizations working in the field of energy. At the same time, a very important area of activity of the North Atlantic Alliance should be the development of new technologies through the production of more efficient fuel, the development of solar batteries, hydrogen technologies, as well as the development of technologies to monitor and assess seismic hazards. Therefore, it is advisable to continue to increase the budget of institutions devoted to carrying out research work and technology in collaboration with academic institutions and the energy sector business. The implementation of modern technologies for alternative fuels will reduce the strategic importance of oil in military operations and thereby reduce the costs of energy used in military operations. In accordance with the evolution of the challenges and threats to energy security, the supportive role of NATO will also develop.

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10 NATO carries out a long-term project called “Sahara Trade Winds to Hydrogen”, under which the organization develops cooperation with Mediterranean states such as Morocco and Mauritania in order to develop new technologies to enable the storage of hydrogen energy generated by wind turbines.

11 NATO carries out projects aimed at monitoring the risks associated with seismic movements. One such project is “Seismic Hazard and Risk Assessment for Southern Caucasus-Eastern Turkey Energy Corridors”, which involved scientists from Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan to monitor and evaluate seismic hazards in the Baku – Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku - Erzurum gas pipeline.
The Present and Future of NATO: Cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Light of Elements of the Alliance Theory

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the context of contemporary research on the establishment, operation and evolution of multicomponent international entities acting in the field of security, is rather particular. On the one hand, it represents a subject of interest for researchers (the objective aspect); on the other hand, as an institution that has been operating and evolving for 60 years, it determines the directions for the analysis, thus becoming the driving force and creator of both the political and research reality (the subjective aspect). The history of NATO has served to produce conclusions, concepts and partial theories, as well as theories concerning alliances that aspire to be regarded as comprehensive (defensive and offensive alliances, collective security pacts, etc.). The existence and activity of the Alliance has left its mark in other spheres of reflection concerning international relations, such as the dynamically thriving theory (or rather, the concept) of regional security complexes. Reflections involving the position of regional security organizations within the contemporary international system, including the concept of international security management, are no less important. NATO has been playing an important role in the plans of such organizations as the United Nations or the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).

Definitions and Models of the Establishment of an Alliance

There should be no argument that international cooperation designed to provide security and its institutional (or organizational) effects in the form of alliances, alignments and collective security pacts, constitute one of the crucial elements of theoretical studies in the field of international relations. When it comes to the modern and scientific approach, it was Hans Morgenthau, generally considered to be a follower of “individualism” in international relations, who regarded alliances and their intra-relations as “one of the biggest manifestations” of the balance of power. Stephen Walt has proposed a concise, though also appropriate definition of an alliance in which he defines alliance as a formal or informal

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relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.² Similarly, Glenn Snyder maintained that “alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership”.³

It is crucial to emphasize that Snyder has categorically separated alliances from alignments that, although involving the sphere of common interests and goals, rather do not apply only to military issues or the issues broadly related to security. The essential difference between Walt’s and Snyder’s propositions is that the latter highlights the formalized nature of the cooperation, which will be particularly crucial with respect to alliance institutionalization processes and their socializing functions that are of key importance for making hypotheses regarding the stability or tendency towards disintegration of cooperation. Furthermore, Snyder acknowledges that in their essence and activity the alliances are addressed towards the “outside”. The reasons for their formation are not, therefore, aspirations to control relationships among their members, but external threats and challenges. This becomes an important difference in relation to the many regional institutions and international regimes that function as a formula for collective security.⁴ Obviously, the tension among the alliance members (participants) is relatively slight, while mutual security is high, however, when considering such a classification of the phenomenon, this effect must be regarded as a “by-product”.⁵ The primary function of an alliance “is to pool military strength against a common enemy, not to protect alliance members from each other”.⁶ This puts the quoted concept referred to within the circle of the perception of alliances in categories appropriate for Kenneth Waltz’s balance of power or, more precisely, Stephen Walt’s balance of threats. The last approach seems to be more appropriate since the “threat” is a category that is definitely more anchored in the subjective and decision-making aspects. Analyses of the alliances make it clear that their perception in terms of inevitable “equations” resulting from the political map, is unjustified. Similar considerations may also be found in the concept of Regional Security Complexes developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver,⁷ which, based on the afore-mentioned theory of securitization, touches upon the subjective aspect of defining security.⁸

⁶ G.H. Snyder, op. cit., p. 4-5.  
Although the argument was proposed that securitization is, first of all, a domain of states (and states *in statu nascendi*), some regimes – NATO, the Western European Union (currently: the European Union) or the United Nations - exhibit a tendency to define their own issues and security areas, which becomes particularly essential with respect to alliance “stability”.

Patricia Weitsman acknowledges that alliances are “bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide some element of security to the signatories. States have different reasons to enter to them. Even when we restrict the examined motives to conditions of varying threat, we must still consider a range of alliance motivations”. Further on, the author touches upon the possible “combinations” of the initial motives for the founding of the individual alliances, depending on the proportion of such phenomena as: the balance of threat, bandwagonning, the establishment of a border/hedge, a tether. To avoid discussing the motives in excessive detail, let us assume, as most authors do, that the main incentives are as follows: balance of power/balance of threat and bandwagonning; let us also consider the other two models as a specific variation of looking for balance.

*Cohesion in the Alliance Theory*

With regard to the operation of the alliances and the mechanisms affecting their longevity, two types of processes are recognized: institutionalization and socializing effects. The first group of factors may be viewed from two perspectives: the already existing values brought in by the entities composing the alliance and the operational requirements that the alliance encounters. Some of the newly-established alliances absorbed, to a lesser or greater extent, the previous smaller transnational structures that had already been developed. Generally speaking, such institutions were adapted (obviously, subject to modification) in order to achieve a new quality. A few factors stood in favour of such solutions; cost rationalization being the most important – adapting an existing solution is generally cheaper than creating new ones, both in human and infrastructural terms.

On the other hand, strategic and operational challenges lead to the formation of autonomous alliance institutions that – like most bureaucracies – tend to build their own system of values and chains of interdependence. In a sense, they become Luhmann’s autopoietic subsystems. In extreme (although not so rare) cases, the institutionalization that tends to grow leads to the establishment of the so called “bureaucratic caste”, whose main interest is to ensure the continuity of the parent

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institution. It becomes a reference point for the officials who often define their loyalty with reference to it. It is worth mentioning that the power such institutions show may make the alliance members adjust their behaviour to the political “signposts” that stem from the alliance institutions.

The second phenomenon that strongly affects the stability of the alliance is its ability to generate the effect of socialization. This should be understood as the aggregation of subsystem standards and rules that are accepted and adapted by the alliance members. The members then become strongly integrated elements of a “whole” who implement a sense of institutional continuance even if the original purpose underlying the establishment of the alliance has been exhausted or is no longer relevant. One can even talk about the operation at the microscale of the universalistic system in which the subsystem rule becomes the dominant one.

If we take the hermeneutic theory of Morton Kaplan as a reference point (obviously, subject to some significant modifications), one can hypothesize that in relations between the entities within such an organization, the tendencies towards cooperation, and even harmonization and solidarity between the entities and the priority of the alliance “law” over the autonomous rules of the entities are strengthened. It should however be stipulated that such a development is characteristic of organisms that exhibit high levels of their own structural development and the identity based on them. At the same time, the entities forming this type of alliance, through minimizing the area of shared mistrust and generating mechanisms for the non-coercionary settlement of disputes, obtain a space conducive to the exchange of information, technology, and the flow of people and thoughts, finally leading to the formation of (or in fact, the transformation into) a collective security organization.

This was clearly formulated by Robert Jervis who noticed that “Although NATO’s functioning during the Cold War did not transform its members and it retains its original purpose of ‘keeping the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out,’ its operation has influenced beliefs and preferences at all levels of government—from the members of the bureaucracy who have a stake in its success, to foreign office officials who have a potent new tool of joint action, to political leaders who will lose domestic or international support if they act unilaterally rather than through the institution (…) Perhaps the most important path by which institutions can change preferences is through domestic politics. Drawing on liberalism, neoliberalism holds that states are not all alike and that preferences in part arise internally. To the extent that this is correct, international arrangements

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can alter the power, beliefs, and goals of groups in society in ways that will affect foreign relations. Thus arms control agreements can strengthen the hands of ‘doves’; lowered tariff barriers can drive out inefficient producers and bolster the advocates for still lower tariffs; one of the less foolish arguments in favour of expanding NATO is the belief that this will give reformers in East Europe greater influence”.\textsuperscript{13}

Both realities – a defensive alliance and a collective security organization – may exist simultaneously; what is more, the establishment of the latter quite significantly affects the aggregation of the defensive capability on the part of the alliance, at least by obtaining greater cohesion in the political, social and technological dimensions. It directly affects the stability of the alliance – when a given threat (or threats) that underlays the formation of the alliance finally erodes or disappears, it is very likely that the alliance will survive as a collective security organization and that its constitutional purposes will be redefined.

The above leads to the relatively obvious conclusion underlying the cohesive alliance theory: “In thinking about the fundamental issues of alliances – their capability aggregation purpose, balancing and bandwagonning behaviours, and management functions – it becomes clear that these different behaviours emerge under different conditions. Threat does generate each of these responses, and, more precisely, different levels of threat will result in different alliance behaviours”.\textsuperscript{14}

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*Table: The level of cohesion within the alliance in terms of high/low internal/external threats\textsuperscript{15}*

Alliances should not be regarded in terms of invariability – their functions, capability and shape undergo crucial modifications as the security environment changes and new challenges arise. At the same time, Patricia Weitsman draws attention to the close connection between the level of cohesion within the alliance and the perceived level of threats (both internal and external): “If cohesion were a constant function of external threat alone, we would never expect alliances to be


\textsuperscript{14} P.A. Weitsman, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

cohesive in the absence of an external threat”. The simplified conclusion that can be drawn from the studies makes us realize that the external threat factor which is subject to a strong and real securitization constitutes an essential, but not the only source of alliance cohesion. The cohesion, as understood by Weitsman, is a function of external and internal threats (tension among alliance members).

Based on the matrix presented, it appears that in the event of low external threats (or their absence) there is no cohesion within the alliance or it is difficult to attain. The highest cohesion potential has been observed in the alliances facing high external threats, with low or no tension among the alliance members. It is, however, worth emphasizing that this element that has not been discussed adequately within alliance cohesion theory and that constitutes the basis of the Copenhagen school securitization theory. Threats, challenges and other elements of the strategic cycle are of a subjective nature, or – perhaps, better to say – they are constructs built based on conscious and unconscious elements, with sharply defined roles of securitization (and politicization) and desecuritization processes. Therefore, the alliances are partially subject to the processes of building their own identity core, having considered the perception of external threats and challenges as well as of interrelations. It would be appropriate here to raise the concern that such a self-identification by the alliance will be verified in terms of adequacy. Insofar as its effects constitute a set of constructs that adhere to reality, the alliance gains stable foundations for its continuance. Should such adequacy be lacking, the institution may extend its continuance, however, the time gained will not be long. If it is used for the effective definition of a new organization, anchored in reality, the organization may undergo certain transformations or may even become a subject that is different in terms of quality (e.g., a collective security institution with a reduced functionality as a defensive alliance).

Otherwise, the existing organization is doomed to become involved in deep political disputes, functional paresis, structural malaise, etc., that results directly from the dissonance between the reality (with all its challenges and demands) and its inadequate self-identification. The attainment of “compatibility” between the

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16 Ibidem, p. 25.
alliance’s external sphere and the interests of its members appears to be crucial. This way, promoting newly-identified threats and tasks, against the background of the continuing lack of consensus among the members, may lead to a situation in which tension among the members appears and intensifies. The persistent search for internal compromise may lead to a significant reduction in the alliance’s tasks, thus evoking questions about the validity and the sense of its continuance.

**Determinant Factors of NATO Cohesion**

Even before the formation of NATO, Hans J. Morgenthau drew attention to similar factors. He believed that a “typical alliance” consists of a dynamic game of various interests and objectives and that its power and effectiveness depend directly on the relation between the power of the interests that shape it and the power of the member states’ vested interests. Morgenthau argued that for an alliance to operate, it is necessary to obtain consent not only for the general purposes of its existence but also for the individual policies and models of inventory distribution. “Many alliances were formed only on paper since such consent could not be obtained, as the community was restricted to general purposes, and did not provide for the particular policies and measures”.20

The above-mentioned remarks lead us to reflect on the present and future of NATO and ask questions about its present-day and future nature. It is worth quoting the opinion of Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander who noticed that, at the end of the 20th century, NATO went beyond the definition of an alliance, or rather it transformed into a regional collective security organization with transregional aspirations.21 What is more, the authors noticed that “the nature of the environment in Europe – risks rather than threats – goes quite far towards explaining NATO’s transformations. Equally critical, however, are the continued commitments of its major member states to NATO institutions. Supporting these commitments are NATO’s legitimacy as a mechanism for Western security and the deep, wide networks of officials and politicians in the NATO countries who are committed to the alliance and familiar with one another (...) … the hybrid nature of NATO’s institution is also important. NATO developed explicit practices to

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control security dilemmas among its members (...). These practices are portable and can be transferred at relatively low costs to new situations.”

During the Cold War, NATO conformed to the characteristics of an alliance with a clearly defined external threat; all the more so since the states of the Eastern Bloc, consolidated in military and, above all, political terms since February 1948, formalized this status and created the Warsaw Pact, based on the mechanisms of establishing counter-alliances. At the dawn of the formation of NATO, two interesting elements of cooperation can be pointed out, by establishing, incidentally, the directions of theorization on the subject of alliances. Considering the American monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons until late summer 1949, the very act of signing the Washington Treaty may be regarded as a merger of the tendencies to balance the threat under a particular form of bandwagonning (United States was not perceived in Europe as a potential threat, however, it undoubtedly constituted the strongest element of the system). On the other hand, the Treaty of Brussels had been signed before the Washington Treaty. Consequently, Western Europe started to form the bureaucratic apparatus. After 1950, and particularly after signing the amended Treaty of Brussels (1954), the tendency to increase Alliance bureaucracy was adopted from the European initiatives.

It is worth noting that the NATO crisis of the 1960s seriously damaged its cohesion. The tool proposed by Weitsman actually explains the mechanisms of this phenomenon – on the one hand, in the face of detente processes, the subjective sense of threat from the Soviet Union had weakened; on the other hand, essential discord among the allies (which, incidentally, coincided with the deep diplomatic crisis against the background of negotiations over accession to the European Communities) was revealed against the background of the dispute over national nuclear programmes, which led to France withdrawing from the integrated command system of the Alliance. Paradoxically, the 1960s crisis led to a significant increase of effectiveness concerning the tools for inter-allied cooperation and the axiological achievements of the Alliance; it also marked a significant increase in the importance of the Federal Republic of Germany which started to become the main NATO state in mainland Europe.

“Many of NATO’s distinctive features had nothing to do with coping with the Soviet threat at all and were a result of NATO’s more subtle purpose of preventing a cycle of mistrust, competition, and instability in security relations among its members. NATO therefore developed specific assets for coping with risks among

its members—primarily but not exclusively with Germany in mind. These features include mechanisms for political-military integration, multinationality of alliance structures, supranational defence policy, and the principles and procedures of civilian democratic control of defence affairs”.

It can be assumed that the decade of Ronald Reagan’s presidency brought a renewed increase of Alliance cohesion, although some social tensions were perceived in the European states of NATO, related to the installation of medium-range missiles. The European pole of the Alliance moved to the British Isles, which was particularly strongly marked after the Falklands War between the United Kingdom and Argentina in which the United States eventually supported the British side. The second half of the 1980s was once more marked by the erosion of Alliance cohesion related to the revival of the European idea of identity in the field of security, expressed, e.g., in the “Hague platform” of 1987. There is no doubt that this was related to the reduced level of the perceptible sense of threat on the part of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, particularly after the meetings in Reykjavik and Moscow. A serious breakthrough took place in 1990, which was reflected by the London Declaration of 6 July, the signing of the CFE Treaty in November and, finally, the resolutions created in November 1991 during the Summit in Rome, where, e.g., a new Strategic Concept and a declaration on peace and cooperation (constituting the continuation of the London Declaration) were accepted.

Further development of the political situation practically eliminated the external threat factor: “Following this change in concept came several institutional innovations. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in 1991 as a political body including NATO and former Warsaw Pact members (and the former Soviet republics once the Soviet Union broke apart in December 1991). NATO created the Partnership for Peace and approved plans for creating combined joint task forces at its summit in January 1994. In 1997, NATO invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the alliance (which they did at the fiftieth anniversary summit in 1999), created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to replace the NACC, and signed partnership and cooperation agreements with Russia and Ukraine”.

The climax and, to some extent, the closure of the debate in the 1990s on the shape of the Alliance was the jubilee Summit in Washington in 1999. The strategic border of the Alliance moved significantly towards the East with the admission

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of the three above-mentioned states of Central Europe – a process that was accelerated in 2004 when more states acceded to NATO. A new doctrine for the Alliance was also accepted in Washington. Having preserved Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the doctrine shifted the NATO mission towards that of a collective security organization, on the one hand, but it also emphasized the global tasks designed to stabilize and maintain peace.\(^{27}\) At the same time, with the approach of the end of the 1990s, a series of challenges for the Alliance emerged which threatened its internal cohesion. Since 1992, the emancipatory defensive initiatives of Europe have accelerated and gained a new quality. The jubilee Summit began in an atmosphere of some tension following the meeting in St. Malo at the beginning of December 1998 symbolized by a set of claims raised by Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State, known as the 3Ds.\(^{28}\)

In 2001, the administration of George W. Bush indeed seemed to move away from these claims, probably striving to restore some of the lost cohesion to the Alliance, which was reflected in the declaration of June 2001 made during Bush’s meeting with the leaders of NATO member states in Brussels: “We agreed that NATO and the European Union must work in common purpose. It is in NATO’s interest for the European Union to develop a rapid reaction capability. A strong, capable European force integrated with NATO would give us more options for handling crises when NATO, as a whole, chooses not to engage. NATO must be generous in the help it gives the European Union. And similarly, the European Union must welcome participation by NATO allies who are not members of the

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\(^{27}\) The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. (24 Apr. 1999), par. 10: **Security:** To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force. **Consultation:** To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. **Deterrence and Defence:** To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area: **Crisis Management:** To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. **Partnership:** To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

European Union. And we must not waste scarce resources, duplicating effort or working at cross purposes”.\textsuperscript{29}

However, soon the reality was to verify these “agreements”. In fact, it was much earlier – as early as during the aerial war in Yugoslavia in 1999 – that the deep tensions concerning both military actions and politics came to light.\textsuperscript{30} They undoubtedly were accountable for the assertive behaviour of the United States when, as a result of the attacks of 11 September, 2001, NATO, for the first time in its history, put the mechanisms of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty into motion.\textsuperscript{31}

The process of separating the interests of the allies visibly deepened after 2003 and the beginning of the war in Iraq. The operation carried out within the framework of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan seems to serve as the main external factor linking members of the Alliance together since 2005. It should be, however, emphasized that the mission became – more than once – the subject of tension among the allies. Moreover, great differences between the strategies of the individual Alliance states became visible during the mission. Finally, it would be sensible to remember that the end of the mission is close.

When it comes to resources, significant divisions tend to appear from time to time. This, in fact, is nothing new. It is mainly due to the reinforcement policies of the Alliance states.\textsuperscript{32} One of the more prominent examples is the issue of contracts in the aircraft industry that has aroused great emotions.\textsuperscript{33} Within the “great strategy” a considerable split in the previous “Transatlantic community of security” is also visible. It may be illustrated by the “pivot” initiated by the administration of Barack Obama which has diametrically changed the position of Europe in the U.S. strategic concept. Against this background, some tensions have appeared among the European NATO members who interpret this geopolitical change differently for the individual risk categories. The process of enlarging the security zone by incorporating new states was, it would appear, effectively stopped in 2008. However, here the Caucasian War played an important role.

Conclusions

As may be concluded from the foregoing reasoning, NATO faces a deep cohesion crisis that is conditional, on the one hand, upon the disappearance of the direct threat and, on the other hand, upon the more frequent and more exact exposure of differences in the interests between member states. If we want to use the matrix of Patricia Weitsman, we may assume that, currently, NATO belongs to the sector described as “low or no cohesion”. It seems that the plans to create a Transatlantic free trade zone, called an “economic NATO”\textsuperscript{34} constitute an opportunity for a new identity for the Alliance (although it appears that using this phrase is more an expression of sentiment than a precise description of reality).

The execution of this project would certainly remove some divisions that make the current Alliance more and more artificial in form. We may, however, question the odds in favour of this initiative, all the more since, in recent months (June - July 2013), the level of mutual confidence has definitely dropped, thanks to Edward Snowden’s “revelations”\textsuperscript{35}. We may expect similar “scandals” in the future.

\textsuperscript{34} C.B. Gray, \textit{An Economic NATO: A New Alliance for a New Global Order}, “Atlantic Council Issue Brief” 2013, [www.acus.org, access: 01/07/2013].

APPENDIXES
The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6 ¹

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France ², on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty en-

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¹ The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.

² On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.
tered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification
shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.\(^3\)

**Article 12**

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**Article 13**

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

**Article 14**

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

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\(^3\) The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.
Active Engagement, Modern Defence

Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon

Preface

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

- It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
- It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
- It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.
- It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.
- It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
- It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.
Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.

2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.

4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

   a) Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

   b) Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

   c) Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant
countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.

5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.

6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.

The Security Environment

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.

8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.

10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.

11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.
12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.

13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.

14. A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.

15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

Defence and Deterrence

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France,
which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:

- maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
- develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
- carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
- develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
- further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
- develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
- ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
- sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
- continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

**Security through Crisis Management**

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.

21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.

22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.

23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts.

24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.

25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:
- enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented;
- further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
- form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
- enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,
- develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance;
- identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
- broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:

- We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
- With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons sta-
tioned in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.

- In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.

- We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.

- We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.

- National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

**Open Door**

27. NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.

- The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

**Partnerships**

28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.
29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:

- We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations.
- We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.
- We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
- We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.

31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:

- enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
- more regular political consultation; and
- enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged.

32. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and
security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
- enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
- broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

33. NATO - Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

34. The NATO - Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO - Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to:

- enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
- use the full potential of the NATO - Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.

35. The Euro - Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the
Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:

- enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
- continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;
- facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
- deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;
- develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.

37. NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:

- maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO’s usability targets;
- ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
- develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;
- preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;
• engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.

**An Alliance for the 21st Century**

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe’s most successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.
NATO operational priorities

In 2012, the Alliance continued its mission in Afghanistan – the most militarily demanding and significant operational commitment to date. At the same time, the Alliance continued to play a vital role in ensuring a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. It also continued to counter the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean and play its part in the international community’s efforts to fight piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden, where, as a result of those collective efforts, attacks were at an all-time low in 2012. NATO also agreed to augment Turkey’s air defence capabilities by deploying Patriot missiles in order to defend the population and territory of Turkey and contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the Alliance’s border.

Today, some 110,000 military personnel are operating in NATO-led missions across three continents.

Afghanistan

NATO Allies and the 22 partner countries contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are maintaining a steadfast commitment to Afghanistan, with the same fundamental objective that has always underpinned the mission: to ensure that the country never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists.

Transition towards full Afghan security responsibility

Afghan security forces will have full responsibility for security across the country by the end of 2014. This goal was set at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon and confirmed at the Chicago Summit in May 2012. Transition is the process by which responsibility for Afghanistan’s security is gradually transferred to Afghan soldiers and police, while the focus of ISAF’s effort shifts from combat to support. Major progress was made in 2012 with the announcements of more provinces, cities and districts entering the transition process.

On 22 March 2011, President Karzai announced the first “tranche” of Afghan areas to enter into transition. A second group was announced on 27 November 2011, and a third on 13 May 2012. On 31 December 2012, President Karzai announced the fourth group of Afghan areas to undergo transition in the coming months. With this decision, Afghan security forces will be taking the lead for security for 87 per cent of the Afghan population and for 23 of the 34 Afghan prov-
inces. By mid-2013, every district in Afghanistan will be under Afghan security lead.

Key for transition in Afghanistan is whether security is maintained once the transfer of responsibility from ISAF to Afghan forces is implemented – put simply, whether Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)\(^1\) are able to do the job. Developments over the past year show they can, as areas included in the first two tranches of transition continue to be the most secure in Afghanistan and in some of those areas, security has improved. For example, in the first nine months of 2012, security improved in some of Afghanistan’s most populous districts: the number of insurgent security incidents dropped by 22 per cent in Kabul, 62 per cent in Kandahar, 13 per cent in Herat and 88 per cent in Mazar-i-Sharif. In Regional Command Capital (the area including Kabul), which is the first regional command to have fully entered the transition process, insurgent violence over the months of January to October 2012 dropped by 27 per cent compared to the same period the year before. Throughout 2012, when complex insurgent attacks

\(^1\) The Afghan National Security Forces consist of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP).
occurred, including in Kabul, the Afghan security forces took the lead and dealt competently and rapidly with them.

**Building ANSF capability**

Transition has gathered pace because of the increasing strength, confidence, and capability of the ANSF. Between December 2009 and October 2012, the ANSF grew by more than 140,000 personnel, with the fundamental support provided by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). The ANSF are a credible and capable force, already demonstrating their ability to secure the country and population against the insurgency.

To date, Afghan security forces lead 84 per cent of partnered operations. Overall, they have increased their ability to plan, carry out, and sustain large-scale operations. For example, a series of six large-scale operations were carried out from September to November 2012, involving some 11,000 Afghan security personnel from the Army, border police and intelligence services. And since October 2011, Afghan special forces have conducted more than 4,000 operations, leading 61 per cent of them.

To professionalise the force, NTM-A has provided almost 5,000 trainers in institutions and specialised schools. After graduation, advice and mentoring in the field are then carried on by around 400 ISAF police and military advisory teams deployed around the country.

In 2012, ANSF training efforts emphasised leader development, the training of Afghan trainers, and the building of literacy and vocational skills. Some 3,200 Afghan Army trained instructors deliver 91 per cent of all training across the country and since summer 2012, English language teaching is provided by the Afghan National Army and Afghan Foreign Language Institute. Success in “training the trainers” means that the NTM-A has now been able to start downsizing its own personnel.

While progress has been encouraging, ISAF has faced considerable challenges in 2012. During 2012, there have been a number of attacks against ISAF troops by members of the ANSF or people wearing ANA or ANP uniforms.

This is an issue of great concern, which ISAF is taking seriously. ISAF and the Afghan Government have continued working closely together to reduce the risk, for example by improving procedures for the vetting and screening of new recruits; undertaking additional counter-intelligence efforts; and strengthening cultural awareness training for both international and Afghan forces. The effectiveness of these measures is kept constantly under review and further steps will be taken, if needed. Afghan and international troops continue to conduct partnered operations, on a daily basis, across the whole of Afghanistan.
Reinforcing stability

Throughout 2012, the combined efforts of the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF continued to push insurgents further away from population centres, therefore increasingly isolating them. Eighty per cent of enemy-initiated attacks occur where only 20 per cent of the population lives and nearly 50 per cent of all the attacks country-wide occur in just 17 districts, which only account for 5 per cent of the total Afghan population.

As Afghan security forces become more effective, the insurgents are increasingly targeting civilians. According to the quarterly report of the United Nations Secretary-General published on 6 December 2012, 84 per cent of civilian deaths or injuries were caused by insurgents. Recent surveys indicate that insurgent brutality is widely recognised and condemned by the Afghan population. In some provinces, local residents have been taking up arms and fighting back to reclaim their villages. The insurgency is also eroding from the bottom up, with over 5,600 fighters known to have laid down their arms and rejoined Afghan society through the

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2 Data source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN), Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database, as of 18 January 2013.
Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, led by the Afghan Government. As support for insurgents decreases, recent surveys indicate that public confidence in the ANSF’s ability to provide security remains high. The general levels of violence throughout the country have dropped over the past two years. While spectacular attacks have grabbed headlines, in the first eight months of 2012, insurgent violence levels country-wide were effectively down by 7 per cent compared to the same period in 2011, and the 2011 figures were down by 9 per cent compared to 2010.

Afghanistan’s future

The broader international community set out a framework for future support for Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference in December 2011. Nearly half the countries of the world pledged to support a “Decade of Transformation” in Afghanistan, from 2015-2024.

In a strong demonstration of international support, some 60 countries and organisations gathered at a meeting on Afghanistan during NATO’s Summit in Chicago in May 2012. The Lisbon strategy of completing transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014 was reaffirmed. Allied leaders agreed that NATO’s main contribution to Afghanistan after 2014 will be to continue training, advising and assisting the ANSF through a significantly smaller, non-combat mission that will follow on from ISAF.

NATO Allies and ISAF partners reaffirmed their strong commitment to support the training, equipping, financing and capability development of the ANSF beyond the end of the transition period. At the meeting of ISAF foreign ministers in Brussels in December 2012, it was decided that the existing Afghan National Army Trust Fund will be further adapted to support the sustainment of the Afghan forces post-2014. The ANA Trust Fund will complement the broader international efforts and other funding streams under a robust accountability framework. The lead responsibility for sustaining Afghan security forces rests with the Afghan Government. Funding mechanisms for the sustainment of the ANSF post-2014 will be based on Afghan leadership and ownership of the whole process.

Kosovo

KFOR’s objective in 2012 was to continue to support the development of a peaceful, stable, and multi-ethnic Kosovo. This NATO-led force also continued to support the maintenance of freedom of movement and ensuring a safe and secure environment for all people in Kosovo, in cooperation with all relevant actors.
After a difficult year in 2011 with a number of serious incidents, the situation in Kosovo improved in 2012 thanks to KFOR's sustained efforts, in close cooperation with the European Union’s Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), and with the support of all communities in Kosovo.

Kosovo reached an important milestone with the end of supervised independence on 10 September 2012. But corruption, organised crime and the lack of economic development continue to influence the general security situation, particularly in the northern part of Kosovo. KFOR maintained its Operational Reserve Force in Kosovo throughout the year to be able to respond swiftly to possible incidents and ensure freedom of movement. However, improvements in the security situation on the ground prompted the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) into withdrawing this reserve force at the end of 2012. NATO will consider further troop downsizing only when the situation on the ground allows.

In parallel, to acknowledge further progress in handing over security responsibilities to local authorities, KFOR “unfixed” the Devič Monastery, a cultural and religious site with designated special status. The “unfixing” process involves the transfer of responsibility for the protection of a religious or cultural site of particular symbolic value, from KFOR to the Kosovo Police. From the original nine KFOR-protected sites in Kosovo, only two such sites, the Peć Patriarchate and the Devič Monastery, remain under direct KFOR protection and are likely to be trans-
ferred in the near future. The Peć Patriarchate should be the next site to be “unfixed” in 2013.

During 2012, NATO continued its support to the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). The KSF is a lightly armed force which will be responsible for security tasks that are not appropriate for the police such as emergency response, fire fighting and civil protection. Following the declaration of full operational capability for the KSF in 2013, the scope and size of NATO’s support will be adjusted.

Meanwhile, progress has been achieved in the EU sponsored Dialogue between Belgrade and Priština, in particular on Integrated Border Management. This dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo remains key to solve the political deadlock over northern Kosovo.

Counter-piracy

Piracy is still threatening the security of maritime routes off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden, but has diminished considerably compared to previous years.

The presence of an international naval force in the region has contributed to this result. NATO (with Operation Ocean Shield) together with other international actors, notably the European Union (with Operation Atalanta) and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, have steadily maintained a deterrence presence in the region. This has helped to deter and disrupt pirate attacks, and protect vessels.

In March 2012, NATO members took stock of the situation through a “strategic assessment”, agreeing more robust actions against piracy. Measures introduced included the need to erode the pirates’ logistics and support base by, for instance, disabling pirate vessels or skiffs, attaching tracking beacons to mother ships and allowing the use of force to disable or destroy suspected pirate vessels. NATO has also extended its counter-piracy operation until at least the end of 2014.

The progress made in 2012 needs to be consolidated in the medium to long term. A deterrence presence, however effective and necessary in the short term, cannot bring a lasting solution to the problem of piracy. The countries in the region, including Somalia, need to develop the capacity to fight piracy themselves. During 2012, NATO offered capacity-building support, for example during port visits which have included the training of coast guards. NATO is also helping to fight the root problem of piracy onshore by continuing to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), at the African Union’s request, in terms of sea- and airlift and also with the provision of subject-matter experts on the ground.
Operation Ocean Shield has contributed to the international effort in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa since 2008, allowing the safe transit of humanitarian supplies to Somalia. This has also helped increase the safety of one of the busiest maritime routes in the world – the gateway in and out of the Suez Canal. With 90 per cent of world trade transiting by sea (representing 23 per cent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product), the security of sea lanes is essential.

NATO support to Turkey

The situation along NATO’s south-eastern border and repeated violations of Turkey’s territory led to a request from Turkey for Alliance support in the second half of 2012.

In June, following the shooting down of a Turkish jet, Turkey requested that the North Atlantic Council discuss the security situation in the region under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. In October, following the death of five civil-

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3 Figures for piracy incidents involve vessels greater than 300 tons engaged on international voyages as defined in Regulation 19 of Chapter V of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention of the International Maritime Organization. Statistics provided by NATO’s Maritime Command Headquarters, Northwood, United Kingdom – the command leading NATO’s counter-piracy operation.
ians after Syrian shells hit the Turkish town of Akçakale, tensions rose further, leading Turkey to request Alliance support to augment its air defence capabilities.

On 4 December, NATO foreign ministers agreed to deploy Patriot missiles to help defend the population and territory of Turkey and contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the Alliance’s border. Germany, the Netherlands and the United States agreed to provide two Patriot missile batteries each, which will be sited at Kahramanmaras, Adana and Gaziantep. This deployment will be defensive only and will not support a no-fly zone or any offensive operation.

**Securing capabilities for the future**

Central to the Alliance’s ability to conduct operations are military capabilities – the people, equipment, training, command and support arrangements – organised and trained to act when called upon. Over the past decade, these military capabilities have been in great demand. With a change in NATO’s military commitment to Afghanistan after 2014, as a significantly smaller, non-combat mission takes over from ISAF, NATO’s focus will shift to ensuring the Alliance has the types of capabilities needed to face the security challenges of the future.

At the Chicago Summit, Allied leaders agreed on how best to prepare for future security challenges which could also include non-conventional threats, such as cyber attacks. The objective of the Chicago Defence Package was to have a coherent set of deployable, interoperable and sustainable forces that are equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so as to be able to meet the objectives the Alliance has set itself: “NATO Forces 2020”.

Against a background of economic austerity, delivering NATO Forces 2020 will only be possible if the Allies spend smarter. This means spending more efficiently, including through more multinational cooperation, and spending more effectively, including through making sure that their militaries retain their ability to operate together as they have done on NATO-led missions.

**Challenging economic circumstances**

In the current economic climate, with public expenditure decreasing across the board, NATO Allies have been increasingly challenged to find the necessary financial resources to ensure they can maintain the appropriate military capabilities. Defence budgets in most countries have declined at a time when the Alliance has undertaken its most demanding and significant mission ever, and when the need for investment in future capabilities is essential.
The positive news is that the Alliance, as a whole, does have a pool of forces and capabilities sufficient to conduct the full range of its missions. But the effects of the financial crisis and the declining share of resources devoted to defence in many Allied countries have resulted in an over-reliance on a few countries, especially the United States, growing capability disparities among European Allies, and some significant deficiencies in key capabilities, such as intelligence and reconnaissance, as illustrated by NATO’s experience in Libya. In 2012, with the approval of the Defence Package and key initiatives such as Smart Defence and Connected Forces, Allies have started to take steps toward addressing these issues.

The combined wealth of the non-US Allies, measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), exceeds that of the United States. However, non-US Allies together spend less than half of what the United States spends on defence, and in the decade since 2001 – the year of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States – their annual increases in defence spending have been significantly less. Since 2008, defence spending by most non-US Allies has declined steadily.

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4 Source: NATO (June 2012) – estimates for 2012. Based on 2005 prices and exchange rates, US dollars. Please note that figures have been rounded off in the small pie charts.
The pie charts show that the United States’ share of Alliance defence spending has increased from 2007 to 2012. While France, Germany and the United Kingdom together represent more than 50 per cent of the non-US Allies defence spending, more recently their defence spending has come under increasing pressure. The share of the other European Allies together has fallen from 8.8 to 7.5 per cent.

In 2006, Allies agreed to commit a minimum of two per cent, as a percentage of GDP, to spending on defence. The graph below shows how Allies are performing against this NATO two per cent guideline. In 2007, only five Allies spent more than two per cent; in 2012 this number had declined to four.

![Alliance defence expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 2007 and 2012](image)

Alongside the two per cent guideline, it is also important to consider what the resources are actually devoted to, from an Alliance perspective. Allies have agreed that at least 20 per cent of defence expenditures should be devoted to major equipment spending, a crucial indicator for the pace of modernisation. The graph

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5 For all of the graphs in this chapter of the report, it should be noted that Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009 and that Iceland has no armed forces.


7 Major equipment spending includes research and development spending devoted to major equipment.
below shows that in 2012 only five Allies spent more than 20 per cent of their defence budgets on major equipment expenditure; among the 22 Allies that spent under 20 per cent in critical investment in future capabilities, nine Allies spent less than ten per cent.

Nevertheless, as shown by the next graph, the investment across the Alliance as a whole in major equipment has risen from 2003 to 2012, mainly as a result of increases in spending by the United States. Taken together, investment in major equipment by the non-US Allies has held steady – some countries have increased their investment and others have decreased.

The result of these disparities in investment is two-fold: an ever greater military reliance on the United States, and growing asymmetries in capability among European Allies. This has the potential to undermine Alliance solidarity and puts at risk the ability of the European Allies to act without the involvement of the United States. Cuts in European equipment procurement could also weaken Europe’s defence industrial base and the ability of European armed forces to remain at the cutting edge of technology.

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8 NATO (June 2012) – estimates for 2012 except CZE, FRA, HUN, SVN, ESP (2011 figures) and GBR (2010 figures)
Yet the contribution of individual Allies is not measured by defence expenditure alone. While NATO’s operation in Afghanistan has absorbed a large proportion of the Allies’ capabilities for a decade, it has also driven the modernisation of their forces. Moreover, other outstanding NATO commitments have been maintained, and principally by non-US Allies. The NATO-led operation in Kosovo, air policing and air defence of NATO’s airspace, NATO’s four standing maritime forces, and the Alliance’s high-readiness standby force (the NATO Response Force or NRF) had to be sustained with a continuous provision of forces.

There is also a third impact of declining defence expenditure within the Alliance. Looking beyond the Alliance to defence expenditures worldwide reveals that NATO’s accumulated defence spending continues to be the highest in the world. However, while in 2011 NATO still represented 60 per cent of global defence spending, the trend is steadily downward from 69 per cent in 2003. NATO’s share remains pre-eminent but may fall to 56 per cent or lower, as early as 2014, if current defence spending patterns among NATO members and other countries worldwide persist.

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Together, these three gaps could gradually compromise the Alliance’s ability to contribute to international crisis management efforts and cooperative security initiatives. Addressing these gaps has been at the centre of the Alliance’s work in 2012.

“NATO Forces 2020”

NATO needs to continue ensuring that it has all the capabilities it needs to fulfil the full range of its tasks and missions. At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, NATO leaders set the Alliance an ambitious but realistic goal: NATO Forces 2020. The objective is to have a coherent set of deployable, interoperable and sustainable forces that are equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so as to be able to meet the targets the Alliance has set itself. These Allied forces should be able to operate together, and with partners, in any environment.

Over time, Allies have made strenuous efforts to enhance the effectiveness of their contributions to NATO operations. The requirement to sustain NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan, in particular, has had a positive impact on the overall capacity of Allies to deploy and sustain an increasingly large portion of their forces at a distance from their home locations. Today, NATO as well as partner forces are much better prepared to conduct complex expeditionary operations in a challenging, unfamiliar environment. Of the 23 European Allies with armed forces, the large majority of them increased the deployability and sustainability of their land forces (18 and 17 Allies respectively) by 2010. Indeed, those 23 European Allies collectively generated 110,000 more deployable land forces in 2010 than in 2004, representing an increase of over 25 per cent. Increases in sustainable land forces over the same period were equally significant.

These improvements result from a range of measures aimed at increasing the mobility and sustainability of land forces and expanding airlift and sealift capacity to transport them on an increasingly large scale; improving the capacity of tactical fighter aircraft to deploy to, and operate from, distant airfields in austere operational conditions; and enlarging the operating area of many Allied navies.

As a result, Alliance forces today bear little resemblance to the NATO forces of two decades ago. In most cases, the armour-heavy national army corps that stood guard during the Cold War have been succeeded by multinational, rapid reaction corps combining a mix of heavier and lighter forces. Many Allied air force squadrons that were tied logistically to their home air bases are now able to deploy within days to other countries – as during Operation Unified Protector in 2011 from Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom to NATO airfields in France, Greece, Italy and Spain – or to another continent, from Europe to Afghanistan. For the first time ever, Allied navies are operating under NATO
command routinely in the western Indian Ocean as part of wider international counter-piracy efforts. The experience gained has shown that individual armed services need to maintain, or strive for, a satisfactory balance between frontline combat forces – whether land, air or maritime – and the supporting assets that enable them to operate.

NATO defence spending as a percentage of world defence expenditures\(^\text{10}\)

The foundations for NATO Forces 2020 are, therefore, in place, but must be protected at a time of unprecedented fiscal challenge. To that end, NATO is introducing a reinforced culture of cooperation through Smart Defence and the

Connected Forces Initiative and is continuing to pursue NATO-wide reforms to create leaner and more effective structures.

**Smart Defence**

*Smart Defence* is a new mindset, enabling countries to work together to develop and maintain capabilities they could not afford to develop or procure alone, and to free resources for developing other capabilities.

At the Chicago Summit, Allies agreed to take forward an initial package of 22 *Smart Defence* projects, which will deliver improved operational effectiveness, economies of scale and closer connections between NATO forces. The experience gained through these projects is expected to help build confidence in multinational cooperation on the larger-scale capabilities required by the Alliance. These projects include:

- NATO Universal Armaments Interface: a technical solution enabling different fighter jets to use munitions from various sources and countries, in order to facilitate the flexible use of munitions across the Alliance. The 2011 air operation over Libya demonstrated the importance of such a project.
- Maritime Patrol Aircraft: a multinational pool of maritime patrol aircraft, available to all the participating countries, and upon request to others as well, for a more flexible and efficient use of available assets.
- Multinational Medical Treatment Facilities: standardized modular medical facilities for multinational deployments in support of operations, which will allow countries to make the best possible use of medical assets.
- Deployable Air Activation Modules: a deployable air base will be created by pooling components required for deployable airfields in support of operations. These deployable airfields are called deployable air activation modules. The multinational pool of deployable air activation modules will be built from capabilities made available by various countries.

Since the Chicago Summit, *Smart Defence* has already produced several more projects. For these positive results to achieve lasting success, all stakeholders, including defence industry, adopt the *Smart Defence* mindset and actively promote defence cooperation. European Allies are involved in every single one of the 25 *Smart Defence* projects agreed so far and are leading around two-thirds of them. In fact, one third are purely European in terms of participation.
In addition to these Smart Defence projects, the Alliance is engaged in the implementation of three multinational programmes that have particular significance — missile defence, Alliance Ground Surveillance and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. These programmes aim to provide NATO with a state-of-the-art collective military capacity to meet emerging security threats and fill outstanding operational needs.

Source: NATO (December 2012).
Missile defence

NATO remains concerned by the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which could carry conventional as well as chemical or nuclear warheads. Building on the theatre missile defence programme aimed at protecting deployed troops, NATO leaders decided at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to expand this programme to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations and territory. At the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO leaders took a significant first step towards this goal by declaring an interim NATO ballistic missile defence capability that now offers the maximum coverage, within available means, to defend populations, territory and forces for NATO countries in Southern Europe.

NATO is working intensively to enhance its command and control arrangements, accommodating national contributions such as the US forward-based radar, US Aegis surface ships with a ballistic missile defence capability operating in the Mediterranean, as well as several assets proposed by other Allies.

At the Chicago Summit, NATO leaders also repeated their commitment to cooperate with Russia on missile defence. They reiterated that NATO’s missile defence programme in Europe is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities. They also proposed to Russia to establish two joint centres for missile defence, related to data fusion and to planning operations, and to develop a transparency regime on missile defence. Work on theatre missile defence cooperation dominated discussions and activities in 2012. In March, a NATO-Russia Council computer-assisted exercise was held in Germany, with experts from Russia and NATO countries, demonstrating that cooperation is not only possible but would also be mutually beneficial. However, more progress is needed to ensure that missile defence cooperation with Russia can reach its full potential.

Alliance Ground Surveillance

The NATO-led operation in Libya showed the importance of an airborne ground surveillance and reconnaissance capability to provide commanders a comprehensive picture of the situation in the field. For the NATO-owned and -operated Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme, 2012 has been a landmark year. On 20 May, in the margins of the Chicago Summit, a procurement contract was signed for the delivery of this capability.

While the initial core capability of five Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles and associated systems is being procured by 13 participating countries, on 3 February 2012 the North Atlantic Council also agreed that NATO common
funding will be engaged and utilised towards AGS infrastructure and satellite communications, as well as operations and support once the system becomes fully operational in 2017. Contributions in kind provided by France and the United Kingdom will complement AGS with additional surveillance systems.

This new capability will be a key component of a wider Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) capacity aimed at providing the Alliance collectively with an improved situational awareness of its security environment in support of deterrence, defence and crisis management.

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)

Providing “the right information to the right person at the right time” during a military operation is a challenging task. In 2012, a new JISR initiative was launched to help coordinate the gathering, analysis and dissemination of information. It will use information gathered by the Alliance Ground Surveillance system and other ISR assets in support of Alliance operations, integrating operations and intelligence.

This will permit the coordinated collection, processing, dissemination and sharing within NATO of ISR material, in direct support of current and future operations.

Based upon a proposal in April by eight Allies to rectify shortfalls in the JISR domain identified during operations in Afghanistan and Libya, an enduring NATO JISR capability was subsequently affirmed at the Chicago Summit as one of the Alliance’s most critical capability needs. In June, a technical trial was organised in Norway to test the connectivity of surveillance systems from 17 Allies. The findings of this trial are guiding further work on the JISR initiative that will be pursued into 2013.

The Connected Forces Initiative

The experience of operating together in Afghanistan in a demanding environment has built strong ties of interoperability and common purpose among Allies and non-NATO troop contributors. After 2014, once the ISAF mission is completed, it will be important to maintain this culture.

The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) aims to ensure the ability of forces to be able to communicate and work with each other. At the most basic level, this implies individuals understanding each other and, at a higher level, the use of common doctrines, concepts and procedures, as well as interoperable equipment. Forces also need to increasingly practice working together through joint and combined training and exercising, after which they need to standardize skills and make better
use of technology. All three aspects – communication, practice and validation – constitute the different facets of CFI. The area of C4 (Command, Control, Communications and Computers) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), which provides the glue that binds NATO forces together, is at the forefront of this work. The Connected Forces Initiative also seeks to make greater use of education, training and exercises to reinforce links between the forces of NATO member countries and maintain the level of interoperability needed for future operations.

NATO’s Command Structure
Reform NATO-wide

Reform of internal structures is an intrinsic part of the Alliance’s ongoing transformation. In 2012, the focus was on the reform of NATO agencies and the International Staff and International Military Staff. In parallel, the implementation of the reform of the military command structure continued.

The aim of the Agencies Reform, approved in June 2011, was to improve governance, effectiveness and efficiency of the services and programmes of the NATO agencies and, ultimately, to achieve savings. NATO agencies provide critical support to operations and managing the procurement of major capabilities. As a consequence, the rationalisation and consolidation of their existing functions, services and programmes into a new structure feeds into the Smart Defence initiative – more interoperable and cost-effective defence capabilities through smarter spending and enhanced cooperation.

In July 2012, in line with the reform implementation plan, the North Atlantic Council established four new NATO organisations to integrate responsibilities of the former agencies: communications and information, support, procurement and science and technology. The restructuring process will be executed in three phases over the coming two years by initially consolidating and then gradually optimising all elements that will be assumed by the new organisations. Transition measures have been put into place to ensure full continuity in service and capabilities delivery.

Implementation of the new, streamlined command structure, agreed in June 2011, took place on 1 December 2012. NATO’s Command Structure has been downsized from 11 to seven entities,\(^\text{12}\) with a 33 per cent reduction in posts.\(^\text{13}\) The new command structure is illustrated below.

As planned, the collocation of the International Staff and the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels was completed mid-2012 to improve internal working arrangements. Discussions on the overall reform of the International Staff continued with the ultimate goal of evolving towards a leaner, more flexible workforce sharply focused on NATO’s priority areas, in time for the move to the new NATO Headquarters in 2016. There have already been significant reductions in support staff in the current organisation and work is being pursued to identify further efficiency savings. At the same time, a review of the International Military Staff has been put in train. NATO also reviewed its financial

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\(^{12}\) These figures cover Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

\(^{13}\) This percentage covers the entire Command Structure: ACO, ACT and the NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency.
procedures in 2012 and identified a number of measures to improve accountabil-
ity, transparency and effectiveness.

Emerging security challenges

In 2012, NATO continued to develop a substantive role in dealing with emerg-
ing security challenges, moving from policy to the implementation of concrete
plans and activities.

Cyber defence

NATO has continued to implement its new cyber defence policy through
a comprehensive and ambitious action plan launched in October 2011. In the
spring of 2012, NATO concluded an important contract for 58 million Euros with
a consortium of private companies to significantly upgrade its unique operational
cyber defence capability, the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability
(NCIRC).

When this project is completed in the autumn of 2013 and all NATO networks
are brought under centralized protection, NATO’s ability to defend its military and
civilian networks against all types of intrusion and attack will be greatly enhanced.
NATO will also be in a better position to assist Allies and partners to detect,
defend against and recover from cyber attacks, and to deploy Rapid Reaction
Teams upon request. To further enhance its cyber defence capabilities, NATO
established a cyber threat assessment cell and held its first full-scale crisis man-
agement exercise based on a cyber defence scenario. Another annual exercise,
known as “Cyber Coalition”, was also held. It involved both Allies and partners, and
proved its worth in testing incident response and crisis management procedures.

Counter-terrorism

The Chicago Summit endorsed an updated set of guidelines for NATO’s coun-
ter-terrorism strategy and a concrete action plan will be adopted in 2013. The De-
fence Against Terrorism Programme of Work has organised exercises, field trials and
demonstrations which have helped Allies to agree common standards for route
clearance, countering improvised explosive devices and disposing of explosives
safely. NATO - Russia cooperation has moved ahead on the STANDEX project
to safeguard mass transit systems in major cities against terrorist attacks; and
NATO and Russia have organized counter-terrorism exercises and increased their
exchange of information and experience in responding to the threat of terrorism.
In the area of protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
substances, NATO has focussed particularly on the maritime dimension and the boarding and inspection of ships suspected to carry these materials.

**The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review**

One of the key outcomes of the Chicago Summit was the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. It examined in depth NATO’s ability to ensure its defence and deterrence capacity against a broad range of 21st century threats. The Review commits NATO to maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence to fulfil its commitments, as set out in the 2010 Strategic Concept. It also stipulates that Allies will continue to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The Review reaffirmed that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist – and that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective. Allies agreed to develop concepts to ensure the broadest participation in nuclear sharing arrangements, including in case NATO were to decide to reduce its reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe. Moreover, the Review stated that NATO will explore reciprocal transparency measures with Russia to facilitate a nuclear deterrence posture at the lowest levels commensurate with Allied security.

**Extending partnerships**

![Partners and non-NATO troop contributors to NATO-led operations](image)
At a time of complex and unpredictable global risks and threats, delivering security must be a cooperative effort. NATO continues to strengthen its connections with other countries and organisations around the globe, reflecting the commitment to cooperative security outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept.

In 2012, the Alliance has sought to broaden its partnerships and reinforce existing ones which could make a concrete contribution to the success of the Alliance's fundamental tasks.

_A broader range of partners_

Over the past two decades, NATO has developed a network of structured partnerships with countries across the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, as well as with other international organisations. Building on these formal partnerships, it has reached out to other partners across the globe, with which it engages in individual relationships.

Many NATO partners have made particular political, operational and financial contributions to NATO-led operations. In recognition of that, at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, NATO Allies held a meeting with the leaders of a group of 13 partner countries – Australia, Austria, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Qatar, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates.

In June, NATO and Australia signed a joint political declaration reflecting their ever-stronger ties and their determination to deepen cooperation to meet common threats. This bilateral agreement is soon to be complemented by an Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme covering existing cooperation and outlining priority areas for future cooperation. Iraq, Mongolia, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea also engaged in Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes with NATO for the first time in 2012. The full scope of NATO's broadened relations with different countries is captured in the illustration on the previous page.

Cooperation between NATO and Russia continues to be of strategic importance, as NATO and Russia share common security interests and face common challenges. Cooperation on Afghanistan has deepened, with an expansion of Russia’s support for NATO transit requirements for the ISAF mission, training of counter-narcotics officials and maintenance of Afghan army helicopters. In the field of cooperative airspace, NATO Allies and Russia have developed an initiative which allows neighbouring countries to monitor civil aircraft suspected of being hijacked by terrorists. This system reached its operational capability in December 2011. A simulated exercise called “Vigilant Skies 2012” took place on 13-14 November 2012 to test procedures and capabilities.
The Alliance’s other formal partnerships also progressed in 2012. NATO is working towards agreeing a new political framework for the *Mediterranean Dialogue* to reinforce the existing relationship between the NATO Allies and the seven partner countries which participate in this initiative. Kuwait generously agreed to host an *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative* Centre, which will help NATO deepen relations with all of its Gulf partners.

Relations with international organisations are developing at a steady pace. NATO and the United Nations enhanced high-level contacts in 2012. NATO and European Union personnel serve side by side in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan. Regular staff-level contacts are held to exchange information and avoid duplication, particularly in the area of capability development. NATO also maintains regular contacts with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and has continued to explore the possibilities for further cooperation with the African Union and other regional organisations.

*Working closely with operational partners*

One of NATO’s most important partnership achievements has been to develop the expertise for NATO and partner militaries to be able to work together and implement complex joint operations. Allies remain committed to giving operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions, from the planning through to the execution phase, of current and future NATO-led operations to which they contribute. This has been the case for the 50-nation ISAF mission and the Libya operation. It is now also taking place for the planning of the post-2014 NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, where countries that have declared their willingness to commit to a concrete and substantial contribution are already part of the planning.

*Greater cooperation in tackling security challenges*

NATO is also stepping up its engagement with partners in new areas, such as cyber security and energy security. In 2012, partners participated in the annual cyber defence exercise aimed at testing incident response and crisis management procedures. Additionally, partner participation is also growing in the area of defence institution building. The Building Integrity Programme provides tailored support to Afghanistan and countries in South Eastern Europe to help reduce the risk of corruption in the defence sector. By promoting good practice and providing practical tools, the programme is helping to strengthen transparency, accountability and ultimately, to make financial savings.
Education is a key agent of transformation and NATO is using it to support institutional reform in partner countries. The Alliance’s education and training programmes, which initially focused on increasing interoperability between NATO and partner forces, have been expanded. They now also provide a means for Allies and partners to collaborate on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defence and military domain. Defence education enhancement programmes have been set up with Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Republic of Moldova. In 2012, Iraq and Mauritania also began cooperating in this field with NATO, while Ukraine and Uzbekistan have requested assistance.

*Maintaining an open door policy*

At the Chicago Summit, NATO met with the four partners that aspire to NATO membership – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — and reiterated its commitment to taking in new members. NATO will continue work with all four to pursue the reforms necessary to meet Alliance standards.

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14 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
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